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in. the., twentieth centurt*..the..mitfd. states his

„

often been sabivelent toward economic:, social, and political
changes, which have tended to limit both the .powers of -the
business community uni entrenched* conservative*, governments,
in underdeveloped countries of Asia.* Africa* and i*stin
America*- While the united states has professed belief in
self-determination for all nations# its actions have often'
indicated support for oppressive regimes for the sake of
maintaining stability*

Beginning in 1933 with the words of

Branklin Delano Roosevelt* s Inaugural Address and followed
'by -the deeds of the united states after the Montevideo
Conference in December# 1,933* the United states professed
a policy of cooperation* friendships equality with the nations
of Batin America# -and non-interference in their internal
affairs*
the tooehatebs of -this ‘‘Good Neighbor11 pollof was the
relationship of the United states to the Republic of Cuba
in 1933 and 19.34*. Aithoughif may legitimately be argued
that the Good neighbor .policy began under Hoover or even

Coolidf

Jiot until 1933 that.,the.
..events „..,ef.a .serious
i‘

-

J

revolution infubU' which.had.been..brewing.. since.,1931,.and
a„.dsbsrmliied ..policy, of friendship and mutual frfsf,.by the
.
toltsi.,States ,ars...hurled together*.
.,fpr tfte j^tseyeit
*
adminiairafion* the Good Neighbor policy' had -t# succeed in
Cuba by avoiding intervention, displaying friendship, and
demounttoting a desire to see Cuba settle its own problems. the purpose of this study is be-- sramine in detail the
dSplotofio relationship of the United states and. Cuba in
this trying period of nearly 'two years*
fhe emphasis of this study is upon -toe dichotomy created
by the United States trying earnestly to promote the Good
Neighbor policy while at toe same- time eKhibiting an un~
willingness to- allow complete sel^determinafeion by promoting
a stable and .conservative government,

the study proceeds only

through M M because, by that time* although toe- Good
Neighbor policy continued, it had had its effect upon toe

Republic of Cuba and the relationship between toe two countries
had been established In a ;pattern which would etotinu# until
the. Castro revolution*

In addition, after 1934 there is a

void in toe amount of -primary source material available*
there has been a great deal written about- euba since
toe downfall of fulgenclo Batista in 19S8.

very little,

however, has been written about the events of if33**Mt; which
ill

Pf0ylde;an

the background,for ■
•the,_Iff0, ,-i,.
have^ been,only two,extensive;.studies

of .pa|#a*^aieflean,.jpel&tlens^&ur^

one is, ..

I^ssell B».ffitseibbonVs Cobaand the united,..States, 1900*
•u ,

r

19II*.: fhls booh#;,published,.in, 1935, is; a’thorough, study ..,,
-of ;the:..twentieth .^entistf'.an^, inelndea^..
a ..e^iiside^jie^a^wti of -information on the 1933^34 .period*.
Pie, author -did net.* ■however,,have access to government
deev^ents :Siic^?as':the 44pld«tl0-ee^es#0hdeh^e.*. ;there ,
is, then*; .a, need:for a etu^r which includes documentation
other than information issued-by the^|ie|>ai;«meiit-o# fiate- ■■-■
to fhd pressv fhe-ether is iohe#t,f#. Smith'1s;f^hl.ished; •
dissertatioh.eiititieii Ihe -felted..States and oabat .Business
and ■.ninlcmsav...-.i f 19,60* While,.it ■is,perhaps.a- moire -vale* ■
able,.work- than ^itsfihhon^s* Smith .concentrates onvfrade
relations- and.JUaeriesn investments ■in Cuba*

where he does

deal with- diplomacy* his interpretation of several- Oepart*
meat- of ■state documents is open '-to question# •
■the writing of this thesis .hasvheen aided'in various :-:
way# by. others-*,. l take full- responsibility^ -however*- for
any errors, in the factual .material, contained herein 'and-for
any misinterpretations of -the ■sources*•■ i- would especially'
like t#...thank my adviser, nr*. Paul
iv

iu

-..Seek oIi;the University

of ©mha/. ief'his ,'eriooa^ageittent:,/advice.*...a M «iticism.\;.._;;.
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CmPTER I
THB RIGHT TO IMTERVEiJE, 1898-1933
The Congress of the United states, by Joint Resolution
on 18 April, 1898, asserted in what was to become Known as the
Teller Amendments
That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition
or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or
control over said island /Cuba/, except for the pacifi
cation thereof, and asserts its determination, when that
is accomplished, to leave the government and control
of the island to its people#* '
Upon receiving word of the Joint Resolution, signed by
the President on 20 April, the Spanish government broke off rela
tions with the United states.

On 25 April, President McKinley

asked for and received a declaration of war#2
On 1 February 1899, following the termination of hostilities
between the United States and Spain,

in order to ready the

Cuban people for self-government and in spite of the Teller

1U.S., Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1898,
XXXI, Part 4, 3954.
2U.S., Conoresslonal Record. 55th Cong., 2nd sess., 1898,
XXXI, Part 5, 4228-9.
1

2-

Amendment, the governing of Cuba came under the authority of
the President of the United States acting-through his repre
sentative in Cuba# Major-General John R. Brooke*

Within a

short time, Brooke was replaced by Major-General Leonard
Wood whose administration of two years and five months was
noted for improving sanitary conditions and public health
facilities, the improvement of the education system, the
building of new roads, and reforms in municipal government.3
Although Cuban leaders were generally satisfied with
wood's administration, there was some agitation that the
United States grant complete independence*

Because of the

growing hostility and in keeping with the promise of the
Teller Amendment, General Wood, acting on directions from
Washington, issued an order on 25 July 1900 for the election
of delegates to frame a constitution for the island*

General

Wood's order also called upon the Cubans to,"* . *;provide for
and agree with the Government of the United States upon the
relations to exist between that Government and the Government
of Cuba."4

■Russell■H. Fiiisgibbon, Cuba and the United States, 19001935 (Hew Yorks Russell & Russell, Inc., 1935)# pp. 30-66*
Cosme de la Torriente, "The Platt Amendment," Foreign Affairs,
VIII, No. 3 (April, 1930), 364*
^Charles E. Chapman, A History of the Cuban Republics A
Study in Hispanic American Politics (Hew Yorks The Macmillan
Company, 1927), pp. 131-32.
\

The result of the convention, which met in November, 1900#
was a constitution closely modeled after that of the United
States.

Although there was some apprehension that the Consti

tution would not he accepted by the united States* Secretary
of War' Elihu Root, in charge of matters concerning the military
supervision of Cuba, did not object.

He had, however, personal

misgivings about a few of the provisions.

The Cuban Constitu

tion did not provide a framework for future relations with the
United States and did not contain features which would trans
fer the obligations assumed by the United states under the
Treaty of Paris for the protection of life, liberty, and
property, to the Cuban government*

§

'

American statesmen and members of Congress, believing
there existed a "special" relationship between Cuba and the
United state© because of the Treaty of Paris, were unwilling
to accept the Cuban Constitution without some provision for
this relationship.

Harry F. Guggenheim, who became Ambassador

to Cuba during the Hoover administration, ©aid that our states
men were, ”. . . fearful of the political inexperience of a
country only 100 miles from our shores#"

He also believed

that these men were looking forward to a time when the United
States would have vital financial interests on the island#
these considerations in mind, they proceeded to develop a

5lbid.. pp. 134-5.

With

political relationship which was, %
sovereign state©*"

* .unique between two

s

.
• .This relationship found-- formal;expression- in a* series •
of provisions# attached to the Army Appropriation Bill of 2
■Harch, lB0.lv!known as. the Platt Amendments, which were to be--' '
■
unbodied in the Cuban Constitution as well, as in-a permanent
.treaty between'1the -two ;nations.-- Article ill- ofthe Platt *
Amendment is most important for it states;

-

■.The Government of1Cuba- consents-!that the' United
States may exercise the right to intervene for
the preseirvation of Cuban independence, the'-"
maintenance of a government adequate for the
protection of life, property, and individual <
liberty, and for discharging the obligations with
. respect to Cuba imposed by -the Treaty of Paris on
the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken
by the Government of Cuba*®
The Platt Amendment, representing the viewpoint of the
administration and drafted primarily by secretary ■of War Elihu
Boot# was strongly defended by Senator Orville H. Platt of
Connecticut,'Who introduced-the amendments, when he said.

%arry P. Guggenheim, ^Amending'’-the Platt Amendment, "
Foreign Affairs, XXI, Ho* 3 (April, 1934), 448.
%.S., Congressional .accord, 56th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1901,
XXX!V, Part 3, 2954. For a complete text of the treaty, see
Appendix X•

”i believe 'it'will settle:what ■may be- called the ■Cuban ■question
satisfactorily to the people of Cuba and satisfactorily to our
own people# *'9 ■

1 -

:1 :

:: 1''

:•!■■■

■‘•Following :a ■brief'debate on:the' Platt;jyendmerits'in ■'the
■senate- on *27 February#in -which;little 'Opposition was incurred,
■that body ■passed -the measures by a vote" of *forty-three ■
'to 1
■twenty# with twenty-five not voting.-

• On 1 March#" the-House

engaged in a :more -'prolonged 'debate 'but"' finally accepted ■the:
11
measures'by a vote of 15$ to -134* ■■ The following-day,
President McKinley signed the Army impropriations Act contain^
ing the -amendments which wore to become much more significant
than the. original'bill*^
To a-majority of the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention# however# the Platt Amendment was thought to be a
very unsatisfactory document.• in an-effort to placate their
misgivings#- Governor Wood conveyed to them a cablegram- from
Secretary of War Boot.

The message# addressed to;Wood, -statedt

®Guggenheim# -Foreign Affairs,- XII. 368. ,
^%.S., Congressional Record, 56th Cong.# 2nd Sess., 1901#
3G0Ciy# 'Part 4#';3037-42, 3146# 3148.- ■
^Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United ..States,' p. 79.
l^U.S.-, Congressional Becord,. 56th Cong., 2nd Sess•, 1901,
XXXIV, part 4, 2954.

.6

You are authorised to state officially that in the
view of the President the intervention described in
the third clause of the Platt amendment is not
synonymous with intermeddling or interference with
the affairs of the Cuban Government, but the formal
action of the Government of the United States, based
upon just and substantial grounds,, for the preservation
of Cuban independence, and the maintenance of a govern*
ment adequate for the protection of life, property, and
individual liberty* and adequate for discharging the
obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty
of Paris on the United States.^
Not satisfied with this' explanation, the Convention, on
13 April 1901, voted to send a committee, headed by Or* Meades
Capote, to Washington to learn in detail American attitudes
regarding future Cuban-United■states relations * After con*
ferring with the President, Secretary Root, members of the
Cabinet, and members of congress from 24 April until 6 May,
the committee returned to Havana. In regard to Article ttt
of the Platt Amendment, Secretary Bsot had assured the Cubans
that, "Intervention in Cuban affairs will be resorted to only
in ease of great disturbances, similar to those which occurred
in 1098, and with the sole and exclusive object of maintaining
Cuban independence unimpaired.

The Secretary of War went

^Report of Leonard Wood,, Military Governor of CUba
(November 27, I90I)., Annual Reports .of War .Department for
fiscal year ended June 30, 1901, pp. 7, 48, quoted in U.S.,
Foreign Relations of .the .United states, .193.3,, V# The Amer*
lean Republics (Washingtont U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), 283.
la Torriente, Foreign.. Affairs,.VIII, 370.

7
still further when he stated;
Intervention will only take place to- protect the
independence .of the Cuban' Republic from foreign attack#
or when a veritable-‘.sfate-of- anarchy agists within
the, republic* intervention always and in all- cases
would be ■in favor, of'independence* even- should/' it
arise, from some .serious, failure*.on the- part-' of, the-:.
Cubans to ’-form their- -governments The "Third- Clause *
is equally binding upon the-,United states to respect
and preserve, the Independence-of Cuba.is
Senator Platt upheld the Root interpretation of the Amendment
when he said;
* * * the Amendment was carefully worded* *. . to avoid"
any thought that acceptance of it by the Constitutent
Assembly,would tend to- establish-S'protectorate or a
suzerainty, or any formqf middling with the independence
or sovereignty of Cuba*^6
After the return of the committee to Cuba, debate
continued throughout May on whether or not the convention
should accept the Platt Amendment as a part of the Cuban
constitution.

Chi 28 May, the convention finally agreed to

accept the Amendment when the president of the Convention cast
the deciding vote*

Although the exact reasons of the delegates
i ■

.

who voted for acceptance are unclear* if is thought that a
vague promise from the United states on a reciprocal trade
agreement may have been a deciding factor*

lsIbid.
16JSM«» P* 371.

The acceptance of

the Amendment was, however, qualified as the delegates
imposed their own interpretation of some of the provisions*
When President McKinley and his advisors disapproved of the
acceptance with reservations, Wood, informed the delegates
that acceptance had to he unqualified*

Finally, on 12 June

■i7
1001* the convention agreed to approval without reservation#
A treaty incorporating the,amendments, as provided for
in Article VXII of the Piatt Amendment* was eventually-'signed
at Havana oh 22 .May 1902V

Hatifications 'were not exchanged'*'

until 1 July 1904'#^®' ■:Xbe:treaty thus" placed1in -'effect- was
to remain'in force-until modified/’ rescinded* or'-replaced

19 By accepting1

by the mutual consent of the’two countries#""'

the terms of the treaty# the Government of Cuba.had, in fact#
permitted intervention in her affairs#'

Ostensibly# it-was for

the purpose of guaranteeing the absence of such intervention
that the treaty was signed#
Article ill of the .Platt Amendment was officially invoked
twice in the next thirty' years*

When a political controversy

^Fitssgltobon# Cuba and .the.United states * p. 85*
Wxbta.
190,S,, Congressional Record. 56th Con?.. 2nd Sess.«
1901, XXXIV, Part 3, 2954.

threatened;‘
American property „in 1906, the'American consul:
General* Frank steinhart, requested intervention*

"Theodore

BooseveIt was reluctant to send troops 'and instead sent a
■.commission headed-by William Howard Taft to attempt mediation
of the dispute*' When President Tomas Estrada Palma and-his
cabinet resigned in September* however, Taft proclaimed him
self provisional governor and American ships and troops were
ordered"to the island.^

Charles £• Magoon succeeded Taft

as provisional governor and served in that capacity until
January, 1909 when the intervention was ended*

21

In 1917, an armed revolt was begun against the government
of President Mario Garcia Menocal,- -the insurgents claiming
that the government was violating their constitutional rights*
After a period of vacillation on its course of action, the
United States Department of State took a firm stand in support
of the -Menocal government. ■ The chief basis for this support
was the Wilson policy of recognising only those governments
which had achieved power by constitutional means,

when reports

began to arrive in the united States claiming that the rebels
were burning sugar-cane in oriente- Province# the United States

2®The best account of the intervention from 1906-1909
may'be found in Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United States, pp.
112-144.
^Kobert F. Smith, The United States and. Cuba.,s. Business
and ..Diplomacy1917-1960* (Mew York* Bookman Associates*. I960),
p. 25.

_

■

10

landed .a force of 220. marines .at ■Guantanamo on 26 February*
subseguently, several, hundred more were landed at Santiago
de Cuba and at other strategic? centers-. During March, the
United.States reiterated its support.lor'the .Menocal; govern*;
ment and denied reports that it was even in communication .
with the rebels*;

By April, 'the.;insurrection had, subsided

and by £ut*e>*had .been entirely quelled*

...

22

Following World War I, American investments in Cuba,
began to expand rapidly-

Although there had. been some

investment by Americans in sugar and to a lesser extent.in
■tobacco and‘minerals during the colonial period* a phenomenal
Increase in investment was noted after 1917 when Bethlehem
Steel Corporation* the United Fruit Company, the American
Tobacco Company*, the Cuban*American Sugar Company* and
several other large corporations# including banks such as the
Chase National Bank# established themselves on the island-

It

is estimated, that American investment in Cuba increased 540 per

22

—

On the 1917 intervention, see
intervention Possible
Under the Platt Amendment*11 M-V- Timgs, February 12, 1917, p. 9
”!?*$.*. Offers .Arms, to .President. Menocal*" H-Y-Times, February. 14,
1917, p* If H.Y. Times, February 20, .1917, p. 1? H-V. Times,
February 25* 1917, 111*1; ’-'Admiral 'Mayo Ordered by President
Wilson to protect U.S. Citizens, Marines Sent to Town Hear
Guantanamo,'* H.V. Times, March 1, 1917, p- 12; H-Y- Times,
March 17, 1917* p- Bt -H-Y.-. .'Times- May 21, 1917*. p- 10?
Fitzgibbon* Cuba and the United states - pp- IS3-16Q-

cent In the years between lilt and 1928#

After 1920, when

the price of sugar dropped sharply M m m a high of 22.5 cents
a pound in 1922 to 1.6 cents a year later#, the American banks
which held the defaulted loans began to enter 'the sugar industry
on a large ■scale#

%%

tn the 1'924 Cuban presidential election* at the height
of American investment in Cuba, official Cuban- opposition to
the Platt Ju&endment. began* •although the incumbent* Alfredo
Eayas* sought re-election# he had/made a one*bem pledge*
Secause- of his unparalleled nepotism and personal use of the
public treasury* however, he was thoroughly discredited * the
Conservatives nominated former President Mario- oarcia Menocal
after the unstable conservative alliance of 1924# She national
league* had disintegrated#

Menocal* however* enjoyed little

more support than iayas because of the hostility he had aroused
during his' years as. President prior to 1917#

the Mberal

candidates were -Colonel Caries Mendieta* who made the tactical
error of campaigning for the nomination on a platform of co^
operation with the United States at a' time when anti-American
.feeling was beginning to run high* ahd-©eaerai ferardo Machado
y Morales* who capitalised upon his stand against the Platt

2%yatt MaeCaffey and Clifford R* Barnett, :^wentieth
Century Cu^at.. the Background ...of..the..Castro. Revolution, (garden
City* M.#ir*I ’{ Anchor Books* Boubleday and Co*#- 196$}'* pp* 2 1 2 -4 3 .

Amendment. Machado won the party nomination# and with it#
the election*

Machado carried every province in the nation

except Pinar del Rio* a traditional center of conservative
strength.24

Although .Eayas had exhibited some strong anti*-0nited
States sentiment while in office# his attitudes -were mild in
comparison with those of Machado.

Two and a half years before

his election* Machado stated publicly%
The Platt Amendment does not* . . . entail a limitation
upon our independence or upon our sovereignty. . . #
The hour has come for our people. . . to restore
and reestablish the original meaning of the Platt
Amendment and. make it an organ without functions* a
dead**letter law* that can be laid away in the tomb#
a relic among the annals of our sovereignty and
independence*
X have always thought that the Platt Amendment
does not reserve* concede or authorise to the govern*ment of the united States any intermeddling In our
domestic affair©#25
After his election, however* Machado’s denunciations of
the United states were no longer as outspoken as those of other
batin Americans*

Jesus Semprum, for example# had characterised

.Americans in 1918 as* M. * * rough and obtuse Calibans* swollen
by brutal appetites# the enemies of all idealisms* furiously

^Fits^ibboh* Cuba and the United States* p. 184
25S1 Dia, May 9, 1922* quoted in Fitsgibbon, Cuba
and the United States* p. 185#

13
enamored, of: the- dollar. Insatiable gulpers of whiskey and
sauaages***swiit, overwhelmtog.r fierce, clownish*
While. Machado continued to denounce the Onited States to.
tempered statements, be intended only to arouse Cubans and
not seriously to antagonize the United states*
Machado's cautious approach to the problem of the Platt
Amendment was reflected in an article written b y .Rafael *u
Altunacra for Current History in 1927* ; Speaking for the
Machado government, Aitunaga, the Counselor of the Cuban
Bmbassy to Washington, explained that the requirements of the
Platt Amendment had all been met by the Cubans, i.e., good
sanitation facilities and fiscal responsibility*

All that

remained of the Permanent Treaty of' any consequence, he said,
t

was the intervention clause*.

Altunaga then praised- toe

United States for never having intervened in Cuba for' selfish
reasons and because' even when intervention had taken place
it was with the greatest reluctance*

he argued further -that

the existence of the treaty only served to humiliate the
i

l« *

4

Cuban people and dishonor the nation*

He believed the world

26jgsus Semprum, ”El Norte y el Sur, ** Cultura Venezolana,
Caracas, I (November and December, 1918), 137,, quoted to Donald
Marquand Dozer, Are We Good Neighbors ? Three Decades of InterAmerican Delations, 1930«*196D (Gainesville* University of
Florida Press, 1959), p* 4*

considered ;the ‘inland '
•as:semi^lhdependent and a protectorate
of* the' United -States* ‘if a 1situation *-were to arise'’-in- Cuba
in'which. life and .property were'destroyed by civil-disorder,
the'Chited'States ■would not*need the Piatt Amendment for the
Wdrid'■would '-expect'‘intervention in "'the name'of humanity and
morality* ■
k

in speaking of. Machado'1's position, he said: ;—

‘'Confronted:by this"situation,'' *
!V
* Machado *;the '*
real reoonstruetor of the Cohan republic, -a warm
and admiring friend of the United states, convinced
of the need of mutual intelligence and cooperation
to'•Solve many problems -which -affect both ■nations" in
equal measure, insists more and more on the necessity
ofabolishing the PlattAmendment.28

W e contention1that Machado was tarring to keep‘Cubans dis
turbed about the'' Platt Amendment and yet not antagonize the
United States 1is well'supported:,

While Machado again -■'

denounced the Platt Amendment ih his 1028 campaign for reelection, the legislature/'whichrhe dominated,:'''in that year refused to strike the Platt Amendment1from the Cuban Constitution.

27 Rafael ■Rodriquez 'Altunaga, ■“Cuba *s Case for ■the ■Repeal
of the Platt Amendment? The Views of President Machado,*'
Current History, HXVX* Ho* 6, -(September, 1927)*, .926* ..
28Ibid., p. 927-.
J
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2%itzglbbon, -Cuba'and the United states* p. 185,

Following Machado's re-election, in 1928, the,, falling
price of sugar was paralleled by deteriorating political
conditions*^®

Poor economic conditions and an increasingly

oppressive government helped to create political agitation
led primarily by three political parties to which were added
other semi-political groups*

The orthodox or non-cooperating

conservatives were led by former President Menocal? the
opposition wing of the liberal■party was oftentimes referred
to as the Miauelistas and was headed by Miguel Mariano Gomez.
'The other major opposition force was the Union Nacionalista
which, while not formally recognized as a political party,
functioned as such and was led by Carlos Mendleta. 31 After
1931, another opposition group gained in prominence.

This

was the A*B.C. (Authentic Cuban Revolutionary Party),

The

idealistic A.B.C. was strongly supported by students after
president Machado closed Havana University indefinitely in
1929.

The closing of the University was an effort to end

the opposition to his regime coming from that center of

3°The problem of the interrelationship of the economic
situation and political unrest will be dealt with more fully
In a discussion of the reciprocal trade program of 1934 in
Chapter IV,
3^Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the united States, pp. 190-191.

m
perennial'discontent.#

While the A,B.C. often resorted to

terroristic methods^ it-was perhaps -the most constructive
of; the opposition groups for it had-developed an extensive
program for social,- economic, ’-and -political- reforms*^- ■
Another group of importance which opposed the Machado
government-after the mid-1920's was the Cuban Communist party
which had been founded in 1925*

OUrlhg the 1920‘s i t con

centrated on establishing "front11 organizations of which the
Anti-Imperialist league was the most important*' The Communist
party -was active, for example, in denouncing .the Pan-American
Conference held: in Havana in 1928 andin publishing an illegal
weekly newspaper- entitled, El Communists. The Communists' •■
were-.also active in the Workers* Trade Union' Movement. (M.s»£u).
They organized revolutionary factions’■In many of:the -trade
unions including'-those of' the railwayman, the textile workers,
and-the-tobacco workers,

'They were also influential''in the

formation of the ■national CUban Workers'* Confederation which
had been established in 1924;by-anarchist**syndicaiist'groups.
It was not until after 1930, however, that they had become
3

3

,

..

well enough established to threaten Machado*

^international Commission of Jurists, Cuba and the
Rule- of &aw (Geneva• international Commission of'Jurists, *
1962), p. 2 8 r Hew York Times. July 23, 1933, VIII, 4? Carleton
Beals* The ,
Crime of. Cuba (Philadelphia!' J.B. Lippincott
Company, 1933), pp. 309-11,
3^International Commission of Jurists, Cuba and the
Mule of law, p, 31*

Although a condition of anarchy, was rapidly developing
in Cuba,, a ^hanging .attitude in the, United. States forestalled..
any direct intervention,

The Coolidge administration, although

indicating a slight modification, of American policy,had in-*
sisted that the, property of United states nationals, anywhere
in the world, was a part of America*stdomain*

34

This

attitude* charged Sumner Welles, who would become Ambassador
to Cuba in 1933, did nothing but create an unfortunate attitude toward the United States throughout South America* 35

in

Latin America, the Coolidge administration's position was
perhaps most ably criticised by the Mexican nationalist
Isidro Fabela in 1926 when he said, "Every dollar that crosses
our frontiers not only has stamped on its reverse the North
American Eagle but carries also in, its hard soul the flag of
the stars and stripes, which is today the most imperialistic
in the world."36
34Harry Hersh Shapiro, "The United states and the Principle
of Absolute nonintervention in Latin America with Particular Refer
ence to Mexico" {Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept, of Political
Science, University of Pennsylvania), p. 141; Sumner Welles, The
Time for Decision (Mew Yorks Harper & Bros* Publishers, 1944),
p. 189i This is a valuable source for comparing Welles's comments
with his telegrams to the Department of state while he was Ambassa
dor to Cuba in 1933* The two sources do not always agree,
•^Welles, The Time for Decision,

pp

. 188-89.

36Bxcelsior, Mexico City, 1927, reprinted in Cuadernos
Americanos* LXXXY, (January and February, 1955), pp. 56-60,
quoted in Dozer, Are We Good Neighbors?, p. 4.

Soon after ,hi& inauguration in 1929, president, Hoover
began a moderate and restrained retreat from the. policy of
intervention in Latin America,

secretary of State Henry

L. Stimson, for- example, insisted that the retention of
United states .brines in Nicaragua was to protect lives, not
necessarily property* ■As Harry. H* Shapiro states*v
Hoover recognized that when .the United States had
acted 'as trustee for other nation© in the hemisphere#
■particularly the weaker,.:geographically adjacent
nations' to the south, hostilities had developed which
redounded fa the disadvantage of the stronger, rather
than the weaker natlon*37
While Hoover and Stimson had recognized the seriousness of
the Cuban situation in October, 1930, they maintained that
the United States ought not intervene by force to protect
the property of American citizens in foreign countries*

in

addition, the United States should not land troops to maintain
an incumbent administration unless complete anarchy were
threatened*,

the Hoover administration retreated still further

when Hoover and stimson abandoned the practice, initiated by
Woodrow Wilson, of withholding diplomatic recognition from
■.

.

• '

3 0

Latin American governments which had achieved power by revolt*

^Shapiro, "The United States'-and won intervention,11 p* 141.
3®Julius W. Pratt, Cordell Hull. 1933*44, Vol. XII of
.The American secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy* ed * .Robert
H* Ferrell {Hew Yorks Cooper Square publishers, Inc., 1964),
p. 1391 Samuel Flagg Bernis, The Latin American Policy of the
United. States {Hew York*- Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943), p. 280*
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foreign policy was mafcatnorphiBea further wWen .tihe ...
r

t

Department of State published, in'1930, Memorandnm..on .the
Monroe Doctrine, which had been prepared two years earlier
by the Solicitor of the state Department# or* Reuben Clark.
Although the document repudiated the Roosevelt Corollary to
the Monroe Doctrine, .the basis for justification of inter**
ventfon in Latin America since 1904, it did not entirely
eliminate the possibility of intervention*

Clark stated:

• . * the Monroe Doctrine is not an equivalent for
1self-preservation* and therefore the Monroe Doctrine
need not, indeed should not# be invoked in order to
cover situations challenging our self-preservation
but not within the terms defined by Monroe*s declara
tion* Ihese other situations may be handled/ and
more wisely so, as matters affecting the national
security and .self-preservation of the 0. S. as a
world power. ^9
Most of Latin America seemed, however, to be optimistic
about the course of American foreign policy as evidenced by
the Clark Memorandum. DaFrensa, the leading newspaper of
Buenos Aires declared on 3 May 1931, that Hoover's policy,
%

* . constitutes a decisive step toward bettering the relations

between the U. $. and Central America and toward the consolida
tion of continental c o n f i d e n c e * I n the absence of any

3%. (Reuben Clark, Memorandum on. the.Monroe Doctrine,
Department of State publication No. 3? (Washington:.U.S. Govern
ment Printing Office, 1930), p. xxi.
4®ba. Prensa .(Buenos Aires) , May 3, 1931# Rioted in Poser,
Are. We Good Neighbors?, ■p . 13*.

20
specific „ act©.of.good will to reinforce the, ghange,in_ „
the..direction of..policy#, however#- there continued- to be a good
; d«laX'of1Criticism directed toward the United States*

El Piarlo

llustradg of Santiago Chile ■criticised the economic .power of
the United states and ©aid it# “. ♦ * is a''colossus whose
financial might has no equal in history*"41

Dr* Carlos

■Saavedra'Lama1of Argentina characterised the United States
as' the ’"gendarme fabuloso"42 and a liberal leader in Nicaragua
charged that the'United States -was' trying'to establish ah
"imperialistic hegemony" in Latin. America.*^2
The increasing violence in Cuba, and the oppressive
*

measures taken by Machado to combat it, led such prominent
Cubans as 'Cosine de ia Torriente to comment' Upon the useless
ness of the Platt Amendment* .Writing' in Foreign'Affairs. in
1930, he expressed the idea that while the Piatt Amendment
had restricted the sovereignty of .CUba and reduced it to a.

-^ E l Dlario liustrado,(Santiago, Chile), dune 26, 1930,
quoted in Poser, Are .We Good Neighbors?, p* 7.
42La Naclon, (Buenos Aires).#, .dune 1, 1931, .quoted in
Poser, Are.We Good'.Neighbors?, o* 7*.
43Francieco J. Medina, Managua, Nicara?ua,May %, i930,
"Memorandum on present. Conditions, in Nicaragua.," ■:enclosure in
I*B. Sutton, Chairman, Finance.Committee 'Rotary international,
to secretary of state, .August 2.4, 1930, Department of-state
Archives',"Washington# Rioted in Poser, Are We Good Neighbors?,
,p. 4.

position,of ,a .United states protectorate,.., the rights.given
to. the ;
united States..by ftbe-Fe*m^nen.t Treaty...had, done nothing
to, prevent revolutions, Insure, constitutional rights,, and
maintain stable government*

on the.contrary,, he'argued*

The possibility of American intervention has been
exploited by unscrupulous politicians for selfish
purposes * * * occasionally fo, .destroy a .goodgovernment, and now and then to strengthen govern
ments which * * « violate the Constitution,^
'■Prominent Americans were also arguing •during this time
for more decisive'change in our philosophy toward Latin .
America.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt articulately expressed

this attitude in. 1928,

Roosevelt, however, had not.always

been anti-imperialist.

During the years he spent as Assistant

Secretary of the Navy, in the Wilson administration he
exhibited a strongly paternalistic attitude toward the Caribbean
nations*

It appears he would have favored the acquisitign

of. additional territory and' the.maintenance of stable government through armed intervention.

45

Within- a decade his *

attitude had changed considerably*^ :tn an article, written.-

4^de la Torriente, Foreign A f f a i r s VIII,'374-75*
^Foster Rhea Dulles and Gerald E. Redinger, "The AntiColonial Folicies of Franklin D* Roosevelt, “ Political .Science
Quarterly. LXX (March, 1955), 2.
4%±Ilard Range, Franklin.D* .Roosevelt1s World Order
(Athensi University of Georgia Press, 1959), p* 53.
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for pore ion. Affairs# .he stated?

.. , . ....

fh© time has cpme when. we must .accept not, .9nly._ ,.
eerta in...facts Bat .many new prinefples.of,a higher
law* a. newer„and better standard in international
relations* We are exceedingly jealous of our own
sovereignty and it is only right that we should
respect a similar feeling among other nations.
Single handed intervention by us.in the internal
affairs of other nations must end? with the coopera
tion of others we shall have more order in this
hemisphere.and less dis1Ike *47
She shifting of .American policy away from intervention
(at least unilateral action) and the movement toward a strict
adherence to the Boot Interpretation of the' Platt Amendment
was clearly seen during 1931 and 1932 * When disorder in
Cuba culminated in a near full-scale revolution in August#

1931, Acting Secretary of state, William R. castle, stated
(10 August 1931) that the United States was not contemplating
sending troops to Cuba,

the purpose of the United States, he

said, was to avoid any armed intervention*

Under the Boot

Interpretation, he explained, only complete anarchy would
justify direct action*4®

Apparently, the Soever, administration

was at this time making a careful distinction between internal
disorder and anarchy*

In attempting to maintain strict

47Franklin Delano Roosevelt, "Our Foreign Policys A
Democratic View,1* Foreign Affairs. VI, Wc /4 (iluly, 1928),
584-85.
4%.y« Times, August II, 1931, p. 8,

neutrality, idiO United; state# did .not.even.go.,as _far as.,to..,place
}
an.arms /•embargo on.Cuba £n-favor'of ■the duly 'elected , albeit
oppressive, Machado government.

49

41though the Machado government was successful'in putting
down the insurrection; of 1931, thecuban political scene
continued tense throughout 1932'as 'Machado'suspended''all
constitutional, guarantees,.declared martial law, resorted,to
the use of military tribunals, instead of civil courts, imposed
strict censorship of the press, and brutally assassinated or
CA
imprisoned his political opponents.
These efforts were
unsuccessful in ending the campaign of terror being waged by
his opposition*

As the new year of 1933 began, the disorder
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in Cuba was increasing and the administration in Washington,
with only two months remaining of Hoover's term, was seemingly
unwilling to act*

^%itsgibbon, Cuba, and..the United states, p. 193*
‘
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5°7XI. 37/178a, The Secretary of State (Cordell Hull) to
the Appointed Ambassador la Cuba (Welles), Washington, May 1,
1933, U.S. department of State, .Foreign Relations of...the .United
States* ,Diplomatic Papers, :1933V"1■Vol, V*■:The'American Republics
(Washingtons U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 202,

empmm xi
momxm m&zmxmt

ahmMa^axsgos^,

1933

Throughout January ana February, while it was reported
that the United states was supplying Machado with aircraft#*’
the activities of the United States government in trying to
bring peace to the troubled island were limited to friendly
negotiations*

These were carried out between the United

states Ambassador in Cuba, Marry F. Guggenheim and the
Cuban secretary of State, Orestes Ferrara, and between the
State Department in Washington and the CUban Charge d 1 Affaires,
Mr* Baron.

When the United states mentioned reports of

political atrocities committed by the Machado regime or
complained about the strict censorship being imposed upon
the press, spokesmen for .Machado replied by claiming ignorance
of.any such conditions.

Cuba assured the. United States that .

most reports coming to the American Embassy were false and that

Times. February 13, 1933, p. 6.
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if anything such as had been reported had actually occurred,,
the tilted States could be assured that no additional murders
■would be committed and that .censorship would be eased#

During

the last few days of the Hoover administration# the Cuban
government was not nearly so willing to deny the conditions
prevailing on the island and# instead# concentrated upon
claiming ■it- was:impossible :to deal with' the'opposition and '
that drastic 'measures therefore' had- to" be taken.2

..... .

The unwillingness' of the United States' Department'of
State and the administration' to act positively to bring peace
to the island brought comments in the United States Congress.
Most active in criticising the administration were senator
William E. Borah of Idaho and Representative Hamilton Fish#
3'
Jr. of Hew York.
Congressman Fish# in particular* thought
.

,

that if the President would not act# perhaps Congress could
force him to.

Although he did not urge direct intervention#

on" 12' January 1933# Representative Fish introduced a con*
current resolution in the House of'Representativesurging

2U.S.' Department
- of .the
of State# Foreign .Relations
United Statesi Diplomatic Papers, 1933. Vol.- Vs The
American; Republics (Washingtons - U.S. Government Printing
Office# 1952), pp. 270^74.
3U.S.# Congressional Record. 72nd Cong.# 1st Bess.#
1932 # o t V# part 7# 7874.

both the appointment of a "strong" ambassador to Cuba and the
Use’o f ‘the good' offidea of the 'President to -bring about !a ■
peaceful' settlement of the Cuban situation.^ ''Shortly after
the:Hoover-'administration had left 'office# 'Representative
Fish discussed the Cuban problem with Dr.' Ernest H. Gruening
of The.nation before a meeting -of 'the 'Foreign Policy Association.
They agreed' the United' states should-not resort'to armed inter*
vention. Instead;' they believed diplomatic pressure should
be-used against'Machado and'that'there should perhaps be aCongressional investigation of the relationships between
American banking firms and the Machado government.

They-’

argued that only after such an investigation could the United
States determine a proper course of action'for rehabilitating
Ctiba.9
On 4 'May.#' Congressman fish'brought'these ideas-onto'the
floor of the House.

He charged the Hoover administration with

having' evaded its responsibility'' and -■obligations' :under- 'the
Platt Amendment to end the 'terrorism ‘in Cuba*. ■ He also charged

4u;s;, Congressional Record/ 73rd Cone., 1st Jess..# 1933#
bXHfll# Part 3/ 2892^93g H.Y. Times January 13. 1933# p. 6?
M.Y. Times.'January 14#‘1933. p.i.
' i
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27
Hoover with ^prompting /*dbiiar diplomacy*1; and intimated a

connection between the Chase MatIona1 and national City
■ 6
banks of Hew York City and the Machado regime;
■

During the same period* another congressman* Represents**
hive Shoemaker (Farmer-Labor, Minnesota) was asking for a
special investigation by Congress of the reported revolutionary
movement based in the United states which was planning the
overthrow of the Machado government*

Representative Shoemaker

■was apparently supporting'the Machado regime when, he stated
*

in his resolution*
. * • that certain underworld characters and Cuban
conspirators were heading-ah-expedition to Cuba for
the purpose of carrying on a revolution against the
government of President Machado* the duly constituted
and constitutional authority of the republic of Cuba*
were apprehended and their arms and ammunition des
troyed by Mew York and Mew Jersey police officials?
and. . •
Whereas it is becoming evident * . . that those
revolutionary activities are being fostered and
financed by.agents of a foreign power* not overfriendly to the government of the United States*
for the purpose of distracting public attention
from contemplated movements of their own. * . .
Rut while it may have been entirely clear to Congressmen
Fish and shoemaker that for different reasons the United States
had an -obligation to-Cuba under the Permanent Treaty to ms intain

^Fit&gibbon, Cuba and the United States, p. 194.
7H.Y. Times * April 22, 1932* p. 5.

a _stable^ govern

was nop .the., interpretation,given

to, the, Plat.t..I^ndmant by the State .Departmentk
January* Secretary of state* -Henry 1. .stimson* in an open
letter to Representative Fish which was printed in The Mew ,
York Times* said, the administration would' hold to a strict
interpretation of the Platt Amendment a© stated-by Hllhu
Root (4 April 1901)»

According to Secretary Stimson, the

Platt Amendment placed no obligation whatsoever: upon the ..
United states to intervene, in any way in Cuban internal, affairs.
Instead* Article III only, **. » . set forth the willingness
of the,government of Cuba that the United States, may.-inter**
o
vene for the attainment of certain objects.**
While several prominent' Americans were debating the .,
problem of Cuba, the terrorism, censorship, and suppression
• *
■
,g .
of civil liberties continued, on the island# '.The inauguration
of Franklin 0* Roosevelt as President of the United 'states,
moreover, brought no drastic' change in American policy toward
Cuba., .from the first'day'of'the new ^admihistfation,' it was
clear the United states would continue'to avoid direct intervention'if at all'possible.

While there was no indication

3N .Y . T im e s . J a n u a ry 2 7 , 1.933, p . I X .
® 0 .S ., F o re ig n R e la tio n s .

1 9 3 3 , V , 274«»77,

that'the policy, of the united.states would change ip, regard.
to;,action it.would'or, .would, hot.take#...there, was an.,indication
that- the .Eooseyelt administration would be more direct'than.
the.,Hoover, administration 'in attempting to woo the 'friendship
*
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of all hatin America*■"Without■specific regard for any'nation*
the new president,.hinted-at' the'" same policy he had proposed
in 1928.^'

in his inaugural address* hedeelared*

in'the field'of world policy x would dedicate
this nation to the policy of the good neighbor—
■the neighbor who resolutely respects himselfand*'"
because he does so* respects the. rights of others*
'the neighbor who- respects his' obligations' and ' 1
respects, the sanctity of.his..agreements in .and with
a world of neighbors»&1
Although Roosevelt was not speaking directly '.of Latin
America#' the label “Good neighbor* policy soon applied'
exclusively' to the Western. Hemisphere*' This direction for
the Good neighbor policy was largely the result of efforts
by Roosevelt1s secretary of State* Cordell Hull#

null had

helped to write the plank in the 1932 Democratic platform

10Franklin D» Roosevelt# Foreign'Affairs * "VI, 578-86.
■^Franklin Delano Roosevelt, “Inaugural Address,“
March 4* .1933-*..
.reprinted in Franklin P. Roosevelt,. The ...public
Papers and Addresses, .of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Vol. "II»
The Year of .Crisis* 1933. (New York* .Random.House# 1938).#
p*.' 207.
7

which, stated*;

«- ♦ no Interference, in, the .internal. affairs

off,other nations.*^2 .Before the inauguration,of 4 March*, he
was..determined to promote-,a .policy of strict adherence to
nonintervent ion * Hull believed*
*. * ... that our principles could, have little effect .
in the.world unless they produced a bounteous harvest
in our own, neighborhood# We could “not look for closer
cooperation throughout the world# * * * unless we
first showed that cooperation could work in the
areas of the Monroe Doctrine*.-3*2
Hull believed the President firmly supported his belief
that the United States should move to restore genuinely
14
friendly relations with Latin America*
Accompanied by Hull* the President personally extended
the Good Neighbor policy to all of the Americas on II April
1933*

in his Pan-American Day address, the President said

mutual understanding and a respect for the point of view of
others were needed to build hemispheric solidarity*

It could

not be done by the acquisition of territory at the expense of
others*3^

^Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* Vol* I (New
¥orkt The Macmillan Company* 1948), p. 310*13Ibld.. p. 309,
14IMd., p, 310»
15Depa*tment of State, Press Releases. April 15, 1933,
p* 243f Cordell Hull* Memoirs, I,■311*

.Words „alone,*, however *_were not^enough to conytiice. batin
America of .a. genuinely, changed .attitude, by the gulfed states#
In .the, .face of,.an Argentine movement, against Amerlean inter-....
vention,'. the high!American tariff which plagued Latin American
economics, the Chaco War* .the tumbling .Machado regime in Cuba,
and the scheduled Montevideo Conference (December,'1933) * it
was clear# at least to Hull, that the united States had to
do more than speak in generalities about our “good-neighbor*
liness *“lb
The first public statement by the new administration
which dealt specifically with Cuba came on 15 April when
Secretary.of State Hull fold a news conferences '
No consideration has been given to any movement in
the nature of intervention* Nothing whatever is
going on that would call for the slightest departure
- from the ordinary'relationships and, contacts between
two- separate and sovereign nations*!?
At about the same time# Congressman fish was. again urging the
State Department to use its influence to bring about a res
toration of law and order in Cuba, Although Representative
Fish was still opposed to the use,of armed intervention, he
*'

*

favored sending a. strong ambassador to ..compel Machado to

!$Cordell Hull# Memoirs, 1, 308-9.
•17Ibld., p. 313*

resign in favor of a provisional government which would be
k

/

jL.6
compelled to hold an honest election-. ' About two weeks later,
Representative Fish asked, in the House of Representatives,
the Roosevelt administration to seek the restoration of civil
■liberties and.a" government which would be adequate; for the
protection of life, liberty, and property.

He noted that

while there was a great deal of sympathy for the oews in
Germany, it should" be remembered"that Hitler has not 'killed
a single Jew while in Cuba there has been hundreds murdered
by the secret police,

He then charged that the affairs of

some American banks and utilities companies in Cuba in supporting
the Machado government were characteristic of# "American
dollar diplomacy at its worse~«*anything to protect property
investments, regardless of human rights. . .

In his

concluding remarks. Congressman Fish expressed satisfaction
with the appointment of Sumner Welles as Ambassador to Cuba.*^
During April, Roosevelt had named his friend, Sumner
Welles, as Ambassador Extraordinary and,Plenipotentiary to
the Republic of Cuba after first ascertaining from Edward

Times, April 17# 1933# p. 7.
19M.Y. Times. May 5, 1933, p. 8.

.33
b*. Reed, the Charge d* Affaires, .in Cuba, that’Welles## appoint20
ment was acceptable to the Cuban, government . ..Welles, who...
had long .been .interested:'.in hatin J^erican affaIrs.,..replaced
Harry F. Guggenheim who had served in Cubaduring the Hoover.
.administration...Guggenheim had.had the misfortune, of. serving.
Sincerely and consistently to ease the political'tension during
a time when he'had little support from Washington and at.a
■time vwhen' the1unpopularity of the United states found expression
ia;a dislike' for the American Ambassador#2^
Welles, 'who was unknown outside Washington but was a
man who had had diplomatic experience from 1913 to 1922 in
the Caribbean region#22 arrived in Havana on 7 May,22

Before

leaving for C uba, Welles indicated his belief in the principles
of the Good neighbor policy and expressed his desire to work
for closer and more friendly relations between the two countries.
He' also said his mission would work for mutual tolerance, and

2^123W45X/95* Telegram, The Charge in Cuba (Reed) to
the Secretary of State, Habana, April 20, 1933, U.S.* Foreign
Relations/ 1933. V, 278. ■
'
■21'
. *
*■ Fit&gibbon,*Cuba and the United States,' p. 195#
22I b id . .

p. 196.

2 312 3W 451/102 s T e le g ra m , The C h a rg e ih 'C u b a (R eed) t o
th e S e c re ta r y O f S ta te * H abana, May 8 , 19 33 , U .S ., F o re ig n
R e la tio n s , 1 9 3 3 , V , 2 8 6 .
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m & p m t among the two countries aM# whenever 'possible* for
now. reciprocal trad© agreements to the mutual advantage of
Cuba muI the united states*

24

2n the general instructions issued to Welles b y the
Secretary of state* the administration mad© it perfectly clear
it was holding to the Hoot Interpretstion of the Platt. Amendment*

Hull said that however alarming the situation might

seem, the domestic conditions did not constitute a just basis
for formal action fey the United states*

fhis was qualified,

however* when the new iUtfeasaador was also fold that the united
States could not help experiencing grave concern when a situa
tion existed which might result in open rebellion against the
government, of Cuba and thus cause destruction of life and
property*

A® a result, the United states felt obligated, to

offer it© friendly advice so that such a situation might fee
prevented*

Welle© was to fee extremely cautious in- offering

his help* however* so that it would not appear to fee inter
vention*

On the contrary, any effort© the Ambassador might

make would fee to prevent Intervention*^

Wie nature of .Welle© *s

2<17H, 37/178, statement of Mr. Sumner Welles, Assistant
Secretary of state /April 24, 193J/, U.S.* Forelcm Relations,
m
V, 278-79.
257 1 1 .3 7 /1 7 8 a , t h e S e c re ta r y o f s t a t e t o th e A p p o in te d
A m bassador in C uba, ( W e lle s ) , W a s h in g to n , May 1 , 1 9 3 3 , U .S .,
F o re ig n R e la tio n s 1 9 3 3 , V, 2 8 3 -8 4 .

assignment might be termed .“intermeddling* ?*...,„Tho administration
was aware that if nothing wer© done the.situation. might deter**
2g
locate .so far .as. to maKe armed intervention unavoidable*. ...
i

i

Roosevelt Knew, moreover# that any form of direot. intervention
would be. contrary to bis stated foreign policy^ and. that,,..
f*

minor agitation against the “Colossus of the North1' in Cuba
could give rise to anti-American sentiment throughout batin
America. 23

More specifically# Welles*© instructions consisted of
four major points*

First# he was to convey to Machado the

belief that any advice which might be offered him by the
United states was given only because of the position of close
friendship between the two nations and because of the concern
which the United states had for the treaty of 1901.

Secondly#

he was to point out to Machado that the United States considered
it imperative for the ending of the deteriorating condition
in Cuba that the terrorism and wholesale murders of his

26Bryce Wood# The Making .of the Good Neighbor Policy
(New York* Columbia University Frees# 1961):# p. 501 duilus
W* Pratt, Cordell Hull* 1333*»44# XII, 144.
2 ^Sumner

Welles, The Time For Bee Ision* p. 194,-'

2®Cordeil Hull# Memoirs# I# 308—09.

opponents cease although the United States recognized the
need of the Cuban government to control the insurrectionists# .
the terrorism and suppression of civil liberties,were going
far# in 'the thinking, of the State Department#.to .prejudice
the people of the United .States against Machado’s government,
thirdly, Welles was to offer the friendly mediation of the
United States between the government and the opposition
forces • Although the exact form of the mediation was to be
left to Welles#, he was to undertake to obtain a. definite and
binding agreement which would bring peace until free national
elections could be held*

Finally, the .Ambassador was to

express the-desire of the united States to negotiate, a new.
2g

reciprocal trade agreement with.Cuba.

Hull stated:

you may say that this Government la strongly in
clined to the view that a speedy improvement in
economic and commercial conditions in Cuba would
result in an immediate allaying of popular unrest
and of political agitation#.and .that the Govern*-'
ment of the United States’hopes that the Cuban
Government will be disposed to.give the consideration
of this problem preferential attention* ®
One week after his arrival in Havana, Welles had his
first meeting with President Machado. ' At'that time#, he .
.

,

.

*

i

29711.37/178a, "The Secretary of State to the Appointed
Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)# Washington, May 1, 1933# U.S.,
Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 284*05>
30Ibld.. p. 285.

expressed the shock of the United States a t 'the acts of
violence being committed in Cuba.

In addition# he told

Machado that the United States would like to see the
restoration of civil liberties, an end of the violence as
soon as possible# and the holding of free elections by the
autumn of 1934.

Ambassador Welles also stated the desire

of the United states to negotiate a reciprocal trade
agreement*

On all points# Welles reported# Machado was

agreeable.

Machado said plans were underway for the

restoration of civil liberties# many political prisoners
had been released# press censorship had been lifted# and
that not only would he like to see free elections the
following year# he was willing to consider resigning before
the election to insure free elections.

Machado also stated

he would not be a candidate for the presidency.
in his report of the conversation to Washington# Welles
was enthusiastic about the prospect of negotiating a new
treaty but he believed the negotiations should be kept
secret until the Cuban legislature could make essential
amendments to the electoral code and approve changes In the •
tariff provisions of the existing constitution.

On the

31837.00/35121 Telegram# The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of State, Habana# May 13, 1933# U.S.# Foreion
Relations# 1933, V# 287-89. Also see, Welles, The Time for
Decision, jkp.*19$~96»
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matter of free ejections, he was also optimistic about
Machado's statements # Although he believed that in the
■period before the election it might be desirable for
Machado to be replaced by someone in whom all factions had
confidence, he did not believe that the State department
should anticipate such a change#

Machado, he said, was

able to preserve order and had the loyalty and support of'
the Cuban Army*
r

if he were replaced, the loyalty of the
t

army would be in doubt*

Under such conditions# it was

likely a chaotic situation would result during the course
of which many malcontents might begin to destroy property
in an effort to secure American intervention*
Two weeks after his arrival in Cuba, Welles was
confident he would be 'able to gain the cooperation of the
oppostlon leaders to work out a peaceful solution to the
political strife*

33

In a conference with Dr. Cosme de la

Torriente, the most prominent of the opposition leaders and
a former President of the Assembly of the League of nations,

32lbid,. p. 290,
■■3^837*00/3522* ‘Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba
(Welles) to the Secretary of State, Habana, May 22, 1933,
0#S,, Foreign Relations, 1933. V, 292*'

he gained not only., the support of Dr. Torriente for. .American
mediation hut was also, assured that,,the. leaders, of the__
revolutionary junta exiled since 1931.. in Itew York. ..(Carlos ..... .
Mendieta^ and Mendes Reflate) would support, a peaceful solution.
Welles -was‘-also told that two of the dissident factions,in
the Conservative party would also support the mediation*
The only group which had not approved o f a program of
conciliation was the group based in Florida and led by,. .
General Menocal.

At the same time, Welles reported that he

believed no f i n a n c i a l 'o r economic concessions should be
granted to the Cuban government until a definite political
settlement had been agreed upon.^
A few days later, Dr* de la Torriente assured weiles
that the A*B.C. and the Qrcranizaclon Celular Radical
Eevoluncionarla or o.e.R.R* had:agreed to cease their
terrorism to seek a peaceful solution.

Machado himself had

issued a public statement in' which he formally expressed his
desire for conciliation and had' actually begun to relax police
and'censorship1regulations and release political prisoners.
Weiles had-reason to be- apprehensive,-however, because'of'
the lack of control many of the opposition leaders had over

3%37i00/3526$ Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Weiles)
to the secretary of State, Habana, May 25, 1933, U.S., Foreion
Relations. 1933. V. 295^98.-

,
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their., followers#. He was fearful, a -rpsprt to _violence., by.
any. dissident group would, bring, reprisals- from Machado and
negotiations would thereupon break ■down-#

,,

By 2 June,. "Welles believed1the situation had improved ■
so that he could formally’■offer' his' services' as :a’mediator*
He told' President Machado:that 'he1
'be lieveC the solution had
'to-be worked out within the' provisions of the existing''
constitution and' without- dissolving the' Congress*

Weiles

flatly rejected; !
the opposition proposal which'called'-for
the immediate resignation of Machado-' and the''substitution
■of an impartial Secretary o f ’State' to serve as Provisional
President*

Under the constitution then in effect, the'

dissolution of congress would have meant that national
elections would have had to be held within sixty days*
since the Liberal party (Machado's) was the only organized
political party, this would have meant that the Liberals
would win the election and the situation would remain the
same to the opposition groups*

Welles told Machado that he

personally -would' like to see'an immediate reform' of the
electoral code based upon the ■recommendations of an■electoral

^837* 00/3-028« Telegram, "The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of State, Habana, May 29, 1933, U.S., Foreign
Relations*..1933. V*, 297-98*

.......

.
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expert. ,fhese •reforms,.weiles, thought, t o u M assure freedom;__
for..-the reorganisation.. of.parties and absolutely -free...elections *
lie also proposed a-revision of.the. Constitution .to. provide
for the election of a. Viee-President, limiting the term of
the text president to, five years with no opportunity for
immediate re-election* and. a reduction in the. number of.'’
.Senators and Congressmen#-'■ All of these reforms* .Welles *
believed, could be accomplished within ate months* ^
.Hot only did Machado.agree:to-rall of Welles *a ■suggest
felons, 'he'offered'to resign his position immediately after
the election o f a Vice-President.

He even told Welles he

would have been willing to do;the same during the .past
three years had there been a'Vice-President*.

Although Welles

did not indicate to Machado a definite time when he thought
this should' be done, he did express his desire to:see the
Vice-President in complete control at the time the, national
elections were held# '

3^837.00/3330s telegram, Ihe im^assador to-Ouba>-(Welles)
to the Secretary of state, Habana, dune 2, 1833, U.S., Foreign
Halations, 1833* :V, 298-300? Hobart P. Smith* ffhe United
States and Cuba, p* 145? Sumner Welles, The Time For Decision*
p*' .
198*'
V'
37837.00/3530: telegram, ihe Ambassador in Cuba-'■(Welles)
to the Secretary of State, Habana, dune %, 1933, U.S*, Foreign
Halations^ 1933*, V* '300*01 .• •

Although.the.
.Cuban mituafian was steadily _improy ing,..
Welles believed hie position bud.,been.damaged when.,.President
Roosevelt announced that he .had.,abandoned, his intention_pi
requesting congress to approve a reciprocal trade program

_

during the current ■session* ’ This statement left the impression
in Cuba that there was no hope of any change in the economic
picture until sometime in the distant future*

Welles there

fore requested the Immediate authorisation of Washington to
proceed as planned in laying the groundwork for a new
commercial treaty so that the positive psychological effect
that talk of a treaty had already brought would not be lost,
The President replied to Welles*s request .by informing him
in a personal letter that, "There is.no reason why we cannot
start immediate conversations for a trade.treaty with Cuba.”
Throughout the month of June, the negotiations to
establish the mediation proceedings progressed smoothly*
Machado was still willing to participate in electoral, reforms
as proposed by Welles and recommended by a special commission

^8611.3731/419 i ■ Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Acting Secretary of state,, flabana, June 8, 183$, U.S.,
Foreign Relations. 1833. V, 304*
^Franklin D. Roosevelt to Sumner Welles in Havana, June
8, 1833, in Elliot Roosevelt (ed.), F*B«R,, His... Personal, betters.,
1928-1845, Vol* l (Hew Yorki Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950),
p. 330*

headed by the bean, pf.,Graduate..Faculties of Columbia University
.(Hew York) , or# .Howard bee McBain.40

in ..addition,...Welleshad

secured., the support, of all the opposition groups, and, by 30
■June, had been informed’of the names.,of .the delegates; to.,the
mediation proceedings representing both the Machado govern■mmxt and;the. opposition, groups*- ■on that day, he telegramed
the-department of'State to.say he would formailycommence
,mediation proceedings on the .following day*4^ ■
■The first: week of .the negotiations proceeded, with •little
difficulty*- -Welles believed, despite; the.recalcitrance .-of
Menocal, the opposition groups were willing intelligently and
rationally to work for an agreement and was encouraged because

4O0.S*, Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 306-15.
42*837*00/35661 Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Acting secretary of state, Habana, June 30, 1933, U.S.,
Foreign Relations* 1933. V, ■316 * 1The■representatives■of 'the
government were General Herrera, Acting secretary of state?
or. Averhoff, •Secretary .of the Treasury, and Or* Ruiz Mesa,
member of the House of Representatives. The opposition forces
were represented by Dr. Cosme.de la Torriente for the Union
Macionalista? Dr* Martines Saenz for the A.B.C. ? Dr. Wilfred©
Albanes, representative from Oriente. for the Conservative
opposition, partyt Dr. Santos Jimenez for the liberal opposition
party? Dr* Dorta Duque for the University! Dr* Aragon for the
professors of the normal and. high schools? Dr* Silverio for,the
QvC.R.R*? and Senorita Lamar for all of the women's organizations.
Also see,' "Machado Government and A.B.C. Rebel Group Accept
Welles as Mediator, ** N.v* Times, (June 16, 1933), p. 1? "Junta
in Hew York City' Meets and Studies Mediation,tt H.Y. Times,
(June 17, 1933),, p. 13? "More .Rebels .Accept-Mediation, ** -(June
28, 1933), p* 3.
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he was., able, to. convince Machadoto.eliminate„martial: law
In Habana..province; and.'.,restore _constitutional.guarantees»
in general,..the conciliatory position of the government.,
ha#'eased the.tension throughout Cuba.and the island was
again peaceful *42

At. this ,
.point , Welles viewed..his., task,

in three parts* . He first- had to get the' opposing factions
to agree'to negotiate "with'one another*
an agreement had to be negotiated.*

secondly, such./

And finally,; the' agree

ment had to continue to-'be’effective until elections could
be held ’in'November, 1934* "

‘ ”•

Welles had been appointed as Ambassador with the specific
assignment of working out an agreement*

At that time, it was

thought he would stay in Cuba only long enough to mediate a
-political settlement and would then be replaced by "Jefferson

'Caffery, a'former Consul' in' Columbia -and Assistant' secretary
of" state after July, 1933*

On B July, Welles was quite

certain his services in Cuba would no longer be needed after
September*

At that time, he'thought; Caffery could be appointed

Ambassador in Cuba ‘and he would'be free to devote:his' time to

4^837.00/35701 'Telegram, The Ambassador in 'Cuba ‘{weiies)
to the Acting Secretary of State, Habana, July 7, 1933, U.S.,
Foreign fRelations».•.1933* *V, 318*

the. forthcoming-. Seventh ..Pan-American conference scheduled
to meet.at. Montevideo ip.Deeaastoer^.

.... ....

.... .......... ..

.Throughout July, although.there were minor disturbances,
the.negotiations proceeded as planned.under the guidance of
Ambassador Welles *„ For a time, Welles was upset because,.
although the opposition groups had complied with his wishes ..
that they refrain from all violence, Machado had not yet gotten
the enactment of a general amnesty bill and had. not completely
restored all constitutional guarantees and abolished martial.
law as he had promised*^4

Weiies was relieved, however, when

he was informed on 26 July that the law had been signed by
the President and had: been put in effect*

On the same day,

Machado informed Welles that he would be willing to accept
the constitutional and electoral revision© which were being
45
discussed at the time*
He again told Welles that after a
Vice-President had been chosen, he would resign from office
■-p#Hi im< 11.i,i tir i 11.iiipi1|i iail

■>*111‘t

,ii.iHf»>flii <11. '■

4^T23W451/111* Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Acting Secretary of State, Habana, July 8, 1933, II*S.,
Foreign Relations, 1933 * V, 319-20.
44tl.S., Foreion Relations* 1933, V, 320-22? H.Y* Times
July 7, 1933, p. 3*
4% 3 7 *00/35831 Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Acting Secretary of state, Habana, July 26, 1933, U*$*,
Foreign Relation^* .193.3, V, p. 329*
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(probably in May* 1934) and allow the .'new Vlee~Pres idenfc to.
hold,office:, untila general election could be.held in November
of 1934*

Machado*s resignation*.however* would cut short his

tern of" office--by. one year,., In -1926*. he,had extended his .own....
term-, through.-a -constitutional .reform.bill .he had pushed., through
the ;-legislature*^
/

in coneluding his- report to the .Department

;

of-State# Welles#, generally •Optimistic'about the eventual
outcome of -the mediation# said*
If the President’s' frame of mind as made evident
today in my conversation with him were to continue
unchanged there would fee-no possibility of an un
successful outcome of the present negotiations. Ihe
chief difficulty is, however* that the President
changes his mind with the utmost frequency and it
is impossible to foretell what his «■opinion may be
when the transitory reforms are brought up for
discussion.^?
■Only four hours after talking with Welles on 26 July,
Machado made an unexpected trip to the legislature and spoke
to both the House and the Senate*

Machado asked for support

until .193S when his term .would "legally*1 expire and then said
that the''mediation by Welles-had been accepted because he was
*

'!,

!

personally a friend, of Cubans. He said the offer of mediation
had not been “upon the 'instruction of the United states govern**
y
46JMsU
472M£-

sws&t*,**.._UlB ^intention, ,..Wellas.tellmm§*. •Oeing. %«lJWPlaf..teat
fgsfjfe ..was no...attempt

l^tea ..Oteted''States
48
and that Welles was teerefera actia-f
tethongh
lie teliered tee #tetweats- of Machado .had inide»laed tee $*©*
■ptoss/tele!* ted teem made toward mediation of tee crisis*
lilies w m reassmred ahoot tee eventual outcome when tte
tepreseiitetl:
tei of w m ^ m r n m m m t aiid of;tee' o^oetttom freaps
■met on tee nmfe day ate made pnofteaa ei'wl; of tee .ixaimrteait
features #f tee pitepeasd.. eteetttefeloisa4

tm sMities*

welie# wee «l£evei. when WatetnftOii ofi£e£a£% reported teat
50
liia mission ted tee complete support of tee StatS' tete^teeat,*.
.neetede# however, m e tefteaiat to- reverse tee position
m m e teat* weiies.ted at first realised % On I Jtefast* tee
Cteaa ateaasador to tee Waited states, Mr* Oscar S« ‘Cintas,
accused ambassador Welles of delaying tee negotiations for a
new commercial treaty to pressure Machado into accepting

-*#0/18881 telegram, m e Jtoasaadot in Cuba (Welles)
te tee .te iiiif Secretary o f State, lisisstta,: duly &f, ItS l#
^jre^n telaMtes> 1033, v, fit*
'^%t? *#0/118?* telegram, tee aiteassador in Cuba (Welles)
to tee Acting Secretary #f state.*- Habana, faly i?,’1S33, W*a*,
11, V,
SQ a .y , T im e s

{ J u ly 2 9 , 1 9 3 3 }, p . 1 .
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the results of the mediation*

But while Cintas was complaining

to the Department of State, Machado was assuring Welles
that he would accept the recommendations for reform which
had been completed by the commission on that day.

As soon

as Welles was able to receive support for the reforms from
all the opposition leaders, Machado promised he would send
the recommendations to Congress and urge their immediate
enactment*^
Later that day, Welles was assured by the Speaker of
the House of Hepresentatives, who was also the leader of the
Liberal party, of the willingness of'Congress to support the
reform recommendations, ". • . provided such agreement made
it possible-for the President to resign his office in a
*decorous4 manner such as the institution of a Vice-Presidency
would be.”52

the Speaker did not believe, however, there

51
837.00/3638, Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of
State, Washington, August 2, 1933, D.S., Foreicm Relations,
1933, V, 331. Acting, secretary of State Phillips denied that
Machado's resignation was a condition for peace. He did say,
however, that peace had to return to tuba before the trade
agreement could be finally negotiated, H.Y. Times, August 3,
1933, p. 6. On the following day, Phillips said the United
States only wished to avoid intervention and did not care
what reforms were adopted as long.asjpeace was restored,
N.Y. Times, August 4, 1933, p. 7*
52
837.00/35941 Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Acting secretary of state, Habana, August 2, 1933, D.S.,
Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 333.
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would be widespread support for the shortening of Congressional
terms unless there were some compromise made to appease the
legislators.

fCII

■

:The proceedings which, had seemed to; be ,operating,so
perfectly for -Welles for over' a "month began to- deteriorate'
rapidly two..days later, when it. was rumored' there, would .be
a full-scale, general strike 'and.,Wei lea learned from reliable
sources that the, Machado government'was secretly promoting*

*■1

the strike,

■ . ■

■

on 4 August, members of the Liberal party

(Machado's) were sent by the President to tell Welles,
because of the general strike which had begun on 3 August,

54

they recommended the mediation proceedings be abandoned for
the time being.

When Welles insisted that if the proceedings

broke down it would mean a return to terrorism and revolution
by the opposition which the government would not be able to
55
withstand, Machado*s delegates withdrew their request.
*

,i

54J. D. Phillips, ♦'Cuba Threatened by General Strike, "
H.Y. Times, August 4, 1933, p. I.
55837.00/3601s Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba ?(Welles)
to the Acting.Secretary of State,.'Habana, ..August. 4,. 1933,
H.S, Foreign delationsf 1933. V, 334? H.Y. Times, August 2,
1933, p. 16.

In a luncheon conversation with Machado * the president
admitted to Welles that he had sent the delegation to visit
him against the judgment of the party leaders.

Machado

believed■that the mediation had weakened.his position and.
the authority of the government*

He wa$ still willing,

however* to agree to any solution which would not have him,
"thrown into1'the street.

’Because, he had again been

assured by Machado of the President1© reasonableness on the
mediation and because the commission had agreed by this time
on all important points in their suggestions for a reformed
constitution such as a modified parliamentary system which
j

would limit the powers of the executive and were nearly, in
agreement on the length of the Presidential term and the
independence of the judiciary, Welles remained confident
57

of the ultimate success of his efforts.

By 7 August, a situation which, up to that time, had
only been "tense1* erupted into violent rioting.

A general

strike began, which was supposedly caused by the economic

^6837.00/3603s telegram, the Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Acting Secretary of State, Habana, August 5, 1933,
U.S., Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 335*
57lbld.
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dissatisfaction .of the lower classes and the general inability,
of the people to see any immediate change in the. present govern
ment*. it was successful in tying up all transportation
facilities with an attendant loss of perishable goods left
58
.•
on the docks.
Rioting began when crowds celebrated a false
report that president' Machado had resigned*

The report was

circulated when it was learned that for- some reason Ambassador
Welles had decided# in the wake of the strikes and growing
terrorism, to present the Machado government with his own
f o r m u l a t o prevent what he termed a ‘'state of utter chaos
On 6 August, he communicated the following to President Machado
and impressed upon him the necessity of accepting the
suggestions t
1. Appointment by the President of an impartial
Secretary of State acceptable to all elements*
_
2. The request by the President of the /Congress/
for leave of absence and authorisation by him of
the new Secretary of State to reorganise the Cabinet
giving representation to all Important political

58j .d . Phillips# “Cuba Threatened by General Strike,"
N.Y. Times, August 4# 1933# p. 1*
59j .d * Phillips, “Havana police Kill Score in Crowd
Outside Capitol? Machado Expected to Quit,“ M.Y. Times,
August 8, 1933# p. 1* Sumner Welles, The Time For Decision,
p. 196*
^837*00/3606? Telegram,’ The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of State# Habana, August 7, ,1933# U.S. # Foreign
Relations, 1933, \r# 336; J.D* Phillips# “Machado 1leave* sought
by Welles#” H.Y. Times. August 9, ,1933# p* 1.

sa

-

elements * ^ .
*
.
•__ ..., j,.
3* The immediate passage by the congress of the
■constitutional reforms which have been, elaborated
by the Mixed Commission as the.result of which ...
the members of the House of Representatives, will.
agree,.to..shorten their terms so. that half of. the ,.
House will be renewed in the national elections
of 1934,.and those representatives- remaining, in the
House to shorten their terms to a corresponding
extent as those who-will vacate in that year.
4. ■■Half of'.the .Senate-is. .renewed ,in. 1934 and the
remaining Senators to agree to shorten their terms
to a total period of 6 years.
5. The creation of the Vice-Presidency, said
Vice-President to assume the Presidency upon his
inauguration.6

Welles also felt obliged to remind Machado that# although
it was the desire of the United States to avoid intervention
if at all possible# the united states had certain very
definite obligations placed upon it in the case Cuba was in
a state of complete chaos and anarchy
President Machado politely informed Ambassador Welles
that although he was still willing to resign as soon as a
Vice-President was chosen# he believed it would be disastrous
for him to take a *leave of absence1 and put the government

^•*•837.00/3606* Telegram# The Ambassador in. Cuba (Welles)
to the secretary-of State,-Habana, August 7, 1933, U.S,# Foreign
Relations/ 1933# V# 336*'
v

§2lbid,. p. 337.

'

t

ill the hands, of a.,secretary of state* ..Machado then, proceeded
to. take steps to again, suspend •■constitutional guarantees .in
an effort to end the .rioting**?

At the, same time, it was ..

being freely predicted, in Washington that the united. States

would intervene in Cuba to prevent anarchy and the disorder
caused by the general strike and lesser officers of the United
States Army and wavy were admitting that plans for intervention had been perfected for six months* 64
On the evening of 7 August* Weiies was still hopeful,
however, that Machado could be persuaded to take the uleave
of absence” and was sure he could obtain the support of the
opposition leaders and the members of Machado’s own Xdberai
party for his plan*

if* Welles thought* his solution could

be accomplished within forty-eight hours, peace could be
restored and the recommendations of the Mixed Commission could
65
be peacefully placed into operation*
Two days later, however*
Machado would still not accept Welles’s suggestions and,

®%37*00/3606* Telegram, 'Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of State, Habana, August 7* 1933, U.S*, Foreign
Relations, 1933, V, 337; also, H.Y* Times. August 9* 1933, p. 12.
64N.Y. limes. August 8, 1933, p. 3.
®5837.00/3606; Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of State, Habana, August 7, 1933, U.S., Foreign
Relations, 1933, V, 337.
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diplomatic recognition*

it was the belief of the Ambassador

that it would then be impossible for Machado to maintain
himself in office and would be forced to resign*

Welles.

then proceeded to recommend that if the United States .
«-

r

(

withdrew recognition* two American: warships should be sent
to Havana wifh orders not to land troops except in the
♦tgraves-t;- emergency-1?' and- these* ships*-would1presumably ‘lend
moral support to the restoration of order after the mild
disturbances which Welles predicted would occur after the •
68
withdrawal of recognition*
Although it was direct and
armed intervention by the United States that-Welles was
trying toforstall, it would appear that after 7 August, the
activities of the American Ambassador were in themselves,
if not armed, at least direct intervention in the internal
affairs* of the. ■Republic’of Cuba*
Machado*s opposition to Welles*s suggestions then
became more firm*

Welles considered it entirely possible

that Machado would be able to force the legislators to adopt
a resolution which stated*
.*£hat the activities of His. -Excellency the
Ambassador of the United states to Cuba inter
fering in the interior problems of the govern
ment have-caused -a deep perturbation of public
order and the threat embodied in his insinuation
of possible intervention in our country are a

68Ibld
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violation upon our rights as a free and independent
people and an aggression upon the sovereignty of
small nationalities*^
Evidently, president Roosevelt was not particularly
receptive .to Welles's.solution,either* :When the .President
received the Cuban Ambassador to hear the complaints of Sr.
■*

■

Cintas against the actions of Welles* he told Ciptas that
Weiies was acting .with .the fullest authorisation, of .the
administration.

When Cintas informed him that Machado

was still willing to resign if he could do so gracefully/
howeyer# Roosevelt suggested that perhaps Machado would
step down to save,the Cuban people from starvation.. The
President offered/ in the event Machado would resign, a
shipload of food supplied to Cuba for the benefit of the
people.

Cintas then promised to take,the offer up with
70
his government.

^%37*00/3624s Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba
(Welles) to the Secretary of State, Habana, August 9, 1933,
U.S., Foreign Relations, 1933* V, 346-47.
7®837.00/3623s Telegram, The Secretary of State to
the Ambassador in Cuba (Welles), Washington, August 9, 1933,
U.S., Foreign Relations, 1933, V,, 347-48? Robert F*. Smith,...
The United States and Cubas Business and Diplomacy, 19171960 (Hew Yorkt Bookman Associates, 1960), p. 147.

The next day, 10 August, Machado was able to force the
executive committee of the Liberal party to reject the
proposals submitted to the government by Welles*

The

conservative and Popular parties, however, continued to
support the constitutional reform measures and the suggestions
71
of Weiies*
That afternoon, Secretary of State Orestes
Ferrara told Welles that his government would have to have
an indefinite period of time before reaching any final
decision and that the solutions proposed by the mediation
committee would have to be postponed for at least six or
seven months*

In addition, he said that his government

requested the United states to acquiesce in any measures used
by Machado to end the strike and that Cuba would refuse the
offer of food made by the united States*

He did state, however,

that if the United States would be willing to make a very
liberal loan to his government without interest for a stated
period of time, President Machado might Still be willing to
*

negotiate- a settlement*

Welles

replied that although he was

not officially authorized, he would assume a loan could be
*

made as soon as the Island had a government which was

72*837.00/3630s Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of State, Habana, August 10, 1933, U.S.,
Foreign Relations* 1933, V, 349.
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constitutional and elected by fhe people.

Any loan to the

Machado government, however, was out of the question. 72
By 11 August, Welles was not so adamant in his demands
of the ,Machado regime,

buring.that '.afternoon, .he.-informed

-Ferrara that, if would .be acceptable it Machado would request,
of his own Initiative, a leave of absence until a* Vice*
-President could, be chosen and the,,immediate resignation.'of.
all, the members, of. the .cabinet except, General, Herrera .who
would, become Acting President until a Vice-President could
be found.

Welles said that he would accept such a proposal

from Machado and forward it to his government and to.Ifhe
opposition leaders for their approval.

Having already

received the,approval of General Herrera for such a plan,
Weiies believed, that if the constitutional reforms could, be
passed by February, General Herrera could then, retire from
office and turn over the government to the Vice-President
73
who would govern until after the national elections#
Weiies believed the solution would be acceptable to Machado
because t

^Ibidv. pp. 349*50.
73
,837.00/36401 telegram,, the Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of State,. Habana, August 11, 1933, 0.S.,
Foreign Relations, 1933# V, 355—56•
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X. It permit© him to save his face by declaring
that he has not accepted the solution^proposed by
me . .. . .. .. ' ,......... ...
.
2 ... It offers security to President Machado for
the lives and property of himself and of the members
of his family*
3. It'offers absolute guarantees to-all of-.the members
of the Liberal Party who are afraid of reprisals by the
. opposition. •>
V
4. St insures the loyal support of the Cuban Army
which is unanimously devoted., to General Herrera although
he is now retired from the Army. . . .
• S. 'the prinoipal"leaders -of the opposition have •••
unanimously decided to accept this proposal since in
their belief it is the only method of obtaining Machado1©
resignation and of avoiding American intervention
which in Itheir opinion Machado is at present determined
to force.
6. From the point of view of the United States Govern*
rnent it seems to me a thoroughly satisfactory solution
inasmuch as it would be a solution undertaken upon the
initiative of the President of Cuba and agreed to by
the political parties and the main leaders of the
opposition. It is essentially a Cuban solution of the
Cuban problem.?4
The same evening, Ferrera informed Welles that the
solution was acceptable to Machado and that he would take his
leave of absence within the next week.

Although Welles knew

that, not all opposition leaders were favorable to the plan,
he was convinced it would be acceptable and that if the
Herrera government could end the general strike soon after
it took power, the island could return to normal.

75

75

in the

. .

837.00/3641* Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of state, Habana, August 11, 1933, U.S.,
Foreign Halations. 1933, V, 357.
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meanwhile, however, opposition from a quarter Welles least
expected moved the unstable situation to a rapid climax*
On the afternoon of 11- August, a small-scale revolution was
begun by 'the officers .of- the first Artillery Battalion of the. Cuban Army:- •later' in the afternoon,* the revolt spread*
7ft . .
to other army units.
that evening, all of the ranking
officers of the Army were unanimous in their demand that
Machado leave the Presidency no later than the end-of 12
August. 77
'

-‘

As a result of the Army coup. Machado abandoned his
office and immediately left for his vacation retreat*

Prom

there, he flew to Massau when he began to believe his life
was in danger*-*7A

Meanwhile, the Army leaders, who had >

originally approved of General Herrera, changed their minds.
Although they liked him personally, they believed his close
association with Machado would create too much opposition.

^837.00/3642* Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the secretary of state, Habana, August 12, 1933, U.S.,
Foreign Relations. 1933. V, 358.
7^837.0Q/36$0* Telegram,; The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles>
to the Secretary of State, Habana, August 12, 1933, U.S.#
Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 359.
Times. August 12, 1933, p. 1

As a result# General' Herrera said that in order to follow
constitutional procedure tie would agree to accept the
ad interim Presidency as soon as Congress had acceptedthe
hurried message of' President Machado requesting' a leave
of absence#

This'procedure!was' followed because# -

constitutionally# the Presidency ad interim could' only" be
entrusted to a cabinet 'bomber.

Immediately after he accepted

the Presidency, Herrera appointed Of. Carlos Manuel de
Ce'spedes# former Secretary of State and former Minister at
Washington# as secretary of state and immediately thereafter
entrusted him with the Presidency. 79

By the evening of

13 August# the transformation of the government was complete
and aside from some minor disturbances the island was under
the control of the Army which Welles believed to be
completely loyal to the new government.

79
837.00/3650i Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of state# Habana, August 12# 1933# U.S.#
Foreign... Relations. 1933, V# 358-59f H.Y. Times# August 12#
1933, p. 1? Pratt# Cordell Hull, 1933*44. XI!# 146.
80
837*00/3646* Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of State# Habana# August 13, 1933, U.S.,
Foreign foliations. 1933, V# 360-61; W.Y. Times, August 14#
1933# p. 3.

CHAPTER » £
"IMERVEOTION BIT INERTIA" 8 A00UST, 1933-JANUARY# 1934
As soon as Dr* Cespedes had taken office as President
ad interim* president Roosevelt and Secretary of state Hull
sent a congratulatory wire to Welles expressing# *% * *
appreciation of what you have done•"■** The following day#
14 August# after Welles had reguested that the United States
recognise the new government because it came to power by
constitutional means# the Department of state approved the
2
request#
During the next few days# it appeared as though
the new government had a good chance for success#

Cespedes

had the obvious support of the United States Ambassador and

1837 *00/3653as Telegram# The Secretary of State to the
Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)# Washington# August 12# 1933# u*s*#
Foreicrn Relations* 1933* V# 360#
2837*00/3649s Telegram# The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of state# Habana# August 13# 1933# U*S*#
Foreign Relations * 1933 * V# 361*62} 837 *00/36488 Telegram#
The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of state#
Habana# August 14# 1933# U.S## Foreign Relations* 1933* V*
363.
62

most of the opposition groups ostensibly supported the measures
which^ put him into office*

3 *
in addition# President Roosevelt

had ordered two warships to assume positions along the Cuban
coast in what the President termed, %
for* •

. . a precaution * * .

safeguarding. . . the lives and persons of, American

citizens in Cuba. . . .

At the same time* Roosevelt assured

the Cuban people that there was no intention on the part of
K
the United States to intervene*
During the first four days of the Cespedes government,
Welles was encouraged by the prospects of success*

Although

civil disturbances throughout the island continued and some
of the Conservative party members were demanding that all
of those who had held office under Machado be removed from
public positions, Welles believed that the government would

3837*00/3656* Telegram, She Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of state, Habana, August 14, 1933, U.S.,
Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 363*^65.
^Franklin D. Roosevelt, "The Good Neighbor Policy begins
to Work in Cuba," A Presidential Statement, August 13, 1933,
Roosevelt, The Public Papers. IX, 322^23.
5
Ibid.? On the sending of the two warships.also -see:
837.00/36488 Telegram, The Ambassador In Cuba (Welles) to
the Secretary of State, Habana, August 14, 1933, U.S., Foreign
Relations. 1933, V, 363? Cordell Hull, Memoirs. 1, 314

fee able to maintain order and control the strikes.

£L

On 19

August, Welles feelieved it would fee feetter if he were recalled
to Washington.

He was convinced that the Cespedes government

had the support of the people and that all the needed reforms
would soon fee adopted.

He also feelieved that the time was

opportune to announce that final negotiations for a new
trade treaty would feegin immediately and that the United states
was taking measures to .relieve the "financial straits of' the'
government.

At the same time, Welles thought his position

in Cuba was becoming untenable*

Because of his close

association with the new government# he was being constantly
asked for advice and# although there was no real criticism
of his position# he feelieved such criticism might fee forth
coming from disgruntled office seekers# the Menocalists#
and sincere opponents of American influence.

As a result#

Welles thought he should leave Cuba to give the new govern
ment a greater chance for success*

He did not believe# however,

that his replacement# Jefferson Caffery would fee limited in
exerting influence*

According to Welles, the influence of

%37.00/3665s telegram# The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of state, Habana; August 'IS# U.S., Foreign
Relations, 1933, V# 365-67.
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Caffery. would be different,.from his in. that,.1*'*. «

it..wilX

be an influence exerted behind the scenes and not apparent
y

to. the public*" ______ _

__
/

....Before^Welles could leave, however, the situation, in_.,.
t

*

Cuba became worse*

By 22 August, some of the exiled political

leaders, notably Colonel Mendieta, Mendez penate, and former*
President Menocal were malting a determined effort to turn
the government into- a purely revolutionary de facto govern**
ment*

They announced their desire to abolish the Congress

and judiciary and remove all officials and have them replaced
by their own followers*

Welles attempted to persuade them

that the only way to maintain order was through the existence
of a constitutional government, not one which would govern
only by decree*

Without outright support for his position by

officials of the government, however, Welles*® suggestions fell
on deaf ears.®
Two days later, with strikes among the sugar workers in
the provinces increasing and violence in the streets of Habana
nearly out of control, Welles became convinced that it would

7
711.37/1831 Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of State, Habana, August 19, 1933, U.S., Foreign
Relations, 1933. V, 367*69.
®837.00/3694s Telegrams The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of state, Habana, August 22, 1933, U.S., Foreign
Relations# 1933* V, 369**70.

not be possible for the administration to rule'as a constitute
lonal government for the remainder of the term of General
Machado. Without the unqualified support of the Army, Welles
believed it would be necessary for the government to modify its
program by' ordering general elections ■to be' held' within three
months*

This could be done, Welles thought, by haying the

Cuban Supreme court declare unconstitutional the 1928
Constitution under which General Machado was elected.

The

Cespedes government could then dissolve Congress and declare
an election to be held in three months*

After the new govern-

ment had been installed, it would be possible to have a
constitutional convention draft a new constitution embodying
the recommended reforms of the McBain plan.
The following day, after consulting with his cabinet.
President Cespedes announced the program suggested by the
American Ambassador to be in effect.
4

’

*

*

'

Because it had been
‘

;

impossible to call the Supreme Court into session to declare
the 1928 Constitution unconstitutional, this was done by
decree of the President

^837.00/3706: Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of state, Habana, August 2.4, 1933, U.S., Foreign
Relations, 1933. V, 371-72
1°837.00/37062 ,Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of state, Habana, August 24, 1933, U.S., Foreign
Relations, 1933, V, 373-76
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Despite the ’’moral” support of the American warships
in Havana Harbor, the strikes and general disorder continued
to worsen., The Cespedes governments hard-pressed to find a
solution to the island's problems, was unable to either pla■f

cate the. dissident political groups or the dissatisfied
masses of'Cubans,- 11

At one A.M. in the morning-on. 5 September,

Ambassador Welles cabled the Secretary of State that there
had been a concerted movement by the soldiers of the Cuban
Army to depose all officers and take over the. Army*

Welles

urged Washington to send at least two more ships to Havana
and one to Santiago de Cuba immediately although he re
commended that troops should not be landed * The Ambassador
‘

1

fully expected a condition of absolute chaos by later in
the day and also a renewal of the general strike. 12
By ten A.M., all of .the government officials had been
forced to leave their posts by the non-commissioned Army
officers and enlisted men*

The revolutionary government set

up by the rebels under.-Sergeant Fulgencio Batista' then pro* ■
claimed that it had taken upon itself a program dedicated to

**%.S., Forelon Relations, 1933, V,. 376*79*
12837#00/3800, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between
the Secretary'of state and the Ambassador in’Cuba (Welles)
September 5-, 1933, 0.S., Foreion Relations, 1933, V, 380? Cordell
Hull, Memoirs, x, 314? H.Y,» Times, September 6, 1933, p. 1.
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carry out the revolutionary plan for Cuba.

This meant that

Batista planned to bring economic reconstruction and solid
political, organization to Cuba and to eliminate and punish
the supporters of Machado, to pay the debts of the island,
restore judicial procedure, and end the widespread disorder.
The decree was signed by Sergeant Batista and a group of
other persons whom the American Ambassador labeled as the
most extreme radicals of the student organization and by
others the Ambassador called, "frankly communistic,M13
This attitude of Welles's is in sharp contrast to his
opinion of Communist and radical activity which he expressed
to a group of concerned American businessmen a few days
before.

Welles did not at that time attribute any of

the violence to Communists,

instead, while he recognized

the existence of foreign agitators'in Cuba, he preferred
to believe that the unrest was due entirely to the laboring
classes which had suffered severly under the .Machado regime
and were simply trying to organize in an attempt to redress
some of their legitimate grievances.

Me saw the only solution

■*%37,O0/3‘?S3f Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the secretary of State, Habana, September 5, 1933, U.S.,
Foreign Relations« 1933« V,.331*83* for an additional text of
the junta1s manifesto seei N.Y. Times. September 6, 1933, p.
1*
.
'

.69
to the„. disorder to be concessions made, toy the industries and
not suppression by. the government Or intervention for the
protection of American.;. property by the United states. ..Sn„
r

*

his; report#; 'the ;jUsbassador frankly; stated *Y"3t esnnatVsee_any.
indications of the 'red menace* which certain Americans doing
business here are fearful of.,f^4
During the afternoon of 5 September# President Cespedes

and his cabinet (the de facto government) were forced to
resign and the government passed into the hands of a committee
of five members appointed by the leaders of the Army revolt.
At that time# Welles was attempting to persuade some of the
opposition leaders to attempt to bring peace to the island.*5
Welles was personally afraid for his own life and the safety
of the embassy.

When an angry mob appeared outside the

embassy# Welles telephoned Secretary of State Hull and requested
the possible landing of troops from the McFarland which was in
Havana Harbor.

The Secretary of State sympathised with Welles

but firmly reminded him that it was American policy to land
no troops and that they could only be called in case of a

^807.00/3739* Telegram# The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of State# Habaha# August 30# 1933# U.S., Foreign
Relations. 1933. V# 376*78.
■
'J
i
3-Sq .s ,. Foreign Relations. 1933. V, 383*84.
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physical threat to him and his staff and then only enough
men to protect the

e m b a s s y , ^

In a meeting between Welles and the opposition groups,
it was decided that the leaders of the army revolt would not
be'able to maintain order and that'an'’.attempt -should there-*
fore be made to establish a new government with perhaps
Colonel Carlos Mendieta as President,

It was also the

unanimous decision at this meeting that the only way a new
government could maintain itself, until the Army could be
reorganized under the Cuban Army officers, was by the main
tenance of law and order in Havana and a few other key points
by United States Marines*

If the present military 1unta

were not deposed# it was thought# they could not maintain
themselves and the government would fall into the hands of an,
11out and out Communist organization.
The next day, however# the commission then in charge of

^837.00/3764, Memorandum of Telephone Conversations Be
tween the Secretary of State and the Ambassador in Cuba, (Welles)
and Between the Assistant Secretary of state (caffery) and the
Ambassador in Cuba, (Welles), September 5, 1933, U.S., Foreign
delations, 1933* V, 385-86.
^837*00/3756s Telegram, She Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of state# Habana, September 6, 1933, U;S.,
Foreign Relations,, 1933« V* 387*68+
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the government flatly rejected the plan because of the control
which would be exercised by the Whited States#

in addition,

the opposition leaders with whom Welles had conferred were
also hesitant about giving their assent to the landing of
American troops#

the revolutionary A.B.C. announced its

intention of not trying to overthrow the new government#
Instead, the &*B#€* would give it moderate support while
maintaining an attitude of "watchful waiting#"

Welles

reported, however, a situation somewhat better than on the
t

day before and that the presence of American ships was helping
preserve peace*

Ihe Ambassador had no policy to recommend

to Washington except to attempt to avoid intervention if
at all possible as long as life and property were being
protected.

He was sure, however, the "undisciplined group

of individuals # * . representing the most irresponsible
elements" who were then in control of the government would not
be worthy of recognition by the United States for some time to
come* 18
On the following day, 7 September, Welles was visited

^8837.00/37671 telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of state, Habana, September 6, 1933, U#8#,
Pore ion ;Relations, 1933* \T# 390-92,
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by Or* Boracio Ferrer, who had been Secretary of War in the
Cespedes government# Ferrer told Welles that he had been
/
assured of the loyalty of a number of soldiers and officers
both in Havana and in the provinces ., Be told Welles that
a movement was therefore underway to attempt to overthrow
the military government established by Sergeant Batista
and
that he ■was sure
this would
be accomplished
within
a
; ■
‘ ••{ . ,
/ I
■: :‘ ' i • *
rt
,

short time#

Although Welles was sympathetic to the move, he

told Ferrer that he could not then commit American support
or military forces to the movement#

When Ferrer had gone,

Welles immediately cabled the secretary of state explaining
that the Cespedes government had not resigned but had been
overthrown by force#

In addition, Cespedes represented the

legitimate and constitutional government of Cuba#

He then

stated thats
If the legitimate and recognized Government
of 'Cuba can mate an effective demonstration of' its
Intention to reestablish itself, it would most
decidedly appear to me to be in' the best interest
of the United States Government to afford them
immediate'support,
Welles very frankly suggested that "a considerable armed force
be landed in Cuba to support'Cespedes#i9.'
a'.:
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*k%37# 00/3778 a Telegram, The Ambassador’in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of state, Habana, September 7, 1933, U#S.,
Foreign Relations, 1933, V,.- 396-98* Cordell Hull# Memoirs# I, 315.
Welles said, in part, "What I propose would be a strictly
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Neither the Secretary of state nor the President were
favorably Impressed with Welles,*a suggestion*

Hull believed

Welles had been over-influenced by local conditions and that
20
he had underemphasized the possible reaction in other nations *
The President agreed with his Secretary of State.

It would be

far better* they thought* if the United states could avoid
intervention of any kind.

In his reply to Welles* President

Roosevelt stated«
We feel very strongly that any promise, implied or
otherwise, relating to what the United states will
do under any circumstances is impossible* that it
would be regarded as a breach of neutrality, as
favoring one faction out of many, as attempting to

limited intervention of the following nature. The Cespedes
Government should be permitted to function freely in exactly
the same manner as it did until the time of its overthrow,
having full control of every branch of the Government. It
is obvious, of course, that with a great portion ofthe army
in mutiny, it could not maintain itself in power in any
satisfactory manner unless the United States Government were
willing, should it so request, to lend its assistance to the
maintenance of public order until the Cuban Government had been
afforded the time sufficient. . . to form a new army. . . •
Such a policy on our part would presumably entail the landing
of a considerable force at Havana and lesser forces in certain
of the more important ports of the Republic. The disadvantages
of this policy as I see them lie solely in the fact that we
will incur the violent animosity of theextreme radical and
communist groups in Cuba. . . it would further seem to me that
since the full facts of the situation here have been fully explained
to the representatives of the Latin American countries, the landing
of such assistance would most decidely be construed as well within
the limits of the policy of the 'good neighbor' which we have done
out utmost to demonstrate in our relations with the Cuban people
during the past five months."
^Huli, Memoirs. I, 315.
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set up a government which would he regarded by the
whole world* and especially throughout bat in America
as a creation and creature of the American Govern*
ment*^
But despite his philosophical opposition to intervention
unless it was absolutely necessary* the President had been
prepared, for the worst*

Even before the recommendation of

Intervention by Welles* Roosevelt had ordered more warships
with soldiers aboard to steam toward Cuba in case intervention
was necessary*

22

Twenty**nine other ships were placed on

Cuban duty on the following day (7 September) and air squadrons
were alerted*

In addition*guns and bomb racks were mounted

on planes and pilots at Ouantico* Virginia were ordered to
be ready to fly south on a moment’s notice*

Regiments of

United States Marines were assembled at Quantico and at Port
Everglades* Florida.

23

Although the President had prepared for the worst, he
was determined not to jeopardise chances for the success of
the Good neighbor Policy*

On 8 September* all military forces

21837.00/37781 Telegram, The Secretary of State to the
Ambassador in Cuba (Welles), Washington* September 7* 1933, U.S.,
Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 402? Cordell Hull* Memoirs» I, 315.
22Samuel Flagg Bemis* Latin American Policy, p. 281? N.Y.
Times, Septeinber 6* 1933* p. 3.
2%*Y* Times, Septeicber 7* 1933, p. 1, 3? Smith* The
United States and Cuba, p* 149./
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the United States and that sUch action would make it nearly
2V
impossible to win the friendship of batin American nations*
Hull was determined that the United states would not be swayed
from its non intewent ion course by pressure from any quarter#
including American businessmen^ with interests in Cuba,

in

addition, Hull's and Roosevelt*s thinking at this time was
significantly influenced by the threat of complete failure
at the forthcoming Montevideo Conference* ■
The United States had been treading a thin line between
intervention for the protection of American lives and property
and nonintewent ion for the sake of the wider and more
important policy of the Cood Neighbor.

By the end of the

second week in September, with the prospect of no cooperation
from other batin American governments for intewention and
with the Montevideo conference due to convene soon, the United
States had found itself forced into a position of being more
firmly than ever committed to a policy of nonintervention and
a denial of "responsibility0 under the Platt Amendment. The
"life, liberty, and property** clause of Article ttt of the

Smith, The United States and Cuba, p* 150*

Platt amendment had become, during the Hoover Administration,
"life, liberty, and property of Americans#*1 During the crisis
of the first days of September, 1933, the "property" clause
had been all but abandoned*

The phrase* "unless .absolutely

necessary” in regard to intervention remained, however, and
was as yet undefined,

in case intervention should become,

"absolutely necessary” American warships lay along Cuba*s
coast and in Havana Harbor on 9 September.
With the threat of military intervention by the United
States eased, events in Cuba moved swiftly toward a political
compromise.

The plan of revolt proposed by Dr. Ferrer

became unnecessary when Batista, realising his position
was in danger pushed a settlement which would be satisfactory
to all political groups*

After learning of the resignations

of two of his chief supporters, Porfirio Franca and dose
oOk
$
Xriaarri,
Batista offered to return Cespedes to the
Presidency,

in return, Batista required a guarantee that he

would remain as Chief of Staff of the Army.

When Cespedes

would make no such guarantee, 30 the three remaining members

^837.00/3807s Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of State, Habana, September 8, 1933, U.S.,
Foreign Relations. 1933. V, 410-*11.
■^837.00/3812% Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of State, Habana, September 9, 1933, U.S.,
Foreign-'Halations1933, V, 414.
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loreiiii .Relations,'liii* v, 4l4^lf| .8i?*DD/41lf* Memoranda
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that the Grau government represented only the **. * . extreme
radical elements."24
In regard to possible recognition of the new govern
ment by the United states, Welles persuaded Washington to
withhold recognition of the new regime until order could be
maintained.

At the same time, Welles recognised that, *• . .

no government here can survive for a protracted period with•»c

out recognition by the United states. . . ."

While it

is entirely possible that Welles sincerely believed that the
new government was. radical and did not have the support of
the people (this was certainly his own opinion for no election
had been held) and was opposed to immediate recognition for
that reason, it is more likely that the Cespedes government
had been a creature of Welles*# own making and he considered
its overthrow a personal affront and would therefore have
opposed any new political structure.
The advice of the Ambassador led to a policy of "watch
ful waiting** toward Cuba.

More than passive, the policy had

^837*00/3803$ Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of State, Habana, September 10, 1933* U.S.,
Foreign Relations, 1933, V, p . 4 1 7 .
3s I b l d .
3® I b i d . i

Pratt, Cordell Hull. 1 9 3 3 -4 4 . XXX, 1 4 8 ; Sumner

Welles, The Time for Decision, p. 198.
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two major points (1) nonrecognition of any .government.believed.
to be “radical”,.and (2) the active encouragement of groups
or individuals who would form a conservative, pro-united
States government ♦

During.the ■first ■days of •the Grau

regime, Welles became convinced that recognition .would'.not,
be offered in the near future*

The Union Nacionalista party.

led by Colonels Mendieta, Hev£a, Mendes.Penate, and Dr.
Torrlento, along with the Menocal party, and the O.C. R.R,

announced their opposition to the Grau government.

Since

these parties represented the majority of public opinion, .
Welles felt justified in believing that the government was *
not one which had the support of the people.^8
During this period* the Department of state reiterated
its stand that it was attempting to work closely with other
Latin American countries in an. attempt to bring about a stable
government in Cuba which represented the will of the people. 39

^Smith, The United States and Cuba, p, 1:52.
^8837.00/3828i Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba, (Welles)
to the Secretary of State, Habana, September 11, 1933, U.S.,
Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 419<*20? 837.00/3830* Telegram, The
Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of state, Habana,
September 11, 1933, U.S., Foreign Relations, 1933, 'V, 4 2 2 *2 4 *
38837.00/3830; Telegram, The Secretary of state to the
Ambassador in Cuba (Welles), Washington, September 11, 1933,
U.S. , Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 424? W.Y. Times, September
12, 1933, p. 1,
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in a statement released to the press, Secretary of State
Hull said:
The chief concern of the Government of the

United States is, a© it has been/ that Chba active •
'■ her' own political problems.in accordance with'the’
desire "of the Cuban people'themselves */ itwould
seem unnecessary to repeat that the Government of
the. 'Unitedstates'has no' interest 'In 'behalf of'or
prejudiee against any political group or independent
organization which is today active in the political
life of Cuba.40
Welles had reason to hope a favorable settlement could
be reached when, during the following weefc, the leaders of
the opposition parties met with Grau San Martin in an effort
to work out a compromise*

At first, Grau, realising his

position was based entirely upon the support of the Army
and the Student- Directory which Welles referred to.as a
group of "immature radicals," seemed willing to compromise*
At the time, the opposition demanded only representation
41
.
*
'
in the cabinet*
A. few days later, however, they had
abandoned compromise and began to insist upon the resignation
of Grau*

On 18 September, they presented an ultimatum to

40
,
. .■
837*00/3830: telegram, The secretary of State to the
Ambassador in Cuba (Welles), Washington; September 11, 1933,
U.S., Foreion delations* 1933, V, 424.
41837.00/3895* Telegram. The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the secretary' of State,’ Habana, September 15,' 1933, O.S.,
Foreign ^Relations. 1933 > V. 438-39.

Grau which insisted upon such measures as the reorganization
of political parties, the appointment of a legislative council
to legislate conjointly with the provisional government,
and immediate measures to end the violence, disorder, and
economic chaos which threatened the island* ■
Mi

*

At this
.■

point, although Grau seemed, willing to resign, he was
persuaded to remain in office by the recalcitrant student
group and the Army.

43
-

r

1

■

' ‘ ,

After the failure of the first effort at political
compromise, Welles appealed directly to Sergeant Batista.
After carefully explaining the position of the United States
in wishing to avoid intervention and reminding Batista of
the especially poor economic conditions on the island, Batista
agreed to talk with the Student Directorate•44

The result

of Batista*s efforts was a proposal for compromise by the

42837.00/3934; Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of State, Habana, September 18, 1933, U.S.,
Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 446-48? 837»00/3936; Telegram,
The Ambassador in Cuba, (Welles) to the Secretary of state,
Habana, September 18, 1933, U.S., Foreign Relations, 1933. V,
446-49.
43
837.00/3959; Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba
to the Secretary of State, Habana, September 19, 1933,
Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 449•
*•\
44837.00/3982, Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba
to the Secretary of State, Habana, September 21, 1933,
Foreign Relations* 1933. V, 451-53.

(Welles)
U.S.,
r
*
(Welles)
U.S.,
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Student Directorate which stated;
1. The retention of Grau San Martin as President.
2. Appointment of a-junta consultiva composed of
20 members,, one^half of.which to he selected by the
.opposition groups, and the remaining one-haIf by
the government supporters to function as a legislative
council. '
- 3. f,The junta consultiva to determine all appointments
to the Cabinet, . . . .
Mendieta and his Union Hacionalista party along with the
o.c.R.R. were inclined to accept the proposal but the other
opposition groups were not*

45

The negotiations again began

to break down when the student Directorate reversed its
position and refused to accept a compromise.

Likewise, the

opposition leaders refused to consider any solution which
meant the retention of Grau San Martin as President.

Efforts

by Batista, who was no longer as sure of his control of the
Army, and was disturbed by continued reports of revolution
in the provinces, to force a compromise during the last days
of September were to no avail.

45837.00/3890* Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of State, Habana, September 21, 1933, U.S.,
Foreign Relations. 1933. V, 454~55.
4% 37.00/4001* Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of State, Habana, September 23, 1933, U.S.,
Foreign Relations* 1933, V, 456<*57* 837*00/4007$ Telegram, The
Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, Habana,
September 25, 1933, U.S., Foreicrn Relations. 1933. V, 457-*58?
837.00/4023$ Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the
Secretary of State, Habana, September 25, 1933, U.S., Foreign
Relations, 1933. V. 459.’
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Early in October, Welles again met with Batista, because
he seemed to represent the only authority in the, nation (the
Army), and persuaded him to again try to work out a compromise
with Grau and the opposition.
.another

co u p d

While Welles did not wish to see

* etat, he did desire to see Batista, ^establish

a conservative government.

Although Washington was consider**

ing dropping some of the requirements for recognition and
affording recognition to Grau,4®,. Welles insisted that the
*

.

government still did not have any backing from the business
and financial interests nor, from the political parties and
that as a result the United Stateswould only be giving
recognition to a government which could not long maintain
itself.4**
At first, Batista was wholly unsuccessful in attempting
to bring together the dissident groups,

Then, during the

47837.00/4126i Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of State, Habana, October 4, 1033, U.S., Poreion
Relations, 1933. V, 468*72% Smith, the United States and Cuba,
p. 152.
48
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'

837.00/4131* telegram, The Secretary of State to the
Ambassador in Cuba (Welles), Washington, October 5, 1933, U.S.,
Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 472.
4

* ■

f

*

-

4% 37.00/4136* Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of.State, Habana, October S, 1933, U. S*,
Foreign Relations. 1933, V, 473-74.,

middle of October, be was somewhat successful in reaching an
agreement between himself, Colonel Mendieta, who represented
all of the opposition parties, and the Grau government backed
by the Student Directorate.

The solution which was tenta

tively agreed upon on 19 October provided for the retention
of Grau San Martin as President, the formation of a cabinet
representing all major parties, and the creation of an
administrative commission which would have, a deciding voice
in all matters affecting electoral and financial decrees and
would be composed of government and opposition appointees.^0
By 24 October, however, these negotiations had broken
down because of continued resistance by some of the leaders
of the Student Directorate and because of a split in the
A.B.C. over a solution to the political situation.

Batista

then became convinced that the only method which would settle
the situation was for Grau to resign to be replaced by Colonel
Mendieta and a cabinet composed of the opposition parties.
Negotiations toward this end progressed smoothly with all
groups ostensibly agreeing to the replacement of Grau with

37.00/4236* Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of state, Habana, October 19, 1933, 0. s.,
Foreign Relations. 1933. %f0 492-93,
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Colonel Mendieta^-*- until 29 October when, after .36. hours
of negotiation, Colonel Mendieta, announced hie refusal to
accept the; provisional presidency.

His refusal was due

principally, to. his. fear- that Batista .could not control the
\
Army and. because as President he would be a puppet of. Batista#
in addition, Mendieta, was probably, influenced by, members ,of
his own.party who did not wish to have, him jeopardize.his
chances of winning,a full term as President when national
elections were held#

Because of this, change in politicalt .

events, Welles reversed his position and began to urge upon
the Cubans the acceptance of .the*previous plan which had .
permitted Crau to continue as Provisional President*

52

,

.As the United States continued to withhold diplomatic
recognition from Grau san Martin (it had been granted to
Cespedes on 14 August and less than a month later he was
out of office), criticism aimed at the United States grew#
Many i,atin American countries, for example, which had agreed

s^837*00/4254* Telegrams The Ambassador in Cuba (Whiles)
to the Secretary of State, Habana, October 21, 1933, U.S.,
Foreign Relations# 1933# V, 496; 837.00/4260: Telegram, The
Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the secretary of State, Habana,
October;23, .1933, 0#S# Foreign ..Relations f 1933# V, 496-97; ;
837#00/4265 and 4267 s Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of State, Habana, October 24, 1933, U.S.,
Foreign Relations# 1933, V, 498*99.
52
837#00/4298; Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of state, Habana, October 29, 1933, U.S.,
Foreign Relations# 1933#■ V, 503*04#

not to act in'regard to Cuba until the United states had done
so Were becoming increasingly anxious to'recognise the new
government.53 'Many critics'of American policy declared that
withholding recognition was equal to direct intervention since
no Cuban government could long remain in power without United
States recognition.^

President Grau had himself proclaimed

that the policy of the United states seemed to be Hinter
vention by inertia."^

In refusing recognition because the

Grau government could not maintain order, Washington was
evidently ignoring the fact that in his first two months
in office. President Grau San Martin had successfully crushed
two major insurrections in the provinces*

As Whitney H.

Shepardson and William 0. Scroggs have written, %

. . the

United states Government was more impressed by the uprisings
**
*56
than it was with the fact that they had been put. down. "

^%3^.01/SS, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of
State (Caffery) * Washington, Wovsitnber 25, 1933, U.S., Foreign
Halations, 1933, U, ‘526.
s%hitney H. ’Shepardson an<3 William O. scroggs, The United
States in World Affairs? An Account of American Foreign Relations,
1934*35 (Mew VorJc* Harper & Bros., for The Council on Foreign
Eolations, 1935), p. 121.
'^Bemls, Latin American Policy, p. 280.

S^Shepardson and Scroggs, The United States in World
Affairs, 1934*35, p. 121.
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By the end of the first week in November, Welles was
still unable to persuade the opposing factions to reach
agreement and the efforts of Batista were, apparently shaving
little effect* •On.6 November, the Ambassador cabled the
Department of State that, general" conditions were growing
worse by the day and that he expected any of the following
to occurs’•

■’

‘* •

a* An immediate c o u p d* etat against Grau by Batista
which if successful will rdsult in the formation of
■* a center government headed by gomes or a military
dictatorship?
b. Outbreak of revolution in Griente and Camaguey
Provinces?
c. General strike tomorrow instigated by the
Communist organisation?
d. Displacement of Batista through violence by elements
in the Army upon whom Guiteras /leader of the'Cuban
Communists/ is working? !
e. reorganisation of the government under Grau bringing
into the Cabinet new elements probably of communist
tendencies which could only result in repeated
revolutionary attempts against it. 7
The position of the Ambassador on the seriousness of
Communist party influence in the Grau government is Interesting*
While it is true that during the existence of the Grau
government the Communists played an active part in attempting
t

t '

'•

!

to organise workers and were important in the national Cuban
Workers* Confederation, Welles placed, their significance out

7S3?.00/43421 Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of'State, Habana, November 6, 193.3, U.S.,
Foreign Halations, 1933; V, 515.

of all proportion to their strength*

in addition# although

Grau had indicated from time to time that he hoped to
initiate a radical program for CUfoa which included measures
aimed against North American companies operating in the
53
country,
communists who were associated with Grau such as
Or* Antonio Guiteras# Secretary of Gobernacfoh, resigned from
the government,5^ blindly opposed Grau San Martin, and
4
■S0
openly called upon the people to oppose him.
When it became apparent during November that the
"intermeddling*' of Welles was having no effect, the position
of persons in the United States department of State began to
change toward him.

On 6 November, Under Secretary of state

Phillips suggested to Welles that he join the delegation
about "to depart for the Montevideo Conference*

After Welles

had replied that this was impossible because he was urgently

^international Commission of jurists, Cuba and the
Rule of Law, p. 32.
,
59
f
837.00/4338t telegram, ihe Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of state, Habana, November 4, 1933, U.S.,
foreign Relations, 1933. V* S12 *
^International Commission of Jurists, Cuba and the
Rule of x*aw, p. 32.
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needed in Cuba during such a critical time,^ Phillips noted
in his diary*
In my opinion Welles is doing no good in Habana; he
has become so involved with the various political
parties and is being so violently attach /ed/ in
the local press and other wise that his presence
there has no longer any 'healing* effect.6^During the second week in November# the violent
revolution which had been predicted by Welles occurred,

in

his reports to the Department of State* however, Welles was
never precise as to the source of the rebellion.

He inferred

that it was being caused by a new Army revolt and by workers
who were dissatisfied not only with the political chaos but
also with the continually worsening economic situation.

63

*837.QO/4342t Telegram# The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of state# Habana, November 6# 1933# U.S.,
Foreign Relations# 1933, V, 515.
62Pratt* Cordell Hull. 1933^44. XII, 149.
6% 3 7 .00/4354* Telegram# The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Secretary of state# Habana, November 9, 1933* U.S.*
Foreign Relations, 1933. V, 517; 837.00/4355; Telegram, The
Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, Habana,
November 9# 1933, U.S.# Foreign Relations, 1933. V#I 518? ,
837.00/4360; Telegram# The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the
Secretary of State, Habana# November 9# 1933, U.S.* Foreign
Relations, 1933# v, 518; 837.00/4368; Telegram, The Ambassador
in Cuba (Wellers) to the Secretary of State# Habana, November
10, 1933* U.S., Foreldn Relations, 1933, V, 519-20. Also see
Hull, Memoirs, I, 317? Welles, The Time for Decision, p. 198.
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At this time, Welles requested a conference with President
Roosevelt to discuss the future course of American policy.

64

Welles met with Roosevelt on 19 November at Warm
Springs, Georgia. At that time, Roosevelt evidently came
to the same conclusions which tinder secretary of state
William Phillips had come to two weeks earlier about the
advisability of Welles remaining in H a v a n a A t about the
same time, Grau San Martin had decided that Welles was
persona non errata and requested his recall.

66

in any event,

Roosevelt telephoned Phillips (Hull was then traveling to
Montevideo) to tell him that Welles would return to Havana
for a few days and would then return to Washington as
'£L

Assistant Secretary of state.

*1

Welles’s replacement in Cuba,

64,
837.00/4391* Telegram* The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Acting Secretary of State, Habana, November 13, 1933,
U.S., Foreign Relations, 1933. V, £20*21? 837.00/4435# Statement
by the Acting Secretary of state /issued as a press release on
15 November/, 0. S., Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 521.
65
.
123 w 451/144* Telegram* The Acting Secretary of
State to the Secretary of state, at Sea, Washington, November
20, 1933, U.S., Foreign Relations, 1933. V, 523.
66

837.00/4450* Telegram? The Secretary to President
Roosevelt (Farly) to the Acting Secretary of State, Warm springs,
Ga., November 22, 1933, U.S., Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 524*
N.Y. Times, November 18, 1933, p. 6.
0^123 W 451/144? Telegram? The acting Secretary of State
to the Secretary of State, at Sea, Washington, November 20,
1933, U. S., Foreign Relations. 1933, V, 523* Pratt, Cordell
Hull, 1933*»44, XII, 149.

Uefferson caffery, had been designated for that position
since early stammer#

He would enter Cuba, however, as the

Personal Representative of the President rather than as
Ambassador#

Apparently, Washington finally realised

that it was inconsistent with the non-recognition policy to
maintain an Ambassador in Cuba.
An additional indication of a possible revision in
Cuban policy came a few days after the conference between
Roosevelt and Welles#

While Hull was earoute to the Montevideo

Conference, Roosevelt expressed a willingness to renegotiate

the 1903 Treaty of Relations with Cuba of which the Platt
Amendment was a part#

By so doing# it was hoped that the

image of the United States would be improved at the Montevideo

Conference.

69

A view, incidentally, which was shared by

observers in London who expressed the opinion that the British
looked upon the move simply as a device to win sympathy in
Latin America and increase American trade during a period

68Ibid.
88Franklin D# Roosevelt# Presidential Statement of
Non-Intervention in Cuba— The Good Neighbor Policy Applied#
November 23# 1933# Roosevelt#* The Public Papers and Addresses
of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, II# 500; Hull, Memoirs, I,
317*

93
of economic depression*70

The good neighborliness of Roosevelt

was tempered, however, when he added that such a revision of
the treaty could not take place,

. until there exists

in Cuba a provisional Government which, through popular
support# * . shows evidence of genuine stability."7^
While the ■United states'was’remaining firm''in'its
stand that recognition would not be offered to a nation which
could not maintain order and did not represent the will of the
people, the whole question of intervention under the Platt
Amendment was being warmly debated.

The New York Journal

of Commerce was reported to be strongly supporting inter
vention.

Reminding the United states of the contractual

obligation of the Platt Amendment and of the fact that
American investors had relied upon it, it said, "We can
not neglect the definite obligations imposed upon this country
by the Platt Amendment* **7^

Other periodicals were taking a

70N.Y. Tiroes, December 14, 1933, p. 9.
7^Franklin D. Roosevelt,“Presidential Statement of
Non-Intervention, in Cuba— The Good Neighbor Policy Applied*11
November 23, 1933, Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses
of Franklin Delano Roosevelt,'
*■II, ‘300 #......
72
"The Challenge of the Cuban Kaleidoscope," The
Literary Digest, (September 23, 1933), p. 7.
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similar stand.

The Review of Reviews, for example, was

concerned about the welfare' of Americans and the millions of
73
dollars they had invested. ■'

*'

An editorial in The New York Times ■stated ■that while
there may have been a few American businessmen and Cubans
of wealth who desired to see the American flag flying over
Cuba, this was most definitely hot the sentiment of a majority
'

of Cubans or Americans,

r'

t

The paper then urged President

Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull to withstand any
pressure for Intervention* 74

.

Raymond Buell and the foreign

Policy Association had taken a similar stand'during August
and again in November but had gone further by deploring the
existence of the Platt Amendment as an unnecessary and use7S

less tool of foreign policy*
Other periodicals were taking a similar position.

The

Christian Science Monitor urged the United States to avoid
intervention because, %

, , interfering in another country‘s

7^Review of .Reviews (November, 1933), p, 18,
^Editorial, "Who Wants intervention," N.Y. Times,
September 12, 1933, p. 22*
.
7SH.Y. Tiroes. August 12, 1933, p. 3?
November 12, 1933, p. 20*

H.Y.-Times,

95
affairs is always a thankless business."76

it pointed out

that past intervention had not been extremely successful and
that if we desired democracy in Cuba we had best permit it
to develop by itself.77

The Wall street Journal was quoted

as saying*
Forceful measures on our part will, work no change
either in the economic circumstances of the island
or in habits of political thought# If the character
of the Machado regime imposed upon us no obligation
to Intervene# we may consistently allow the new
provisional government a wide latitude to work out
its own destiny.78
Further# the Hew York Herald Tribune severely criticised the
movements of a fleet in Cuba saying that*
. . . it is not intelligent action and is certainly
disastrous policy. . . . The appearance is that of an
Administration going off half-cocked in all directions#
It was that sort of snap Judgment that took the Maine
to Havana in 1898— -a much less jingoistic performance.7^
hatin American newspapers# particularly in Buenos Aires#
were also interpreting the deployment of ships and the with
holding of diplomatic recognition as direct intervention under

7^Literarv Digest .(August 19# 1933)# p# 9.
y7lbid#
78“The Challenge of'the Cuban Kaleidoscope," literary
Dioast (September 23# 1933)# p. 7.
7^literary Digest (Septenber 16, 1933)# p. 7.

the Platt Amendment,80

The Literary Digest reported that some

European newspapers were taking a very similar stand against
@1
the da facto intervention by the United States,
One' of the'most severe criticisms'of 'American policy
came from Samuel G. Inman, 'Writing for The Christian Century,
Hr* Inman first denounced the American press for trying to
■/.v

bring on intervention with such explosive headlines as
"Counter-Revolution:11 and "Labor Prepared to Destroy all Sugar
Hills**1 which he charged were reminiscent of the Hearst
press during 1898*

He then warned Roosevelt and Hull to

beware of the course Congress might itake for the protection
of American business, of the influence of American business**
men, and of the strong influence of business interests in the
administration in the persons of Secretary Woodin, Secretary
Roper and Ambassador~at-Large Davis, all of whom had financial
interests in Cuba*

Finally, the author reminded the admin is*-

tration of the real .need for basic reform in Cuba where there
had been nothing but inequality and the ever present "moral*1
authority of Uncle Sam*

indeed, many of the,Cuban "revolutionists"

had only been looking to the united States where a revolutionary
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ •

80Ibld.
81Ibld.

:jj ‘

-
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socialized program had become necessary in a time of great
difficulty*

He said?

The new government has officially announced its
intention to respect international treaties and
financial obligations, to protect life and com*
pensate for land taken and there has been no
suggestion of any anti-religious movement* They
are not communists and promise to.take vigorous
action against either a communist or a conservative
movement, either of which they believe would defeat,
the real purposes of the revolution* But they will
not accept placidly attempted dictation from- the
United states*82
finally# he reminded the administration and the American public
of our experiences with Mexico and Russia to show that we
could deal with the'problem much more'realistically if we
appreciated the fundamental character of the problem rather
than treating-it as#

* . a mere eruption. “83

Perhaps the most bitter denunciation of Mrerlean policy
and of Ambassador Welles in particular came from Carleton
Beals*

ih jSje^^tion# Beal© condemned the “inept meddling"
QA
which made "non* intervent ion merely a hypocritical pose.1*

82Samuel Guy Inman# "Which Way in Cuba?1* The Christian
Century, h# Mo* 41# {October 11# 1933)'# -p. 1268*"
8 3I b i d .

■©^Carleton Beals, "American diplomacy in CUba#'*
nation {January 17# 1934)# p. 68.

The

He charged that Welles attempted throughout his stay in Cuba
to create a government subservient to Washington and in so
doing repeated American blunders of a past generation#

The

meddling of Welles, he charged, made a government unfriendly
to the united States a logical result#

The sending, of .©hips
SB
to Cuba only strengthened that anti-American feeling#
Furthermore# he claimed

that the unsettled and terroristic

situation at the end of

1933 was the result of Welles's

attempt tot
.# # # install reactionary and discredited elements
in control of the Cuban government# his use of the
embassy as a club room for the reunion of all the
enemies of the government# his abetting of the
terrorist A#B*C. which talked conciliation during
the day but planted bomb© at night, have contributed •
to instability and armed revolt#86
the time Welles had arrived back in Havana after
his conference with Roosevelt, the Oran government had success
fully suppressed the counter-revolution of November.

This

fact was causing Acting Secretary of State William Phillip©
to question whether or not the criterion of withholding re
cognition because the government could not maintain order

85ibia.
a6XfeM., P. 69.

was valid. 87

Baring the first weefc in December, Welles and

the Uruguayan Minister sought another compromise solution*
At first, Grau again agreed to resign no later than April,
1934.

later, however, Grau again reversed his position.

This led General Menocal,■ in exile in-Florida, to declare
0Q
that the only solution was violent revolution.
By Q
BOcember, the political scene which had been relatively quiet
for only a few days was again becoming tense*

In particular,

the American controlled Cuban Electric Company and Cuban
Telephone Company were afraid for the safety of their ;
property*

This prompted Welles to notify the Department

of state that he would have to postpone his return to the
United States for at least a few days-until a settlement
could be reached or the crisis subsided.^

87837.01/47# Telegram, The Acting secretary of state to
the Secretary of State, Washington, Wovember 28, 1933, U.S.,
Foreign Relations. 1933. V, 527-28.
88837.00/44671 Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Acting Secretary of State, Habana, December 2, 1933, U.S
Foreign Relations. 1933, V, 529-30* 837.00/4475# Telegram, The
Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Acting secretary of State,
Habana, December 5, 1933, U.S*, Foreign Relations. 1933, V,
531-33* 837.00/4475: Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Acting Secretary of State, Habana, December 7, 1933, U.S
Foreign Relations. 1933. V, 533-36.
4

s% 3 7 *00/4485# Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles)
to the Acting Secretary of State, Habana, December 8, 1933, U.S
Foreign Relations. 1933. V, 536.
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By 11 December, the negotiations which called for the
resignation of .Grau, the continuance of the revolutionary
program, 'and the 'retention of Batista as Chief of :Staff of
the Army, and in which Welles had acted as a "friendly
observer" had completely broken down*

With the situation no

nearer a solution'than It had been in September, Welles'agreed
,

to leave Havana on 13 December*

90

On the same day, The New

York Times reported a charge made by the Uruguayan Minister
to Cuba, Benjamin Fernandez de Medina, that Welles had ruined
the recent negotiations by conspiring with the opposition
forces*

The Department of State replied for the former

Ambassador by saying that Welles had confirmed to the Depart■
9i
ment that he had acted only as an observer*
•

Meanwhile, Cordell Hull was attempting to convince the
delegates to the Montevideo Conference that, "* . • the United
States Government is as much opposed as any other government
to interference with the freedom, the sovereignty, or other

^®123 w 451/162# Telegram, The Ambassador in Cuba,(Welles)
to the Acting Secretary of State, Habana, December 11, 1933, U.S*,
Foreign Relations, 1933, V, 539i 837.00/4498* Telegram, ‘The
Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Acting Secretary of State,
Habana, December II, 1933, U.S., Foreign Relations, 1933, V,
539-40*'
'
91H.Y. Tiroes. December 13, 1933, p. 10.
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Internal affairs or processes of the governments of other
nations*u^2

Hull made inferences to the Cuban situation when

he stated*
My Government is doing its utmost, with due regard
to commitments made in the past, to end with all
possible speed engagements which have been set up
by previous circumstances* -There are some engage
ments which can be removed more speedily than others.
In some instances disentanglement from obligations
of another era can only be brought about through the
exercise of some patience.^3
More specifically, Hull withstood pressure from Chile,
Argentina, and Mexico to immediately accord recognition to
QA
the Gran government.
The United States,'he said, wished
only for a situation which would benefit all Cubans and would
recognise any government when the two major conditions had
QC
been met.
Hoping for support, Hull, after receiving instruc
tions from Roosevelt, urged other Latin American governments

^Cordell Hull, Memoirs, I, 333-34.
93Ibid., p. 333,
94037#00/4449e Telegram, The Ambassador in Brazil
(Gibson) to the Acting secretary of state, Rio de Janeiro,
November 24, 1933, U.S., Foreign Relations, 1933. XV, 40-41.
957X0.0/371, instructions to the Delegates to the Seventh
International Conference of American States, Montevideo,
Uruguay, Washington, November 10, 1933, U.S., Foreign Relations,
1933, XV, 151.
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to withhold recognition for the time being so, as to do ,nothing
which would jeopardize the success of the Pan American
Conference*^®
nevertheless, the subject of intervention ,and In particular
the problem, of CUba was. a .vital part, of .the conference pro
ceedings • The Chairman of the Cuban delegation* ;Sr* Angel
Giraudy, denounced the United States by saying:
It is not possible to remain silent when it is affirmed
that the united States doesnot wish to intervene in .
Cuba, because this is not true. '*’ * if it is not
intervention when in a defenseless nation a rep*
resentative of the United states incites part of the
people against the government* * *r if it is not
intervention to surround a defenseless island by a
threatening squadron in the; attempt to impose upon
it a government it does not desire then there has
never been any intervention in America*^7
She indication of the United States that it was willing to
abrogate the Platt Amendment and the statements by Hull to
the other delegates that the United States was willing to back

96837.00/4449: telegram, The Acting Secretary of state
to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Hull), Washington,
November 25* 193$, 0* 3*, Poreiqn Relations, 1933, XV, 41*42*
^7Piarfo de la VII Conferencia internacional Americana
(Montevideo) , No* 11* p. 19, quoted in* Harry Hersh Shapiro,
"The United States and the Principle of Absolute Nonintervention
in'batin America with Particular Reference to Mexico" (un*
published Ph.D. dissertatfon, Dept* of Political Scfence,
University of Pennsylvania* 1949) p. 148*

its words- with deeds' saved -the United States from a diplomatic
disaster; ' The conference had before ft a draft of a convention
on the rights and duties of states which had been prepared by
the international Commies ion of American Jurisconsults at
Rio de Janeiro in 1927*

The most important part of the

convention was Article Q which stated, **/■ * * ho state-has the
right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of
another* **"

Although secretary Hull had some reservations

about signing the declaration/ explaining his reservations
were due to a lack of time to study all of the articles, he
voted for the convention including Article 8 . "
The position of the United states in wooing batin
America was enhanced further by a speech delivered by president
Roosevelt to the Woodrow Wilson Foundation on 28 December.
The President first reaffirmed the United states*s position
against intervention.

He then said*

The maintenance of constitutional government in other
nations is not a sacred obligation devolving upon the
United states alone* The maintenance of law and the
orderly processes*of government in this hemisphere is *

"united ‘States Department of State, Report of the Dele-'
gates of the United States of America to the Seventh International
Conference of American States, Montevideo. Uruguay, December 326. 1933* Conference Series-No* 19* Publication No. 666. (Wash
ington! Government printing Office, 1934), p* 103.
"Harry Hersh Shapiro, "The united States and the Principle
of Absolute Nonintervention,** p. ISO.
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the concern of each individual nation within its
own borders first of all* It is only if and when
the failure of orderly processes affects the other
nations of the continent that it becomes their
concern and the point to stress is- that in 'such an
event it becomes the joint concern of a whole
continent in'Which we are all neighbors.100
It must be noted.that it was only armed Intervention
I*1 internal affairs that the United States was abjuring*
Presumably, the "intermeddling*1 of Welles and later of
Caffery.was officially sanctioned.
concern is also interesting*

The statement on joint

Theoretically, joint concern

meant joint consultation such as Roosevelt had been pursuing.
The policy also implied the possibility of joint intervention.;
In any intervention in Batin America, the principal military
force

would Have to come from the United States.

seam that while Roosevelt was intimating

It would

that the policy of

unilateral_intervention under the Roosevelt corollary and
action in Cuba under the Platt Amendment were at an end, the
President was seeking sanction for nearly the same policy
through international law and the Pan-American Union.101

As

100Address by President -Franklin 0* Roosevelt at Washington,
D.C. on December 28, 1933, Department of State, press Releases
(December 30, 1933), p. 380, reprinted in James w. Gantenbeln, ■
The Evolution of Our Batin American Policy* A Documentary Record
(New Yorks Columbia University Press, 1950), p. 166.
101Bemie, Batin American Policy* p. 277.
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far as the administration was concerned# formal use of the
Platt amendment was- out of '.the question after 28 .December
largely because' 'it was viewed as unnecessary'.:

, .. ,

throughout January, Caffery worked to secure a change
in government in much the same manner as had Welles.
i

'

'

1

Grau,

■

.however.#, remained'-convinced'-that .he was maintaining stability
and would be able to hold free elections if he remained in the
Presidency* 102
»

caffery, in fact# agreed with Grau when he
*

>

'

'

reported to Washington that, the government was supported#
. . . only by the army and ignorant masses who have
been misled by utopian promises * However# unless
Dr. Grau decides voluntarily to give up power it
is my opinion that he can be forced to do so only by
the armed intervention of the United States .1°$
Caffery believed that'the- upper class political, and business
leaders had to be relied upon to bring stable government to
the island.

In addition# he believed that only a change in

government would avert a more radical and communistic

102827.00/4596* Telegram, The Personal Representative
of the President (caffery) to- the-’.Acting Secretary of state#
Habana# January 11, 1934# United States Department of State#
Foreign Relations of the United States? Diplomatic Papers#
1934, Vol. V* The American Republics (Washington! U.S.
Government Printing Office# 1952), p. 97.
iC)3S37.00/4591 s ,Telegram# The -Personal Representative
of the President (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of state#
Habana# January 10# 1934# U.S., Foreign Relations, 1934, V#
95.
. "" .

revolution. He reporteds
*- * * the de facto authorities in view of the
fact that they have no support from the better
■‘elements' of the country are" relying-more and
more on radical and communistic elements and we *
'
may soon be faced with a very grave situation in
connection with the protection of our manifold
• interests on the island*
By mid-?January* politleal conditions were as unsettled
as ever before;^ '-labor disturbances affected most phases’of
t

,

t

,

»

1 -'*.
'

the already crippled economy and the threat of strikes or a
■

'm

1

'

*

. '

1
'

i ''•

»

general strike led by the communist labor leaders increased
d a i l y * - B e c a u s e of the-, severity of the situation and
Caffery’s urging* Batista became convinced that he had to use
his authority with the tony to force a change in the govern*
... ,
■ i ** ■ ■■ ;
ment* Batista again contacted Carlos Mendieta and urged him
to accept the Provisional Presidency until a final solution
could be negotiated*

Mendieta* however* considering the

problems caused Grau by the lack of united States; recognition#

104Ibid., 96
.-

10^837,00/4605: Telegram* The Personal Representative
of the President (Caffery) to the Acting secretary of State#
Habana* January 13* 1934# U*S.# Foreign Relations* 1934, V*
97'**98? 837.00/4606: Telegram, The personal Representative of
the President (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of state#
Habana* January*14# 1934* U*B7* Foreign Relations/ 1934, V,
9S*
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wanted advance assurance that his government would be recog**
nized by the United States,

caffery" urged Roosevelt to grant

such assurance on the grounds that otherwise,

. . Batista

will probably turn definitely to the left with definite
disaster for all our interests here (or declare himself a
military dictator)."107

When Roosevelt refused to grant

advance recognition, 103 Batista threw his support to Carlos
Hevia, a man who was relatively unimown but was definitely
more conservative than Grau San Martin, thus accomplishing
what Welles had been trying to do since September, 1933.100
As one author states, "Batista had cast his lot with the
conservative, pro-American political groups, and his reward
was twenty**five years of power. "HO

1^^837.00/4606t Telegram, The Personal Representative
of the President (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State,
Habana, January 14, 1934, U.S., Foreign Relations, 1934, V, 98.
108037#00/4609? Telegram, The Acting Secretary of State
to the Personal Representative of the President (Caffery),
Washington, January 14, 1934, U.S., Foreign Relations, 1934,
V, 100.
109937.00/4619 s Telegram, The Personal Representative

of the president (caffery) to the Acting secretary of state,
Habana, January 15, 1934, U.S., Foreign Relations, 1934. V, 101.
HORUby Hart Phillips, Cuba* island of Paradox (Hew
Yorks 1959), p. 81, quoted in Smith, The united States and
Cuba, p. 155.

cmmmn sv

,..

.

‘'mcomtnom, abrogation, mt> reciprocity, 1934
After,some delay, Hevia was installed as Provisional
i
President on 16 January, 1934.
At the same time, and
'■

<

■

.

■

* :

'

throughout the next few days, there were growing rumors
of strikes being fomented by the Communists and radical left
under the leadership of Antonio'Ooiteras. ‘After negotiations
between Caffery and Batista, Batista sent word to Caffery
,

»

-

>

r
i

that the Cuban Army and Navy were taking direct steps to
end the possibility of strikes or a general strike.2

Although

Batista believed the situation was under control, there was
enough' public' dissatisfaction with the choice of Hevia that
Batista again began to negotiate with Mehdieta to persuade
him to accept1the Presidency.' Mendieta, ■Batista‘thought,■
-t

*837.00/4622t telegram, The Personal Representative of
the President ( C a f f e r y ) , t o the Acting .Secretary of,.State, Habana,
January 16, 1934, U.S., Foreign Relations, .1934, V, 102.
2Ibid.t 837.00/4625* telegram. The Personal Representative
of the President (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of state,
Habana, •January 17, 1934, U.S., Foreign Relationsf 1934. V, 102^03.
108

3*09
could command more widespread popular confidence.

3

On 18

January, Hevia resigned his office and Mendieta was installed

as Provisional President,4

Caffery immediately telegraphed

the Department of state that although there was a small
communistic element opposed to Mehdieta that would undoubtedly
he attempting to topple the government, he believed Mendieta
was capable of dealing firmly with the situation and would
be capable of maintaining law and order
The question of popular support raises an interesting
hut difficult question.

Both the representatives of the

United States and most of those in a position of local power
believed Mehdieta to be the champion of the people.

The

New York Times reported and subsequent events indicated,
however# that a great deal of opposition to the government

3837,00/4616i Telegram# The Personal Representative of
the President, (Caffery) to the Acting secretary of state*
Habana# January 17, 1934# U.S., Foreign Relations, 1934. V#
103? 837,00/4633s Telegram,„The Personal Representative of
the President (Caffery) to the Acting' secretary of State#
Habana, January 18, 1934, U,S*# Foreign Relations, 1934. V, 104,
4837.00/4634t Telegram# The Personal Representative of
the President (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State#
Habana, ’January 18.,. .1934..# U,s. # Fore Ion Relations. 1934, V#
105,
%37.00/4643* Telegram, The Personal Representative of
the President. (Caffery) to the;.Acting Secretary of state,
Habana# January 18# 1934, U.S., Foreign Relations, 1934, V#
105,
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remained,

barge, numbers of workers were, on strike and a
*

r

general strike was threatened for 19 January* Presumably,
while most of the government workers were protesting be
cause they had not been paid for several months, the re
mainder of the opposition was to the military control exer
cised by Batista and to the United states for interference
in the person of Jefferson Caffery.
Although it appears that most political groups# with the
exception of.what Caffery called the "extreme left and • . .
the adherents of Machado, *'? supported Mendieta# it is
Impossible to tell precisely the extent of Mendieta4© backing
at this time for no election had been held.

This would not

be clearly known until at least 22 April# the date set (by
former Provisional President Grau) for the election of a
constituent assembly,

m

reality# Mendieta believed even

April would be too early to hold an election.

He supposed

it would take longer to take a census# organize political
parties, and make proper preparations for a free election,

6

J.D. Phillips# "Mendieta Accepts Cuban Presidency*
Takes Oath Today," N.Y, Times, January 18# 1934, p. 2,
^837,00/4664t Telegram, The Personal Representative of
the President, (Caffery) to the Secretary of state, Habana,
January 22, 1934, U.S. Foreign Relations, 1934, V# 106,
%r.Y. Times, January 20# 1934; p. 7,

The new .government did„ not. postpone seeking close; _
relations with the United .states,•.however#

Almost immediately,

Mendieta expressed hope that as soon as Cuba established a
jt

stable government, a new trade agreement would be completed
9
and the Permanent Treaty of 1903 revised*
Nor did the united
States delay in seeking cordial relations with Mendieta#
Two days after the provisional government was established
and while the country■was still■threatened with strikes- and ■
violence, it became clear the united' states intended'to *
recognise Mendieta*

on 20 January, Washington looked toward

recognition within a week or ten days*

President Roosevelt

expressed hope that Mendieta would meet his two requirements
of backing by the Cuban people and ability to maintain law
and order.

The President further stated he had had no word

from Cuba on that day but expected good news*

10

The next day, Secretary of State Cordell Hull returned
to Washington from the Pan American Conference at Montevideo*
Upon arrival, he received a message from Acting Secretary of
State Phillips informing him that President Roosevelt had
invited the Latin American representatives in Washington to

^QN.Y* Times, January 20, 1934, p# 1

.

.
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ineet. with, him _In. a i w days*,..t$be purpose ,of. the. ^proposed
meet ing„ was' to ...inform the |&tln. American countries qf„.;__
Mendieta *s success in meeting the-requirements for recognition*
The United States, was certain, on 21 January* that Mendieta.
had popular support and was able to maintain order-~w±th ,the
help of the Army.

11

Caffery, on 22 January, affirmed Roosevelt^s position
on Cuba.3,2 The following day, with the concurrence of the
President, 13 Cordell Hull instructed Caffery to immediately
extend ‘formal and cordial“ recognition to the Government
of Cuba.^4

At once, France, Italy, Great Britain; and the

self-governing Dominions recognised Mendieta.

The Latin

ilHull, Memoirs, 1, 342. The Hew York Times reported
that this was the first time the U.S. had consulted the nations
of Latin America en masse about the recognition of the govern
ment of a sister state although there had been previous
consultations between the State Department and Latin American
ministers over the situation in Cuba, H.Y. Times, January 23,
1934, p. 1.
12837.00/4664: ' Telegram, The Personal .Representative
of the President (Caffery) to the secretary of state, Habana,
January 22, 1934, U.S. Foreign Relations, 1934, V, 107.
^%ull. Memoirs. 1, 343.
3^837.01/701 The Secretary of State to the Personal
Representative of the President (Caffery), Washington, January
23, 1934, U.S., Foreign Relations, 1934. V, 107.

A m e r i c a f o l l o w e d

with,

:

secretary' of-stdfe. Bull.announced,,the:with- ' "
dfewai q#';’iin,ite# ftstes. navy vessels; from Cuban, waters.*6
-,: in pargeting.a -ehange.iii. :ttte government >of .Cuba- through:
of

and puffery' with Batista and;others

#f ,3^ 1iti^i^Jniiuenc#*::the United. states *^parently. was not
thinking « 4terms of. whether,or m % this action constituted
ihfeweatJOa-bn Cuban internal affairs orwhather or;,not
the, meddling.was:
;hoostii*t-Batista to a .^eition oM m m -,
absolute.power*., fvt the -oontraiyY/the, only ■eohsideratioii^ >
seems to have been bringing ..about.a :«apM, settlement to.
eliminate -the:danger of dii^t,totefy^ition ..for the/pro*'
taction,of.juries!! lives, and 'property* :consideration .was also given' to bringing about a more favorable attitude, to
ward the United', states on the part, of ,Latin American, nations.#*^
criticism of the administration's policy in
regard to the .^cognition of Cuba was forthcoming from the
nation*

p m magazine espoused* .on .11;January, ■the: .idea ■that .

-*Y*.:.iimes* ■January;24*,; 1934,... p.* ■s.*
*1 % good discussion of the motivation of' the /United
States In granting' recognition,,may .be, found. .in, ..Sryca, wood, :
,
.
T^.,.mklng:i,of•..the. feed, Sflelehber Policy (Mew York* .,Coiurbia
University Press*: .'JJill*.p. '111*..
.. ;
•
:■
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no nation should have to win the approval of the United States
Ambassador before recognition is granted and further?
To contrast the insurmountable testa and standards
we presented to President Grau and the ready
recognition we accord to colonel Mendieta is to
disclose the inconsistency, the absurdity, and the
personal bias which have characterised our Cuban
policy* The only way in which those past errors
can be rectified and the Hew Deal really brought
to Cuba,is to proceed henceforth with a frank,
vigorous, and generous policy. ; *
A part of the generous policy advocated by The nation was
19
abrogation of the Platt Amendment without reservation*
By the time this article was written, however, the
United States was already proceeding toward that goal.

On

18 January, Representative Hamilton Fish, Jr. had risen in
the'-House to express his affection for the new President of
Cuba who had been selected by the Cuban people, to request,
recognition, and to ask that the United States proceed to
abolish the Platt Amendment*

He reasoned that the United

States had failed to keep its obligation to the Cuban people
and that the Amendment had therefore lost its meaning.
Because the United states had neglected its moral obligation

18The Nation
19It>ld.

(January 31, 1934), Vol. CXXXVTII, p. 117.

and because of the presidential policy opposed to the use of
armed force or military aggression, particularly in regard to
Latin America, the'Platt Amendment should,, be repealed... He
20
then .proposed .to introduce a resolution to that.Offeet #...
On 29 January, Representative,Fish, charging that the Platt
Amendment was “only a scrap of paper,** introduced a concurrent
resolution (H. Con# Res* 28) requesting the President to
take whatever steps were necessary for the revision or,
repeal of the platt Amendment or that part of ittdealing
with intervention (Article ill)*

The resolution was sent
21

to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. *
Meanwhile Senator King introduced a resolution in the
Senate on 22 January (s* Res* ISO) calling upon the senate
Foreign Relations Committee to examine the circumstances
surrounding the adoption of the Platt Amendment to determine,
**. . . whether conditions now existing justify the repeal of
such Amendment and the complete relinquishment to the people

2O0.S., Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd $ess*,
1934, LXXVIII, Part 1, 892-93*
2iU.S., Congressional Record, 73rd Cong*, 2nd Sees*,
1934, LXXVXII, Part 2, 1539? H*Y* Times, January 30, 1934,
p # 5•

off * * Cuba of the government and control of such island. .

• .”22
the, next day, The Hew York kilties reported,, that the..,
administration. would seek the. advice of the Senate Foreign
23
delations Committee on repealing the Platt Amendment.
One particular problem was whether or not negotiations, with
Spain had to precede negotiations with Cuba on the treaty
because of the obligations undertaken by the United States
with Spain in the treaty of Paris,

it was,the opinion of

the State department, however, that this would probably not
be necessary since the obligations were expressly, Mlimited
«■*»

<mm

ry

m

to the time of its /CUba*s/ occupancy.”*
Although specific information is lacking, the Congress-*
ional committees apparently did not fully investigate the
matter of the Platt Amendment*

Within indexes of government

documents, there is no indication that either the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee or the House Foreign Affairs
Committee ever published a report on their proceedings on

22tf.s., Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sees., 1934,
LXXVI11,'Part 1, 1052.

23*»Koosevelt decides to Recognise Cuba," N.Y. ffimea,
January 23, 1934, p. 1 .
Times. January 24, 1934, p. 1.

the Piatt Amendment during.the. period,from January to May.
Russell Fitzgibbon explains this by saying that Congress
dropped the.,,matter when..,it was .understood the Department
ofState .was undertaking an investigation toward the same

.. 25 •. .- !

goal*

‘

-

” ■■.

O n .X.February,. in accepting the credentials of Dr.
Manuel Marquez sterling as Cuban Ambassador to the United

States, president Roosevelt invited the Cubans to open
negotiations with the United States for revising the treaty
relations between the two nations.

In his,remarks* the

President asked for*’ ". . . modification, of the permanent
treaty between the united States and Cuba and for revision
of the commercial convention between the two countries.“2&
.•'
*

p

r-

■

r v ’ ..

4

tPhe Mat ion wholeheartedly approved of the President*©
statement.

27 immediately after the President’s announcement*

the Department of state' (secretary Hull and Assistant Secretary
Sumner Welles) began preparing the new treaty.

28

2^Pitzgibbon# Cuba and the United States# p. 200.
26N.Y. Times, February 1, 1934* p. 8 .
27l?he Hat lop. (February 14* 1934)*
28Hull* Memoirs, 1, 343. Sumner Welles was appointed to
the position of Assistant secretary of state on January 10* 1934.

1X8

The prospect of a new treaty toeing quickly concluded
was indicated toy' Assistant1Secretary of'State Sumner Welles.
In Washington* in an address to the Young Democratic Clubs of
.America oh 29 March#' the Assistant Secretary'criticized
the promotion of big business by the Hoover administration
and the Hawley-Smoat Tariff.

He also criticized the Grau

regime and attempted to justify the failure of the United
States to recognize'it. ■Welles then "proceeded'to promise
immediate revision of the tariff preferential on Cuban
sugar and the elimination of the Platt Amendment as aids
to rapid Cuban recovery.
While Washington proceeded to negotiate a new treaty
with Cuba and to help Cuba’s sagging economy by a new
commercial agreement* Americans were becoming vocal in their
praise of the new Cuban government.

Although Mendieta had

been in power, only ten days* Eussell B»‘''Porter was able to
write* in The New York Times, a strong article supporting
Mendieta.

Porter found Mendieta to be a godsend because

he was friendly to the United States# would take a strong
stand against communism, would probably not expropriate
land-»~at least not without just compensation# and because

2^H.Y. Times. March 30, 1934# p. 16
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he expressed a desire for partnership with American
capitaI*3®

■

Meanwhile, president.Mendieta announced elections.
for the Constituent Assembly would be held no later than.
31 December, 1934, full civil rights were guaranteed, and
a constitution would be drafted'within forty days.?*

By .

1 February, however, it was apparent that Mendieta1s control
was not as firm as the United states had "hoped" it was*
Tobacco and railway workers were on strike and there' were
numerous threatened strikes among the sugar workers* 32
In the face of widespread labor difficulties, the
Mendieta government was quick to take a firm stand*

On 3

February# Mendieta declared virtual war against the "small"
radical element which was fomenting the difficulty.3^ it
seems as though most of the trouble was caused by a return
of companies to private ownership after they had been statecontrolled during Grau's tenure *34

By mid-February, however,

50Russell B* Porter# "Cuba, With a Hew President# Renews
Her Hope for Peace," H.Y. Times, January 28, 1934, v i i i , 2*
^*n .Y. Times* January 30, 1934, p. 5*
32H.Y. Times, February 1, 1934, p. 8 *
33K.Y. Times■ February 4, 1934, p. 21

^Articles appeared almost daily in,
1 to 15, 1934.

n .y

. Times. February

_
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the labor situation.had quieted considerably and most workers
had returned, to ..their jobs#
„

35

,;

.During the first week in March,, the labor, situation

again became serious.. fills, was especially true in the
provinces.of priente, Camaguey, and Santa Clara and
36
specifically among the sugar workers.
When the proportions
of the discontent grew, the government made preparations to
tighten military control throughout the Island.
order were rapidly fading. 37
4

Peace and

On 6 March, Mendieta announced
'

that constitutional guarantees would be suspended and heavy
penalties imposed.upon strikers. 38

As strikes continued,

Mendieta reiterated his claim that the agitation was thoroughly
Communist Inspired. 38

35See N.Y. Times. February 1-15, 1934.
36N.Y. Times, March 2, 1934, p. 37.

N.Y. Times, March 6, 1934, p. 8.
'n .y . Times, March 7, 1934, p., 4.
39Americans in Cuba were also blaming the disturbances on
Communists. On March 11 „ 1934, the following article appeared in
the N.Y. tiroes, p. 27s
"John T. Danaher, general manager of Dollar bine Interests
in Cuba, arrived from Havana yesterday on the liner President
Pierce. He said he did not believe the country could solve its
labor troubles until the communistic element among the workers
was eliminated.

121
By mid-March, most workers 'had again returned to work
and the labor situation seemed somewhat under control,

Cuba's

internal problems were far from over,, however, for during April
stories appeared which claimed dissension within the Cuban
government.

40

By the middle of the month, Cuba had declared
41
a moratorium on foreign debts for an indefinite period.
$h@ tense situation began-to ease by the end of April

and into the first days of May*

Strikes, bombings, and *

terrorism in the streets of Havana continued as protests of
one kind or another against the government.

But for the most

part, the disturbances were occurring with less frequency and
with less popular support. 42

John Barrett, former Birector

General of the Fan, American Onion, theorized that the minor
terrorism of April and May was a part of a plot by anti^United.

Mr* Banaher said the one man capable of handling the
labor situation in Cuba would be Colonel Fulgencio Batista, now
in command of Cuba's armed forces. Colonel Batista is a strong,
intelligent, fearless man and would bring peace to Cuba if he
had wide powers to police the island, he declared."
V, Times'.■April 6, 1934, p. 16.
4^H*Y. ffimes, April 11, 1934, p. 17. Most bankers in the
United States were not concerned since the Cubans had promised
to continue interest payments* Sees "Bankers Hot Uneasy on
Cuba Moratorium," H.Y, Times, April 12, 1934.
Almost daily reports appeared in N.Y. Times, April 15
to May 15, 1934.

.........

....

grates groups, to bring about intervention

.

by
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the united grates

and with.it, increased resentment toward America throughout
the southern Hemisphere*^3.
Even if Barrett's analysis of- the domestic difficulty
in Cuba is correct, the terrorists were too late- to force
intervention by Washington under the terms of the Platt
Amendment*

On 29 May, the administration went about as far

as it could to end criticism of American "imperialism."
fhat day, .secretary of State Cordell Hull transmitted the
text of a new Cuban treaty to the President and recommended
its transmittal to the senate for ratification.

44

the treaty

had been signed that morning by Hull and Sumner Welles for
the United States and Ambassador M. Marques sterling for the
Republic of Cuba.

45

Until then, negotiations had proceeded

secretly with government officials speaking only of
"negotiating with Cuba."46

43M.Y. Times. May 29, 1934, p. 10.
44H.Y. Times. May 30, 1934, p. 11.
45

O.S., Congressional Record. 73r<3 Cong., 2nd Sess.,
1934, LXXVXXX, Part 9, 9839-40.

46H.Y. Times. May 30, 1934, p. 11.

..... Th©..two principal articles, of .the treaty were, section I
abrogating the treaty of Relations of 22 May 1903 and
section ill permitting the united states'to retain-the
Guantanamo naval base.

47

In his message accompanying the

treaty to the Senate (Executive Q), the President saids
In this new. treaty with Cuba, the contractual
right to intervene in Cuba which had been granted to
the.United States in the earlier treaty of 1903 is
abolished, and those further rights, likewise granted
to the U.S., in the same instrument# involving
participation in the determination of such domestic
policies of the Republic of Cuba as.those' relating,
to finance and to sanitation, are omitted.
By the consummation of this treaty, this
government will make it clear that it not only
opposes the policy of armed intervention but that
it renounces those rights of intervention and inter*
ference in Cuba which have been bestowed upon it by
treaty.48
'After presentation of the message to the Senate, the
treaty was referred, on the same day, to the senate Committee
on Foreign Relations.^9

The following morning, the Committee

47U.S., CongressionalRecord, 73rd Cong., 2nd Seas.,
1934, bXXVXIX,.Part 9, 9840. See Appendix II for a complete
text'of the new treaty.
48
■ U.S *, Congressional Record# 73rd■Cong•, 2nd Sess;,
1934, &XXVXXX* Part 9# 9839* Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Reguest
for Approval of a Mew Treaty With Cuba, May 29, 1934, in F. D.
■The. Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin Delano ..Roosevelt,
Vol. Ills ’ The Advance of Recovery and Reform (New York.*
Random House, 1938}, pp. 270-71.

took pp. the business of the.,treaty*...jFhere- is no readily
50
available report, of that Coi^iitee .meeting* :.... ..it is .
possible,.however, to speculate upon the. session*

The

Hew York Times, on 30 May, reported the views of the leading
members of the''Foreign Relations' Committee* ' Chairman Key
Pittman of'Nevada called the., treaty the, "most remarkable
pronouncement*1 in relations between the United States and.
Iiatin America since the Monroe Doctrine*

Be further de

clared he .was strongly in favor o f ■the■treaty and was sure
it would be ratified*

Senator Borah, the ranking Republican

on the Committee, also favored the treaty*

51

In fact.

Senator Borah had jmade a speech during January in which he
had strongly "recommended the Abrogation of the. treaty because
the United States needed an earnest foreign policy which
would exhibit* %

• . honest friendship with all nations
V

'1

»

.- -4,

which would■respect the rights'and' sovereignties of other
52
nations without distinction of great and small*14

50
■better -from Buford Rowland* Chief, l*egislatfve Branch/
Office of Civil Archives of the United States to author*
'Washington, September 29, 1965*
S1N.Y. Times. May 30, 3.934, p. 11.
^N.Y. T im e s . January 9 , 1 9 3 4 , p . I f
(February* 1934), p. 46*

Review o f Reviews
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Although senator Johnson was undecided on the evening
of 29 May, senator vandenberg said he was wholeheartedly
in favor of the treaty*- <-He'called the-Platt Amendment
”a nature fake, a paradox#

As long as it' remains "in'the

Cuban Constitution,
we
cannot
escape /the economic
i.
.
, _ . . •.
i

responsibility paralleling a political responsibility*”^3
•i

i

'.

•

’ .

•

■ :

' , '

Senator Vandenberg*s opinion* as an expression of isolationist
thought, represents, as well the. sentiments of Senator Borah*
Because of domestic difficulties, they -viewed as imperative
the elimination of foreign responsibilities*
She treaty was reported favorably and unanimously out
■‘

■

’

■

!

j

of committee on the same day it wasfirst taken up*

$hat

afternoon (30 May), Senator Pittman presented thetreaty to
54
the Senate*
the fact that the Committee considered the
treaty for such a short period of time indicate© the
-probability of little or no disagreement among the members*
Although the treaty had been reported for immediate
action on 30 May, Senator Pittman withdrew his reguest for
consideration when Senator Huey Long demanded time to discuss
Latin American, affairs*

Long did. not object to the treaty
■ *:

*

53N.Y. Times. May 30, 1934, p* 11,
54
U.S., Congressional Record* 73rd Cong*, 2nd $ess*, 1934,
LXXVIII, Part 9, 9925.

../ _

_
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but wished to, take the opportunity, to accuse Rockefeller
interests of financing Bolivia in the Chaco conflict and of
attempting to force Cuba to recognize Chase National Bank
loans.*55
'
On 31 May, Senator Bong had no further remarks to make
on Batin American affairs*
treaty to a vote#

Senator Pittman then brought the

Senator Marvel M* Bogan of Kentucky, who

was in the Chair, put the question and declared the treaty
ratified/.before the Senators on the Republican side of the
chamber realized what had happened.

56

senator Simeon D. .

Fess of Ohio took the floor to say that had he realized the
treaty was being acted upon he would have spoken against it *
Oregon Senator Charles B* McNary then moved reconsideration
so that Mr. Fess could address the Senate. Mr. Fess wondered
about the advisability of the treaty given the "volatility
of the Cuban mind*"

Aside from this remark. Senator Fess made
""

57

no further objection and the treaty remained ratified. ^

^SN«Y. Times, May 31, 1934, p. 16.
56U.S., Congress iona1 Record *. 73rd Cong•, 2nd Sess*,
1934, BXXVIIX, Part 9, 10116? N.Y* Times, June 1, 1934, p. 4.
57

U.S., Congressional Record.•73rd■Cong., -2nd Sess.,
1934, LXXVIII, part 9, 10116.

The speed with which the treaty was ratified was
indicated by Dr. Marquez sterling, Cuban Ambassador, who
was witnessing the proceeding© from the gallery,

when the

treaty had been ratified. Dr. Sterling got* up, tapped a
reporter on the shoulder* and asked him what had happened.
When told that the treaty had been ratified, Dr. Sterling
•58
gaped incredulously.

'

it was by the above process that in two days the United
States senate ratified the new treaty of relations with Cuba
and the Platt Amendment was abrogated without a recorded
vote.

Cuba ratified the treaty on 4 June and on 9 June,

ratifications were exchanged at Washington.

In less than

two weeks a goal for which most Cubans had been striving for
a generation was reached.^
Latin American reaction to the new treaty was immediate
and enthusiastic.

By 7 June, Mexico, Chile, Argentina,

Panama, and Venezuela had voiced their approval. The
Panamanian newspaper, Batre.1la. de .panama,- said that the
United States had finally supported words with action and had
thereby given Latin America a basis for confidence in the
• 50'
“An Amendment1© End#"
59Hull, Memoirs. I, 343.

Time (June 11, 1934), p. 14.
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United States,60

in. Chile, the government newspaper, La Naci6n,

anC'another, Bl. Mercuric, ..voiced the-sentiment that, the-new
treaty- .pointed to, a period- of more cordial, relations between
61
the United States and Latin America.
On 4 -June, the
argentine government expressed pleasure at the action when
the Ambassador of that country called on Secretary of State
■fig
Hull,
Three days later, the Mexican Ambassador, Or,
Fernando Gonzales ■
.Roa, .expressed similar sentiments to
Mr. H U H , 63
.American reaction was more'diverse*

Newsweek reported

that although there was general rejoicing both in America
and in Cuba, there were many who believed the continued
bombings showed.Cuba was not ready to go it alone,

These

critics were also mindful of the fact that the United States
64
had private investments on the island totalling $1,500,000,000.
On the other side was The Nation, which could only praise the
treaty.but. added that if did-* not go.far enough-since-the

Rn

h .y

. Times, m y 31, 1934, p. 16.

.

:

61
N.Y. Times. June 3, 1934, p. 28.
H.Y. Times. June 5, 1934, p. 1.
63
N.Y, Times, June 8, 1934,. p. 3. *

. !,

64 '
"Cuba* Nation Freed of Bonds Imposed by Platt Amendment,11
Newsweek (dune 9, 1934), p. II,
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United states should have abandoned the Guantanamo base
as well,66
A more interesting attitude was shown by columnist
Arthur Krock.

Writing in The New York Times, Krock generally

praised the treaty*

He said* however, that the united

States, without the Platt Amendment, had the right to inter*
vene in Cuba as it had done in Haiti, the Dominican Republic,
and Mexico, for the protection of American citizens and
property,, without a declaration of war*

Without the ‘Platt

Amendment, the United states could assert its interests in
a more tactful and less brutal way.

Columnist Krock concluded

his article by reporting that on Capitol Hill the attitude
was that the abrogation of the Platt Amendment was a good
way to soften our line toward Latin America without surrendering
66
an ounce of protection for the United states.
A new political relationship was not enough, however, to
bring Cuba up to what secretary of state Hull called# M. . *
the surface of normality.*10^

Economic assistance was needed

i

65The Mation (June 20, 1934). p. 689.
®®Arthur Krock, H.Y. Times. May 30, 1934, p. 16.
67j*Uli, Memoirs. I, p. 344.

as much, as a new president and a new/treaty,*

puring the.,

latter part, of February and. into March, Assistant secretary
of state Sumner Welles had been negotiating with, the /,
Secretary of.the Cuban Treasury, Joaquin Martinez.saenz,
to provide the impoverished island with economic assistance*6®
On 10 March, the negotiations culminated in the establish
ment of the Cuban Import-Export Bank to finance exports to
Cuba*

The organization was similar in structure and purpose *

to the Soviet Union Import-Export Bank which had been
established earlier and -was controlled by the same board of
d i r e c t o r s * T h e arrangement, however, was not an actual loan
but instead was a revolving credit fund under which the I-E
Bank would advance funds to Cuba for the purchase of silver
in the United States which would then be used for minting and
paying the past due expenses of the Cuban government such as
meeting the government payroll.70

Apparently, however, the

short-term credit was to be almost immediately paid for by
Cuba and the opinion was- being■expressed in Cuba that the
$10,000,000 in silver to go to the island would be far too

68N.Y. Times* March S, 1934, p. 6*
®%*Y. Times* March 10, 1934, p. 1.
70N.Y« Times * February 28, 1934, p* 29*

small to be. of any material assistance in meeting the
71

economic crisis.'4.
More important than providing short-term credit, however*
*.

■

^

x-

was the revitalisation of the Cuban economywhich depended in
a large part upon the
profitable
exportation of sugar. A
i
' ;.
r
' ’
1r
’
*

*

writer for the London Economist explained the importance of
sugar by saying it would be impossible to bring political
.stability, to Cuba, until order could be "brought out of the chaotic world sugar situation. 7.2 The economic relationship be**
tween the United states and Cuba went bach to the bilateral
reciprocity treaty of 1903.

Under this treaty, Cuban sugar

entered, the
united
States at a 20%1 preferential
tariff
re■
’
■■
duction, and, in return, -united States products received a
20% to 40% reduction in the Cuban tariff.^3 The 1903 tariff
gave Cuba a profitable market for sugar in the United States,

7*j.0. Phillips, “§10,000,000 Silver Ordered by Cuba,*
H.Y. Times« March 24, 1934, p. 6.
72hiterary Digest, (September 16, 1933}, p. 7.
7 3Power Yung-Chao Che, “A History of the Hull Trade
Program, 1934*1939,* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept,

of History, Columbia University, 1957), p#'!S7# MacGaffey
and Barnett, Twentieth Century Cuba,.p. 215# Phillip G*
Wright, The Cuban Situation and Our Treaty Relations
(Washington* 1931}, p* 26-30, cited In smith. The United
States and Cuba, p. 24.

to the dismay of domestic sugar,, growers,., and because the

.

.tariff, specified that.the.preferences should not be, general*
issed and...extended to other, countries through most*favored*
nation clauses, gave the United states a virtual monopoly
74

on the Cuban market *

After 192?, .however* bdth ‘the., united, states ’-and Cuba
■’became'mdre:profective in theif ;tariff, polioies* ;'Cuba, finding
If tiad1 inadequate markets for its.'increased sugar/production/
began to raise- tariffs in an effort to diversify the 'economya
*

•’

*'

,

•

Under the tariffs of 1927, 1930, 1931, and 1932, Cuba was
able especially in the production of foodstuffs to develop
domestic industries♦75

Although the preferential agreement

remained in effect, the .United .States, in 1930, enacted the
Hawley-Smoot tariff which fixed the duty on Cuban sugar at the
high rate of 2 cents per pound*

76

The high tariff policy- of the united States worked a .
particular hardship on Cuba,

the island was dependent for

?4Ibld.
?$MacGaffey and Barnett, Twentieth Century Cuba,, p.
215? Smith,, United states and Cuba, p. 48*52.
76Power Yung*Chao Chu, r,A History of the Hull Trade
Program,11 p. 16<b Smith, united States..and Cuba, p. '53*7,1.
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•95 per*' cent,of..her: national- income, upon:‘the, sale of -s u g a r 77
in the. world •market.,-.. < Finding .the; European market drying
up because of the economic nationalism rampant there,78 ,
she was forced to depend even>more heavily uponJbter ability- to sell .sugar.to .the- United States* for.;a .reasonable profit*?^
After 1930, however* Cuba encountered increasing difficulty
selling to- the United-States.

The insular possessions of

Hawaii,. Puerto Rico, the Virgin islands, and the. Philippines
rapidly Increased their share of the united States * sugar
market from an average of 23% in the years 1922-1926 to 48%
in 1932.

in the same period, Cuba‘s share dwindled pro*

port Ionately-* from 56% to 28%.

To some observers, the reason

for the economic distress which overtook Cuba after 1931

,

can be found in these figures coupled with increased pro
duction.

It was the economic distress, they would argue,

which culminated in political unrest and eventually revolution.

?^Welles, The Time for Decision,.(p. 193.
?®0o2er. Are We Good Neighbors?, p. 25.
1%elles. The Time for Dec ision, p. 193.

,

80Editorial, "Plans for S u g a r , H.V. Times, February
6, 1934, p. 23.

80

By 1934, the United states was anxious to change the
economic relationship which, was so unsatisfactory, to Cuba.
The stimulant, however, was not only., a humanitarian desire to
help the Cuban people and a political desire to strengthen
the Mendieta government.

The. tariff policy of .the United

States throughout the- 1920*& and particularly.after 1930
brought disaster to United states trade as well as to Latin
America.

The incentive to draw up a new commercial agreement

with Cuba did not come from American relations with Cuba alone.
It was a part of a more comphrehensive administration plan
to better trade relations throughout Latin America.

The

value of American imports from Latin America was a little
more than $1,000,000,000 in 1929 while exports to Latin America
were only slightly less,

in the year ending in June, 1933,

however, the value of imports from Latin America had fallen
to $212,000,000 and exports to $291,000,000.

In this short

period of time, total trade with Latin America had fallen to
one*fourth of what it had been.83* It was because of this

^Hull, Memoirs, I, 308$ .Department of Commerce,
Historical Statistics of the Unifed Statesi A supplement
to the Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington!
U.S.* Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 250*51, cited in
Dozer, Are We Good neighbors? p. 23.

.............

,
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astonishingIgss. .of trade during., the. depression., years that
Cordell Hull began correcting this situation.which was;-..... ,
unprofitable to both Latin America and the. United,.StatesHull had instructed Sumner-Welles .'to attempt the negotiation
of a new agreement with Cuba during April and May, 1933 •
When political events became chaotic, however, the attempt
was temporarily .abandoned, 'In December,. 1933, Hull ^secured
the adoption, at the Montevideo Conference, of a resolution
stating that the American-nations would promptly.''undertake,. .
*. . * to reduce high trade barriers through the negotiation
of comprehensive bilateral reciprocity- treaties based upon
mutua 1 concesaions *1,82
Early in February, President Mendieta asked Roosevelt
to resume negotiations for a new treaty when he wrote t ..
Our labor problems are most serious and increasing be*
cause of delay in starting the crop. As sugar is our
main industry we need a ■very substantial raw sugar
quota which % have anticipated to my people would
probably not be less than 2,000,000 long tons and a
reduction in the duty. These concessions obtained
quickly would give the mill owners incentive to
pay higher wages and start w o r k .3 2

82Dozer, Are We Good .neighbors?, p. 25.*
83011.6135/105* Telegram, The President of Cuba (Mendieta)
to President Roosevelt, Habana,.February 5, 1934, U.S., Foreign
Relations, 1934, V, 182.
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In his reply, president Roosevelt stated,his intention of
beginning work on a new agreement immediately.

The outcome,

*■

he hoped, would not raise prices for American consumers but
*
■

■would, instead/ 'benefit 'American ‘producers'as''Weil ■as:-theeconomy «

V**, ^

BooseveX* '
■announced

the resumption' of negotiations with Cuba to draft a'
commercial treaty and that M. * . favorable consideration
will be given to ah increase in the existing preferential
on Cuban sugars to the extent compatible with the joint
~

.

to

Congress, Roosevelt urged the addition of sugar beets and
sugar cane to basic commodities under the Agricultural
Adjustment Act and allocation of the American market for
•

'

*

'

. *.

,! '.

' . ' V'

’

sugar, through quotas, to the various domestic, Cuban, and
insular sources. 'Because of the quota system proposed, it
was believed that the preferential which -set the Cuban sugar
tariff at 2 cents per pound could be increased without damaging
domestic producers.

The extent to which the administration

was willing to go to benefit Cuba was hinted at, moreover, by

3^811.6135/105* Telegram, President Roosevelt to. the
President of Cuba (Mendieta), Washington, February 8, 1934,
U.S., goreion -Relations., .1934, V, 182 *'■
8%r.Y. Times, February 9, 1934, p. I.

secretary of Agriculture Henry. Wallace when he discussed the
possible, elimination of domestic sugar production under the
program announced by the President.88

<

The first'concrete, step..toward helping the.Cuban .sugar
♦

'•

*

>

1

• ? *.

economy was taken on 9 May 1934 when President Roosevelt, upon
recommendation of the Tariff commission, reduced the sugar
tariff by 25 per cent-'Under the "flexible' provision '* of. the
Hawley-Smoot Act which allowed the President to alter tariff
schedules*

87

Less than a month.later, the-united States

passed the Trade Agreements Act.

Negotiations then began

in the United States between Assistant Secretary of State
Sumner Welles and the Cuban Ambassador, Manuel sterling, and
in Cuba between American Ambassador, Jefferson Caffery and
Cuban Secretary of State, Cosme de la Torriente.88
The agreement with Cuba, signed on 24 August 1934 and
effective 3 September, continued to provide for the
relationship between the United States and Cuba,

special"

Under

86ibia.
8 7 U.S.

Tariff Commission, Chancres in Import Duties since

the Passage of the Tariff Act of 1930j p. 17 ■cited in ■Power
Yung-Chao Chu, HA History of the Hull Trade Program," p. 160?
Hull, Memoirs, t , p. 344.
88PQW3 *. Yung-Chao Chu, "A History of the Hull Trade

program," p. 156*57.

Section. 350(b). of the Trade Agreements Act, provision was .made
to continue the preferential agreements of 1903 which were not
to be extended to other countries.

After Cuba had cpnsented

to' a reduction in her tariff schedules, on several: important
articles, imported from, the united'States, the united 'States
granted preferences of 20, 40, and 50 per cent below the general
rates on 35 Cuban items amounting to over 90 per cent of CUba*s
exports to the United States.
was fixed at 20 per cent.

On sugar, the preferential rate

This reduced the tariff on Cuban

sugar-from 1.5 cents a pound to 0.9 of a cent, or approximately
one-half of the rate against the rest of the world, which was
1.875 cents.

This reduction was the most important feature

of the act.89
This concession to Cuba was offset, however, by the Jones*
Costigan Act of 9 May 1934 which brought sugar within the scope
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act and provided for an import
guota on Cuban sugar and for a processing tax on all sugar
consumed in the United States,

The quota of 1,902,000 short

tons, fixed by the secretary of Agriculture,88 was somewhat
less than the 2,000,000 long tons sought by the Cubans.93,

89Xbid.. p. 159-60.

90lbld., p. 160.

9 %.Y. Times. February 9, 1934, p. 13.
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When the A.A*A* was invalidated by the Supreme Court in 1936,
the Jones-costigan Act remained In force and the agreement
92
with Cuba was therefore, not■affected*■
%
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The effects of the commercial treaty were immediate and
f
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somewhat surprising*’ In the first four months after -the. .
treaty became effective/ exports from the United states to
Cuba increased 129 per cent over the same period in 1933*

The

increase of imports into- the JUnited States from. Cuba in these '
same months was even larger as Imports on a whole showed a gain
of 155 per cent and those items accorded major tariff concessions
increased by 165 per cent*
Cuba’s benefit, however*

The tariff was not entirely to
After the agreement was signed,

American investment interests flooded even more dollars into
the island*

Most of this investment, moreover, was controlled

by a few banking houses such as the National City Bank of New
York.

As Power Yung-Chao Chu states*
The American penetration brought some stability and
prosperity to Cuba, but it largely destroyed the
economic freedom of the Island. To be sure, the
new trade pact did much to halt the fail in Cuban*

92Power Yung-Chao Chu, MA History of the Hull Trade
Program,” p. 161.
93U.S* Department of Commerce, Press -Release,.(February
9, 1935) cited in# Power Yung*Chao Chu, 11A History of the Hull
Trade Program," p* 164? Hull, Memoirs, I, 344*

jmteriCI# trade and put needed..dollars in.,the^pockets
fCfaffe^,._.#^ft.pfssentS«..,.lwfrifcfeeiess^ it was the
.American interests there who received the lion's,
share of the benefits resulting from such an increase
#of exports to the united states*^
'the;'abi^atlom of the1^tia%t;.»eMiEe*if ,wss.f^b'enough#
mofewe^#:wUfc’wibii thef;il@peii<lihf_ fatiff ^a^fe^eut# to ;eure
‘all of the iilifof the tearl "&$' therAntillas*-;Putin#' dune#
labor disturbances continued as a 10 terrorism in the streets
of ftavagta* As a result#' Mendieta saw fit:to Increase
>
■88 ’
restrictions upon constitutions 1 guarantees *
hithough
this sort of trouble was to- continue well into 1935# the
Pooseuelt administration- took one further step■Oh 29 June
to help Mendieta * 'While 'the trade agreementwas being
collated# poosevelt placed a ban on' the exportation of arms
and munitions to Cuba except:for those 1ieensed by ;the'State
pepartment:on' the basis' of:reguests by

:Cuban Ambassador

*to;the united states#^

94lhia., p. 165*

’

'
Times# June' ’l#34r ‘
4MS>*'■Mll.|$pa,:'^Cuban ''
Chiefs Seek to Preserve -unity#w H»if»times# June 4# 1934# p* t*
^%37ylli/§4§# The secretary of State to President
’feeaeyelt, ffesbiagtbn# 'June' 29#' 1934# U.S.##- Foreign Relations *
V, 185*86* 837.113/540, The Secretary of State to the
Cuban Ambassador (Marques Sterling)# Washington# July 7#’1934,
Foreign Relationa# 1934# U# 187* Ifanklit* $> fteosevelfc,
PTO ciaiB ftatlon n o . 2089, dune 39, tf34,vin'i i a h k l M 'b e l a n o
aoose^eit# The Public .Papers-..and Addresses# 111, Sit#

Cfl&PliS* y

■The efforts of ;tbe itbilted states :to stabilise -the ■Cuban

economy and ,fOveanunenb did .not .reap immediate rewards,* ..Near
■the end of 1934 civil disorder .on ■the island was again
increasing*

This culminated in a .hearly~soeeeesful .attempt

at a general strike during torch# 1935.*

Moreover, Mendieta

resorted to the techniques of Machado by suspending
constitutional guarantees and the writ of habeas corpus*
Penalties- for those convicted of setting the cane fields
afire or commiting other acts of destruction, were fixed at
■ I
life Imprisonment or death.*'"
Whereas general elections had originally been set for
31 December 1934, they were postponed until torch.#:. 1935*
hater, ■they were postponed ■until.November*

During this

period, President. Mendieta announced that under no conditions
■would he leave his office until a successor had been duly

%it£f ibbon#- Cuba,and the .United States, p* 291*

elected Jjythe people *i fhe reluctance' of ..Heiidieta„.fcp"negotiate
’-with .opposition/partiesand;tp .restore the. fUJl,..i#fai, stefae
■of,the'political.. parties before'

,.193$,. caused .W W L to

:wonder'Whether -oar--not ftee 'elections.could ,tos•held; a t :ail*-

■

■ Although the United •States 'had teen- disturbed toy a

'‘Very ■Stoller situation during 1933 and 1934,. theevenfs of
191$. d M n o t create'apprehensionin the^iiiiited'Btotes#:: .fhe.
'United States had..gone about.
-$0 far as,,possible;
:Without;
.to*
tervening .during ■the 1933 *crisis*, :In addtoiou*.;the'Mendieta
government, which tended to he pro-United states and not .
unfriendly to American investment interests, was entirely
.,aatIa.fkctory to theOhiteb States.*. ,America was also' re-;
assured.toy the presence of the- strong, a m of 'j^igeneiei Batista
■and the. Cuban Army which were apparently supporting Carlos
..

,

. I

Mendieta,

;;

.Any attempt to- analyse .American foreign’policy ^toward
Cuba ,in,.the period of .the. first two years'of the Mew Deal
must’taice.into account not only .the specific
->
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also

some toread.oeneepts .of American fofelgh 'policy#-...William;
.l^Xeman.Williams*' in his tragedy, of American ’
.Mnlomaov, comm
ented upon three eenaibef&fiohs direct.lag united states"

States*;he. said»L^h§s^,|ieen -.motivated.
■

.

■

.

^taa^|gi^Lissi^aLsi*%.■

-

other,,:p©oples.*...

'Gompiimenting. this ls'.;the_desire of;/the..'Baited,Statea,.to .,..

'fhe-.^rtoolple:-of-seif^determimtion fear- ail ..people !af
'an- intethationmi5level*--fhe;Wited ''States-has-tried- to
help other -nations -establish: their own government upon the
ptl«o.iples:which >.that -nation ■believes ■are.
-■best for:its ■.own,■
welfare,*. <‘But underlying these ■policies is the 'persistent-"
idea that .no nation is ■really ■eapatole of good government ;er ■■
economiseprogress except by .proceeding'in the same way as
3

■the .lilted States^- Williams;quotes former.secretary.;of,,
state'Bean-O* Aoheson'as saying.-ef our .foreign aid program..,
,eWe are willing to help people who* believe- the- way: we dot-..;'
to continue to live tha way they want ..to. live."4

In *the toae&grouhd of American policy during the 1933-34
period there is a good'deal- of -the humanitarian impulse of .
toerioan'policy-*; -fhe Baited:states seems'to have been genuinely
oonoeimed for -the' ae«momie welfare nf.the-Cuban-■people' who -

'%illia«i; Appltoan Williams-* ■fffoe traeedv .of:American .-, ;
Biolomaoy, tilled* "rev* 'XMr Yorh't'
' Belta-'Boohs Bell ■
polishing Bo*>• iSSli#. p * 9* ;
-

4I M S -

p-

10-

th#' most difficult period/ in,fheif
history...JPhe./Baited states, alsoseeps to heve^been„.lefitto

mabely .interested.,.. In.. .the. establishment of a stable ,govern* ,
meat.which could bring an .end to the civil .disorder without
resorting to- the oppressive measures of the Machado regime*
■fhere also seems to have been, a'good -deal, of the.
third' aspect of American. foreign policy- involved in the
diplomacy of 1933-34.

Although tohassaclor Welles had long

been ■personally opposed to Intervention in toatin America,
both ■the actions- of Welles and later o-f Jefferson Oaffary
proceeded upon- the assumption that the United states ■knew
what was best for the people of Cuba* • the belief of-Welles
that. the 'United states had a contractual obligation under
the Piatt Amen^nent caused him to behave in such a way that
his actions, while trying to- avoid armed intervention*, .made
it appear to- many persons both in Cuba .and-the -Waited states
as though 'the united States was .intervening directly*. It.
also seems as though Welles-*# continual -refusal to recognise
the e m u San Martin government,

(it was apparently largely

upon the advice of Welles that recognition was not extended
to Grau) of which he did not -approve* delayed a settlement.
in Cuba and-perhaps prolonged the political and economic
distress.

Hither consciously or unconsciously, Welles was promoting
the establishment of a government Which was conservative and
v

t

favorable to the United States and to American investments
in Cuba.

This was perhaps to the detriment of the Cuban

people and therefore contrary to the humanitarian and self*
determination considerations of American policy.

The actions

of the Ambassador, however, cannot toe too severely condemned,
He genuinely attempted to forestall armed intervention when
past administrations would surely have landed troops,

inter

vention had been a common American procedure and Welles,
although his “intermeddling11 cannot be approved in terms
of promoting the self-determination of nations, did a
creditable job of avoiding it to the best of his ability while
still trying to protect legitimate American private and public
interests.

Historians may condemn the wooing of Batista

as the wrong choice.

At the time, however, it appeared to

Welles and Caffery, when weighing United States and Cuban
interests, to have been the only course of action.
While the intermeddling of 1933 was probably undertaken
for the vague and mixed purpose of humanitarian interest and
self interest, the outward actions of 1934 were undertaken
for more specific reasons.

There are several explanations, all

of them probably containing some truth, for the abrogation of

the -Platt'|Uftsndm®nf*.7.the'

;thf

iscffft ;■$#?tk■'J"

Sign fug,,'rMlthe .r^iprogal/trade., agreementwith theCubans* --7While

^ # r y 'tf*7,
:
<i^faii^|af!

ini &oame de la Worreints.believed ■the Platt

bash,' abrogated;in.,!e ^ e r *to ‘assure ■the ■Uniied ■statue ' th a t '* "
certain 'politicians would :no€''lio

intervention

'for;
.their own:ends Shd ■to eliminate 'any eoatrlbOtlon:of Che ■■■
.

.*

5

Platt imsendmenc to the political turmoil of 1933#- 'othmt’f'
'explanations’have;beeh advanced*-

;

■

; .- u :,.,

«.

If ■is-' possible that the Iiiiport^Export Sant ant the
abrogation'of the Matt amendment were simply'devices ‘to
*

lend prestige to a ■

■which Was ■
friendly:to.'the

United States and which the United States wanted to have feiaaih in power. -In addition# the United states wanted 1’'
S'g^erhmsnt which' was stable enough to conduct negotiations
for a ’new trade agreement.

While the trade agreement is 1

usually considered in'terms:;of its benefit to the Cuban people
economy# 'and stability'of:the ■government#'''the'ttaiced'atsiteswas also anxious'to conclude•the'agreement'In:order't o :benefit
her own trade program ‘daring'the- depths ■of ■the'depression.

........................

_.. .........

I

. . . /fhe.

of;jh#/''?M i f ;toen#»eiit#'.;in7p##iicdJaf#

m^-;alo#';h#ve been, am expression of.- the igso^s^variety of ■
*

?

.^pdohbefg#;7#M:', 7,
'

f

;;
werO' ali;'basloai.iy ’isolationist/ah€ ■i^hO:leheitsodiif''

supported the; new ;trsaty;
i7;

;fartl^ulhr»';

■wm pleasfd.. at-'.the..t#ospeois;'of .:;Sitvar■loams/ie ;OUba:which' /’
'^re/ptofit^blO' -hO-bis constituents W 7 Nevada*" while1these.'
mem were'Infei^ted 'in international trade and eemmereeamd
iieiilistlcaiiy ■sought, peaceful'' relations among the’family "
of nations* 'theyabterred anything''which'put the
'•States into:an ’"entangling alliance*M * Believing the Platt
taemdment- to have placed an obligation upon the’United•States #
ll'rt -consistent with;isblatiohisf philosophy to desire am" "
abrogation of -this international ’responsibility. -: '
Plmailyvthe metions7of the tinited states ‘toward Cuba
can b e 'oonsideired as a part of the overall poliey of the oood
■iieifhhorv : the;avoidance of'dlreof %»^'aofion#,;fhe"Oiteh'■loan#1-tlie abrogation of 'the;Plhtt:jmiendment#■■.and' the signing
of a trade-'tretty were'mil a' part of :-the-nisw:-toage 'the limited■
States was attesting to;create;throughout'bafta’Jlmeriem*^"'
fhase'inexpensive gestures, in ttam.were-, the cornerstone of

%ryee WOOd# fte i^hino of the Good Weiohhor Policy# "

th#\ G0oa Neig]#q3f polioy. . SJL sucqeesfttX in £nbaf_ the unitea..
et^ating afbibaaeS
.
—

..;,•::s#i|a,;|#fel.ii

.with:skeptieism*

/

hemisphere*'.. ‘

:tG .yiew,.■thp...pew P i M e y
.$he Onitea.statasrv'':%■was #||I|Vtwas frying

tapoyeiep m o m
^

Ortf to

4apwssien.
,in ;t

of ?fhe. support.

^

e

a

n

a

.asstire .ffseii'

toeriea in $$$$ of;possible conflicts

,.ih. the ipf.Sasfc ;ani

, .Sy,l8.f6 an#. 3J.37*. ^.heweyeir#

ft appears .as though the OooO I’reifhbor poiioy which haO had
4 fs;first reel, test iii C M

.<iar.ihg--Xt|l. ana, 1814 ,was being

wiasly ■ana ■enthus lastiea3.Xy acceptea.

.la. Cronefa.of -$*$m

aald the tftiitea States was nolgnger, ‘*hhe big brother, the
.tutor,,,:
a»a ,the.:oai?etaKer- of\.the;'pattiiiiu^y of aff .toei'iea# * . *■ *
the <^noept of. .the *9008 neighbor" wQUia be pat. to many
another, test throughout .the, Xtie*s,but the ...initial effects
of frtenaXiness, military nonintervention, ana cooperation with
the.

states as ,eiihibitea..by?fhe,Aitear0 tates auring the

..aiserier in Cuba won fear the. itetsayeXf aamiaAstrafioii a major
foreign policy victory in batin America.
immiM... 1.1 >i<«iiiii..j ii-|i.i«..Mi..«l ..I^I.NUWI i. ^ i ll,-ii>.i.wi.» M ..M ViU^»-^~lii i»rii.iii
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Treaty with Cuba■mribadylng the Platt Amendment
May 22, 19G3
ART. I. Til© Government of Cuba shall never enter into any
treaty or other compact with any foreign, power or power©
which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba,
nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign power or
power© to obtain by colonization or for military or' naval
purposes., or otherwise:, lodgement in or control over any
portion of said island*
ART* II* The Government of Cuba shall not assume or contractany public debt to pay the interest ’
upon Which* and to make
reasonable sinking-fund provision for fhe ultimate discharge
of which, the ordinary revenues of the Island of Cuba, after
defraying the. current expenses of the Government, shall be
inadequate.
ART. HI* The Government of Cuba consents that, the united
states may 'exercise the right to intervene for the preservation
of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate
for the protection of life, property, and individual■liberty,
and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba
imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United states, now to be
assumed and 'undertaken by the government of Cuba*
ART* IV* All Acts of the United states in Cuba during the
military occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, and

&•&* Congressional ..Record-, 56th- Cong* 2nd Sees*, 1901,
3GQCIV, Part 3, 2954# Malloy, 'edU* Treaties,, Convention©-v etc*
Vol.* I, p* 362 ff, reprinted in, Henry Steele Commager, Documents
of: American History, Vol.’ll (7th ed* rev. ? Dew yerkt AppletonCentury-crofta, 1963), 29*
149

im
mil -imMl rights sccjntred thereunder shall be maintained
■and protected *
&#&,. V. m e Government of Gtoawill execute, saS ai fair as
necessary extend, the plans already demised or O'fher plans
to ^.mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities
of the island, to. the end'that a 'recurrence of epidemics and
infections diseases may be prevented thereby assuring:pro
tection to 'the people'hhd commerce of CuhaV as well as to
the emme^cm of the southern portc of the United States and
the people reaidihf therein.''''*
vi* .She Isle Of fines;$hall he .omitted.from the
bonridaries ’of'Cuba*' sp#oified 'in' the ’
"eOnsflthtiOfi, 'the title
thereto ..being- left' to ‘fattoe adjustment!by treaty'. '
Aief* ittx*. fco’■enable _;thetbaited ■states ’to maintain ■the"
independence of'Cuba*'.and to protect 'the' people- thereof, *
as W l l as for Its :o^h'defense,"lthe fOTOrimient of Ghbif^
will sell 'or lease to the Ihiited States' lands necessary
for coalisif or navel stations at certain specified points
t o ‘he'afreed upon with' ‘the President of':the'..ihifed'"Sfafds*' . % .
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the- United states of America and the Republic of
Cuba,'being =animated by- the desire to -fortieth© relations
of friendship between the two countries and to modify, with*
this purpose, ihe-iralafions ^established between'^them" by the
l?feafy of aelatlbns ..signed at .Habana, ‘May '22> lfOJ> have
appointed, with ■this .intention, as .their ■
-Planipotentiaries i
the President of the United States of toerioa? Mr.
Cordell bull, .secretary of state-of the United States-of
America, .and ■$$&*■ Sumner Welles, Assistant Secretary of state
of the United.-states of ■America? and-;
•^

:..-fhe provisional ■
.president'' of fhe ■Rspublib of Cuba,1 - >.
Senor Or* Manuel Margues sterling, Ambassador Bxtraordinary

and Plenipotentiary Of the' Reiuditie'ef Cuba to the felted
states _of Amerleaf ' '
Who, after having communicated to each other' their
full powers which, were found to be in good and due .form,
have agreed upon the following articlest
ARf* I. ihe -treaty of Relations which was concluded between
the -two contracting parties on .May 22, 1903, shall cease to
be' in' force',- and, is 'abrogated, from the date on which the
present freafy goes into effect 4.'
Alt* H i Ml'the acts effected .in. OUba by the United states
of America during its. military occupation of the island., UP
to' May 20, 1902 , fhe date oh which'the Republic of Cuba was
establlshed.-' have been ratified, and held as valid? and ail
the rights legally acquired by virtue, -of those ac-ts shall be
maintained and protected*

%*.' b *, Conureaslooal.
.:ieoord,'■1trd ■Cong* >':2nd toss **’
If-34,

'Raft i,' 9040*" v ..

modification or abrogation, pjf the stipulations....of.,,the...agree-.,..,
mfef.. in .regard to. the..lease.to...the United states of America
.of,-lands -in:ieba *for coaling1and fimmt -stations- 'aifned ■■by -the
President of..the Republic-of Cuba on February 16, .1903, and
by the. President .of the United-States of .America on the 23rd
day of the seme- month, and year#' the- stipulations of *that ;agreement with, regard, to the. naval station ■of 'Guantanamo :*
shall continue In effect* --■
W e .*eei#lemehbary agreement in
regard to-, naval @r .coaling stotions ■signed'l>eiween:-the two
Govenmenfs., on duly 2# 1903, also shall continue in effect
in the sameform and on the same Gondltions -with respect
to.- the naval- .station' at' Guantanamo* •SO' long 'as 'the' United'
States1of -America •-shall -not -abandon ■the said.■naval •station;of
Guantanamo or the two' governments '-shall not agree-;be a'modi**
fieatien of its-present- limits, the- station shall continue
to/ have- the-.'territorial. area;that- it new has*;-with':
the-limits
that is 'has on the date of the -signature of the 'presenttreaty*- - \
&M* -IV* ■■if at-any time' in-the-Mature a situation, should
arise that appears to point to- an outbreak of contagious
disease in the territory of either of■fhe-oontraotinf parties,
either of the two Goveriments shall, -for' its -own protection,
and without -It# act' being .considered unfriendly, exercise
freely and at Its discretion1the- right to suspend communications
between those of Its -ports- that it may designate and all or
part of the territory -of the other party, and for the period
that it may consider to be advisable*
jy®* V* the ..present treaty -shall-be ratified bythe ;<"
oontraoting-partles in accordance with their respective;1
constitutional methods1 ■-and shall go Into offeat on the' date,
of the exchange of.their ratifications#; which shall take
place M the. city. of Washington as soon as- possible*
■ in w&ZWB wmmofri ■the-respective Plenipotentiaries have.
Signed the present treaty and hive affixed- their ^seals--hereto*
TOMB in duplicate*-' in "the English and Spanish ■languages,
at- Washington on the twenty^ninth day of May, one thousand -'
nine- hundred-end' thitfy^ioor*
,
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Documents
Clark,# U. Reuben. Memorandum ,<*& the Monroe Doctrine. Depart
ment of Efate Wbllcation No. 37. Washingtons U.S.
feverameut. printing;office# it30.
The text of the Clark Memorandum Is only a summary
’of the history of the Monroe Doctrine, fhe document
is more important because of the preface .In which
;Clark begins an official .retreat'from the Roosevelt
Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine of 1904,.
Gantenbein# -dames.W* The .fvolarion.,of Our hatin American
Policy..A Documentary Record. Mew yofk-t 'Colutnbia
University' press# its#*
fhis volume contains some relevant documents*
It is rich on the period of the Spanish-American
War hut somewhat weak on the 1930 *s.
Roosevelt# Elliott ted.). P. P. R».., Mis Personal letter^.
192.8*1945« Vols. X, II. New yorkt Duel!, Sloan
and Pearce#:1950*..
''-There aye few personal letters In either volume
which deal, directly .with Latin American affairs.
...There, are#, however*, a- few letters, written to. Sumner
.Welles. While he Was ■imbassador ■to Csba which- are
.valuable*.
»

1

;

*

f*
■

11

Roosevelt# Franklin Delano. The Public Paoersand Addresses
, o f .Franklin .Delano....Roosevelt.'.
' Wi* lit -fhe.'year of
. Crisis., ..1933-* Uol* Sit i:■, The Advance of Recovery and
i vols. New yorks Random Bouse# 1938.
Although the material contained In these volumes
is available elsewhere, this is perhaps the most
readily available and easy to use source on Roosevelt *s
statements* There :1s a good deal of .material on I*atin
America and on Culm in particular.
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■II;S*. eoivtresslonal Record* -28rd Cong** 2nd '.Sob #** 1914,*

voi * 7mmgm *-" parts •v®+ Although -the;Congressional Record.was also tiisS
for ■toe ■period from ■189$**1903* -I M i ■use;was ■limited
to ■the ■reedtog of ■a few.- important documents.. Volume:
bKXVIIf •for ■1934 has a great.deal' of materials for ■
the;immediate •period.of the ■abrogation ■of the ;Platt •
Amendment#.from January anti! may 29# however, there *
was■very little•said to/Congress.m relation.to■Cuba*.
11*#*. department of State*

-loreiet* Halations of the totted

StateaM of plematie' .Patera*. 1932* 1■S; vole* • vet. IV*
The M m w i m m ^publics.*. feshtoftoni. 0*8# Sovernment
printing 'Offtoe# 1992#
:;
This volume contains the diplomatic papers
dealing with toe Seventh Pan-American Conferenee at
.Montevideo*'
'
V.S*

department of Stated' 'jdteton'^iattenn.o f ..tjhe malted
Staftaafe. dtolomaticPaoers, 1933. S -vols * vei *V*
'toe .American ;leoubiio.s.*1’•Washingtons o*S*'-Covernmeiit
■printing Offlee# 1952*
‘■
' ''
' This volume'Ms th e major source of information on
toe diplomatic ■relationship'of toe1'United ■States :and
Cuba •to 1933;' 'Contains over '300 pages':of1documents
on CUba. ‘’
*'

0*8. 'department of ■State# 'foreign Relations of toe United
States.*.. diplomatic pacers * '1934. ■§ vols * *
r Vbl* ;V* ■
toe-. Jmierfcsn ....Republics* ' Washington*, V.S* eevernment
l^.totiUg 'Offtoo.#*' 1952#; ''
''
‘,
: This 'volume oontatos some information "through
■toe recognition of 'the'mendieta government. 'Alter'
m m time* !toe printed documents concentrate on"
.tod.ividuai ■tariff schedule agreements. There is also
a .copy of* the 1984 treaty with Cuba but no correspondence
■ on toe:period when'"toe tfeaty- :
wah being:negotiated* '■
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Reports
foreign/.Policy .Association:. "..Problems. of.....the *$ew Cubst.
Report of. the Cornmission on Cabaii Affairs* Hew ■ ., ..
iforh'i:.foreign--l^liey.Association# Inc*.#,'19|S*..
....
i;.’ ''TOe, _
0o«iaaloiii "beaded by 'Raymond ieslfe puell,
coventrated ^t# .efforts upon recono®V *.,social.# and,
land p r V V 1^*- It, doc#; -hPt dehl extensi^Iy with:- ..,
political problems*
international Commission of duristS;*^ ■-Cuba and...the./,Pale. of'M m * , Genova* International Commission of duristsf,,.,
IfM-9yf^ h e ;international Commission of Jurists is a
consnitatitO-* non^fove^menfal organisation with the
'thsited ’natioas Bconomie,and .Social Ceaactj/ ,- ■■-,
•
■,, :( fhe report* deals with the period since Ifif -bat
has several pages of valuable information cm the
^ origins of political parties in Cuba.
it i-..;
U*$*

Oepartitient of State# ..Report;,of '.the Delegates of ..the
United ^States of America to. the Sfxth internat ional
Conference '..of.American.states, Havana, Cuba , 1928*,
^shingtonf ■. U* s« ■Government.printing■Office>,If2.9*
the>sixth' Pan^JVmericsn Conference' is .not-.of...
direct interest for- this study. ■-it is signifleant,
however, because of the refusal of the United states
to accept /the principle of nonintervention in hafin
America*
:•.■■ .
\.

U.S.

o^artfitenf.of; .state. ■ Hsncrt. of .the Oeleqatea' of the
conference:of American.States. Montevideo, Uruguay,
beeember
.If33...-. conference’Series Ho.,19.
Bepartm^it pf State piiblicafion Ho. 666. Washingtons

U.S.. Government printing-Gfflce#.:.-1914#,:
;fb% -report.of th# Seventh.;.Pan-American: Gcmfarfhc#
is significant because of. the. acceptance by the United
states of the principle of nonintervention and- the
attempts of the delegates, Hull in particular# to
promote the Good neighbor -Policy- at -the conference*
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Newspapers
Ihi.new .York Times. -daitnaty, 1933 to August# 1934*
fhe
iroi^ JTteea is perhaps the heat source
of information.on the Cuban 'guestloh* Not only did
the paper print authoritative information as it came
from government sources in. the United States and from
its wire services.#, the paper maintained .its own
correspondent in Cuba*' In a few, instances# the paper
editorialised on. the Cuban situation and on the
Piatt Jmiendmenf* ittie overall, presentation of Cuban
news seems to have been largely unbiased#Books
Beals, carleton. fhe, crime, of ,
:CUba* . Philadelphia*
J*s* lippincott Company* 1933* ,
Beals's attitude is critical of the United
States for supporting the Machado regime and is
sympathetic to the rebels• Largely undocumented
and deals mostly with the period up to 1933#
BernIs, Samuel Blagg* fhe .Latin,American.
...Policy.o f .the
United:States* 'New York* Harcourt, Brace and
■ Company.# 1943#'
A good general survey of Latin American policy*
I t .is especially good on the general policy of non**
intervention. In places, however# It is obvious
that Semis, writing In 1943.# did .not have access
to all government sources.*
Sums# dames .Macoregor* Beosevelf* -ffhe M o n .and, the Box.
'.New York* Barcourt, Brace and. Company ,.1956*
. the few- statements about the Cood Neighbor
policy are interpretive-* Latin American affairs
have not been dealt, with extensively, however*
Chapman# Charles SU & History ..of the Cubap .Beotablici . A
Study.In:.Misnanlc;American Politics * New Yerkt
The Macmillan Company, 1927.
A. useful and standard work on the .early history
of fhe Cuban republic*.

Do&er, Donald Margaand* Are We Good Neighbors ?: Ifhree.
Decades of. later^Amerlcan Balationa, .193.0*1960.
Gainesville* University of Florida Press, 1959.
the majority of -this work deals with the
period after .1934*. .It is extremely useful,
however, for comments during the X933-34 period
and before- from Latin .American ■-sources * - ■
Fitsfibbon,-. Bussell H. .Ci&attand* the united states, 1900^
' -1935* New .Yorki Bussall & Bussell, inc., 1935.
.: This book -is excellent on the period before ■
1933#, Although ■it.is good, on the 1933-*34 period,
the author did- not have access to-government
documents which are now available*
Hull, Cordell*' the.Memoirs of Cordell..- Hull ■* 2 .vols*

New York* The Macmillan Company, 1948*
Information on the Cuban crisis is limited*
Hull was in London during the summer of 1933. and
in Montevideo during November and December, it.is
good, however, on Hull’s general attitudes- toward
Intervention and on the Good Neighbor policy* inhere
is no mention of the preparation of -the Cuban treaty
by the Department of State during the first months
of 1934*
lakes, Harold 1* fhe .secret Diary of Harold h. lakes♦
Voi* 11 -The-.first thousand .Days# I933«*I936. New
Yorki -simon and Schuster, 1953.
-. Although the- book deals.little with inter
national affairs,, it is valuable for- ■discussions
at cabinet meetings during September, 1933.,- during
the Cuban crisis-*
Israel, Fred b. Nevada* a Key Pittman * Lincoln* university
of Nebraska press., 1963'.'
The book relates valuable and interesting personal
information .about--Pittman, chairman of the senate Foreign
delations-Committee during-this period, 'the bibliography
l0f-helpful*- *■■

Mscfeffay, Wyatt, and Barnett, Clifford* Twentieth. Century
'.Cuba *....The. Background of..the.. Castro Revolution.
Garden City,'M*¥*rAnchor Books, pgubleday and Co.,
1965*' Originally''published as quba1by 'Human ’Relations
Area. Files,-Ind*'Press, .New Haven, Connecticut as
Vol. 'X in the survey.ei World Cultures aeries# '1962 *-.
'-The book Is' valuable background reading oil the
entire' twentieth century. It concentrates, however,
on'the period, since. World war It and relies heavily. _
upoh secondary 'sources*
Nevins, ’Mian,"and' Haeter^boiiis M-* .(ed* #-. ..The united States
1and ..fts glace in’World Affairs, ‘1918*1943* 'Boston*
0* c* Heath 'and' CO-*#''1945*;
The book does not deal directly with -Cuba and
■'very'little with Latin. America as a'whole*; There
is one chapter on hemispheric defense which Is some*
what, useful*. There'are also some good general state*
ments on foreign policy*
Pratt, dulius-W*" Cordell. 'Hull.,.,..19.3.3*IM4* .Vols# XII and
M i l of The .American ,.Seerefatleg, of'.State and..'Their
Diplomacy* Edited by Robert H, Ferrell '(-ed*"l and '"
Samuel. Flagg Bemis (advisory ed.). New York*
Cooper Square Publishers* ■inc.,.. 1964*
The chapter on the Good Neighbor' policy' follows
quite closely the material in''teideil Hull *s Memoirs*
There a.re, -however,'some Interesting interpretations
and added' information which-mate 'the source ,worth
■-consulting# '
*
Range, Willard*. Franklin..P.*..:Roosevelt *s '.world. Order * Athens:
:University of Georgia Press,' 1959*'
Tie book deals almost exclusively with European
-policy*. ’ There is" some limited information on Cube*
Robinson, Edgar Eugene* The.~Roosevelt Leadership* ‘193-3^45*
Philadelphia'and New yorkt '8* B*:Li®incotf Co.,
1955* 1
'
. ;
The book deals only -generally' with foreign policy*
It is of little or no 'use for any'
■in depth stu^Y
foreign affairs* '
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fellins*;'Alfred B* 'Boosevsit -and Howe* '■Hew York*, Alfred
A*' KhOpf,.. 1#62*' ,
! :;'Although there' is 'little on. .Batin America* ■it;:
is food on indicating Roosevelt*& thinking on the
Ceod'Heifbbcr policy and on intervention just before
ffnllieft for the Montevideo inference#' ! 7
Shepardson, Witney B. and scroggs, William 0* ,.theUnited
States -in ..Hbtld Affairsi .. An Account of'American''
: . - Foreign .Relations, 1914-1935*.’.
’ifewsIpr^t- jMblietied
for the Council on. Foreign Relations 'by Harper & Bros*,
- ,..
-. 7
7, ,:::: 7
; S # hoot contains^ one-brief chapter';oh .i^tin.
American affairs* '^fheWe' are a "few' pages of' summary
* ; .material,on,-Cuba*
.emith, Robert F* -fthe United States and Cuba t ,
..Business
. and-.Biolcmsaev, 1917-1960. ‘Hew Yorks Bookman Associates,
19m * ..
W e heat secondary source consulted'on.the
.period.*, fie information,is quite detailed.and well
documented although some, interpretations are. question
able*
.';'
;
Weli.ee* Sumner* W e 311ms. for. Decision* Hew York r, Harper
S Bros.v Publishers,. 1944*. W e chapters deal ihf ;with Batin America are
interesting -for making a -comparison with Welles1s
statements on Cuba made74**-.1939*. By 1944, .he ,was ,
much less jingoistic*"
tr . • •,

,.

Williams, William’Appieman*-- ffhe ffraaedvof .American
Mnlomaev.., and ed*. rev* ..Hew'York* Belta' Books
.Jfimlt, publishing C<%/, liei*
,An,excellent. source:\on .American•'diplomacy in .
the twentieth century* , there is also some specific
Information-on- Cuba which the author uses to support.
■his. critical contentions ’'about 'jywarlean diplomacy* ■
Wood, Bryce* .fhe.,Making, of. the good neighbor....Policy*. Hew
,Yorks Columbia iniversity Press,.; 1951*.
Wood#s work ,is an excellent source on the <3ood
•.neighbor policy* two chapters 'deal exclusively with
Cuba and are well documented*
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Wright, Phillip, G., The Cuban Situation and Our treaty
Relations* Washington,.B..C.* The Brookings.,
•institution, 1031* .... „ _ .
„
,
The hook is largely a„history of the Platt___
Amendment in which the author believes the Platt
Amendment was retained because of American business
interests in Cuba,
Articles and.Periodicals
Altunaga# Rafael Rodriquez. ."Cuba's Case for,the Repeal
of the Platt ■Amendments The;Views .of President..
Machado,** current History 1 xkvi, Mo, 6 Asepiimfoex,
• 1.9271.,. pp.* 925-27 * .
/
The author, an official of the Cuban government,
in the United States# presents Machado’s position*
which is’a cautious denunciation of fhe Platt
Amendment.
"An Amendment’s End#’1 Time* (dune 11# 1934), pp. 14-15*
This is a good popular article dealing with
the ratification of the new Cuban treaty in the
Senate *
Beals, Carieton. "American Diplomacy in Cuba, '* The Hat ion,
(January 17, 1934), Vol. CXjOCVXll, pp* 68-70.
The article is good on Cuban internal affairs
and highly critical of American policy.
“Cuba and the Mew Deal,1* The Mat ion, (January 31, 1934),
Vol. CXXXVIXl, pp. 116-117*
A good article presenting arguments for the
repeal of the Piatt Amendment*
Dulles, Foster Rhea, and aodinger, Gerald E. "The. AntiColonial policies of Franklin D* Roosevelt,** Political
Science Quarterly, bXX (March, 1955), 1-18*
A good article dealing particularly with the
evolution of Roosevelt’s thought up to 1934.
Guggenheim, Harry F* '*Amending the Platt Amendment, **
Foreign...Affairs, XXX, No. 3 (April, 1934), .448-457, .
A well-written article by a former Ambassador
to Cuba calling for the revision or abrogation of
the Platt Amendment*
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Sail, Helen. "The island liaact laoor, n Survey .Graphic.# JOCIV,
No# 2 (February, 1935), 74-77.
The article deals with social services in and
to Cuba and is of little use. fhe author believes that
land and concentration of' wealth are the biggest
problems of Cuba.
Herring, Hubert. "The jpownfall of Machado, “ Current History,
(October, 1933), pp. 14-24.
h good general article on the history of Cuba,
since 1898 and it© relationship to the United states*
Inman, Samuel Guy. "Which Way in Cuba?** .Christian- Century
(October 11, 1933).
The author, in this well-written article, is
highly critical of the "meddling** of the united states
and suggests a more rational approach to foreign policy.
“Machado*s rail and the Problem of intervention in Cuba,"
The literary Olcrest (August 19, 1933), p. 7.
Although popularly written^ the article deals
quite objectively with the problems inherent in an
interventionist policy,
Mitchell, Johnathan* “intra-Mationaltsra at Montevideo,"
The literary Olgast (December 2, 1933),' p. 5.
The article is a good discussion of what amounts
to an isolationist policy toward, tatin America*
nation, The, (June 20, 1934), Vol. CXXXIX, p. 689,
This very brief and untitled article praised: the
abrogation of the Platt Amendment.
"Our SteepensIbi11ty to Cuba," Review of.
.Reviews (February,
1934), pp. 45-46.
The article is an. editorial in support of the.
"abrogation of the Platt Amendment, it- argues that
the United states has not met its responsibility,
“Permanent Halations to Cuba," Review of Reviews- (November,
1933), p., 18. . . .
An editorial discussing Amerlean foreign policy
In Cuba and the prospects for future good relations.
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R o o s e v e lt, F r a n k lin D e la n o *
"O u r F o re ig n P o lic y *
A
D e m o c ra tic V ie w , ” . F o r e ig n a f f a i r s . ' V I, 8©« 4
( J u ly , 1 9 2 8 ), S 7 8 -S 8 6 .
"
'
' ;
A s ig n i f i c a n t 'a r t i c l e illu a t r a f e t n g R o o s e v e lt's
t h in k in g on in t e r v e n t io n b e fo r e h e be cam e. P r e s id e n t,
" r e s t in g ©b c in t e r v e n t io n ie&Aosr in . Cuba *
{S e p te m b e r 1 6 , 1 9 3 3 ), p .
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j^nnedf*' Thomas Crawford * "Charles 3u- Beard and;.American
foreign'unpublished th*p* dissertation,
©ei>artitteh^'>ef '-.Historf* .Stanford university, ii61»
Although some other sources indicate that Beard
.made seme critical’-statements." about- itoOsevelb's •foreign
policy1'to regard to Cuba,.Kennedy does not ..mention It#
:l^t0Ohi,,l#l^te’^rthhr*

“She implementation of the Monroe

■Doctrine.' :Unpublished Bh*B, *dissertation, ’Department
o'f 'itiafOfy* •Briheeioh llhlvetslty*.1042#.'

Mtheugh.this;is a-■good ■.§enerai ^dismission.of
-the-Monroe ©eetrine 4o the-' twentieth century* the
sources urs::-iargely 'secondar^’
.'* Xhere is some information
on the 'Seventh ^an^^^ridan Conference. 'hat’'nothing on
CUbaivaffairs- 'in the 1933^34' period. ■
Shapiros ‘Hairy Xiersh*.- • *fhe united'States 'an&:the Principle
of -l^solnte^l^nintei^ntion in hatin America with
'tartienlar 'inference' to/Mexico**''' tlnpahlished'-ph^D*
::dissertation*/ Department 'of 'Political Science,

'university ■
'of-•$^nns^ltania■,■,1949* 1
A'*good treatment- of '-the problem -os intervention
^ih^atlh irnierica *s^fticulariy _f'torn the- standpoint"of
international law* 'fhere" is’also;a good- deal of ■in-*
■•'foi^fion'-on. the'^M^ntevideo-COnfermice- of <1933v ;
Although -the dissertation--does' not deal 'directly with
Cuba*,:'the'':author1s .discussion:of;attitudes in „other
■hatin
countries isveiuable for ‘collateral
• -material.*.
*
' .:;
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